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Preface
In July 2018, 13 former members of Aum Shinrikyo were executed in 
Japan, including Asahara Shoko, the guru of the new religion whose 
crimes killed at least 29 people and injured 6500 more. Aum’s offenses 
were as heinous as any the country has seen. There was the premedi-
tated slaughter of attorney Sakamoto Tsutsumi, his wife Satoko, and 
their infant son Tatsuhiko in Yokohama in 1989. There was the sarin 
gas attack in Matsumoto in 1994, which targeted judges overseeing a 
lawsuit involving Aum, and which killed eight people and injured more 
than 500. And there was Japan’s crime of the century: a terrorist attack 
in which five coordinated releases of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway on 
March 20, 1995 killed 12 and injured more than 5500—and which (but 
for a bit of luck) could have killed many thousands.
No one was surprised when those Aum killers were condemned to 
death. In February 2004, I interviewed 30 of the people gathered on the 
sidewalks around the Tokyo District Court where Asahara was about to 
be sentenced to death. Everyone received the same question: “If Asahara 
is convicted, what sentence do you think is appropriate?” The ensuing 
conversations lasted six hours, with all but one respondent concluding 
that this serial killer deserved to die. The exception was an office lady 
who said she preferred a life sentence because “death would be too easy 
for him.”
Fourteen years after Asahara was condemned to death, few Japanese 
objected when he and 12 of his henchman were hanged. Soon after 
those executions, Murakami Haruki (a well-known Japanese novelist) 
published an essay in a national newspaper which built on his moving 
accounts of the subway gas attacks that had been published two decades 
earlier.1 In this essay, Murakami noted that “as a general argument, I 
adopt a stance of opposition toward the death penalty” but then said “I 
cannot publicly state, as far as this case is concerned, ‘I am opposed to 
the death penalty’,” because he had acquired “a painful awareness of the 
feelings of some bereaved families.”2
By arguing that he opposes capital punishment but not in this case, 
Murakami is articulating a sensibility—the death penalty is “unavoidable” 
(yamu o enai)—that is ubiquitous in Japan’s culture of capital punish-
ment. Prosecutors use this expression to explain their charge decisions, 
to justify their demands for a death sentence, and to persuade Ministers 
of Justice to sign death warrants. Victims and survivors use it to lobby for 
the ultimate punishment. Reporters and editors use it to forecast capi-
tal outcomes and to interpret death sentences. Judges and lay judges use 
it—often—to explain and justify the death sentences they impose. And 
Japan’s government uses it to ask citizens whether they support capital 
punishment (a typical survey question asks “Do you agree that the death 
penalty is unavoidable in some cases?”). The “unavoidable” expression 
simultaneously suggests that the death penalty “cannot be helped” and 
that the speaker is ambivalent about this purportedly “inescapable” out-
come. The reservations wrapped in the expression suggest that Japanese 
capital punishment continues to operate because agents of the state 
(prosecutors, judges, politicians) and citizen-onlookers represent them-
selves, to themselves and others, as cogs in a machine over which they 
have little control.
Sociologically speaking, the view that capital punishment is 
“unavoidable” is a fiction—but it is a fiction that performs important 
functions. Claims that capital punishment “cannot be helped” provide 
comfort and deniability, both to those who participate in state killing, 
and to those who support and acquiesce to it. In this way, the linguistic 
formula reflects “bad faith” of the kind lamented by philosophers and 
1Murakami’s books Andaguraundo (Kodansha, 1997) and Yakusoku Sareta Basho 
de (Bungei Shunjusha, 1998) were published in English as Underground: The Tokyo Gas 
Attack and the Japanese Psyche (Vintage, 2000).
2Murakami Haruki, “AUM Shinrikyo Cases Still Not Closed”, The Mainichi, July 29, 
2018, at https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180729/p2a/00m/0na/004000c.
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sociologists, for it “pretends something is necessary that in fact is volun-
tary.”3 The frequent use of this fiction also illustrates how Japan’s death 
penalty is kept “smothered under padded words,” which modern socie-
ties frequently do in order to discourage debate about the subject.4
Systems of capital punishment ask normal people to perform extraor-
dinary, prohibited acts—acts of bureaucratic, premeditated killing.5 To 
facilitate such acts, and to foster support for this form of state killing, 
Japan’s culture of capital punishment provides a handy linguistic mech-
anism of moral disengagement. By framing capital punishment as “inev-
itable and unavoidable” (yamu o enai), this fiction disavows personal 
responsibility while lubricating the machinery of death and legitimating 
executions. In this era of abolition, when it has become increasingly diffi-
cult to defend capital punishment, these are noteworthy functions.
Many Japanese observers believe the Aum executions are exemplary, 
because the death penalty was “properly” imposed and “properly” car-
ried out for murderous acts of breathtaking wickedness, and because 
the agony and anger of victims and survivors demanded that the ulti-
mate penalty be paid. In these respects, the Aum executions give us a 
glimpse of the death penalty at its most legitimate. But on closer inspec-
tion, these executions—the best-case scenario for Japanese capital pun-
ishment—are deeply problematic. To wit:
• The Aum executions foreclosed many avenues for learning the truth 
about how promising young scientists became hardened killers.
• The executions leave lasting questions about why Hayashi Ikuo—
the Aum executive who hoped to kill hundreds by releasing sarin 
gas on the Chiyoda subway line—escaped the ultimate punishment 
(he received a sentence of life imprisonment). Did his killings not 
qualify as the “worst of the worst”?
• The Aum executions failed to create “closure” for victims and sur-
vivors. For those whose bodies and souls have been brutalized, 
3Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (Anchor Books, 
1963), p. 143.
4Albert Camus, “Reflections on the Guillotine”, in Resistance, Rebellion, and Death 
(Vintage, 1960), p. 178.
5Craig Haney, Death by Design: Capital Punishment as a Social Psychological System 
(Oxford University Press, 2005), p. x.
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a renewed sense of meaning and connection will only come (if it 
comes at all) from outside the law—from attachments with other 
people.
• The executions, which took place 23 years after the last Aum 
offenses, hardly send a credible message of deterrence to potential 
offenders who (research shows) are far more sensitive to the cer-
tainty and speed of punishment than to its severity.
• The executions leave lingering doubt about important legal issues, 
including the mental health of Asahara, who drooled and defecated 
on himself for years preceding his hanging, and whose appeal was 
never heard by Japan’s Supreme Court.6
• The executions and the narrow focus on the individual responsibil-
ity of those who were hanged deflected attention from questions 
about the colossal failure of Japanese police to prevent the subway 
gas attack, despite an abundance of evidence that Aum was man-
ufacturing sarin gas (among other weapons of mass destruction), 
and that Aum had used it some nine months before the attacks in 
Tokyo.
• And in a sharp and unexplained break from the customary prac-
tice of shrouding Japanese executions with secrecy and silence, the 
Aum executions were covered in real time by Japan’s mass media, 
with reporters broadcasting from outside the gallows at the Tokyo 
Detention Center on the morning of July 6, and with television 
celebrities providing breathless hanging-by-hanging commentary 
for millions of viewers who tuned in on that day to sensationalistic 
stories about Japan’s most notorious offenders who-are-right-now-
while-you-are-watching-finally-being-kicked-off-the-planet (“and now 
a word from our sponsors”). That surreal media coverage maxi-
mized public enjoyment of death penalty discourse while minimiz-
ing public exposure to actual state killing, for no private citizens, no 
reporters, no victims, no survivors, and no family or friends of the 
condemned were allowed to attend any of the Aum executions.
6Japan has long been criticized for executing inmates with mental illness. See, for exam-
ple, Amnesty International, “Hanging by a Thread: Mental Health and the Death Penalty 
in Japan”, September 10, 2009, pp. 1–76; and The Lancet, “Execution of Prisoners with 
Mental Illnesses in Japan”, Vol. 374, No. 9693 (September 12, 2009), p. 852.
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In short, the seemingly exemplary execution of 13 Aum offenders 
in the summer of 2018 actually revealed much that is wrong with cap-
ital punishment in Japan.7 It also raised a question that has long been 
ignored. The novelist Murakami wrote that he was willing to allow capi-
tal punishment for individuals who have committed heinous crimes, and 
many of his readers surely had a “me too” reaction. But acquiescence to 
the death penalty for a select few offenders seems myopic and naïve, for 
to employ the penalty of death at all is to presuppose the existence of 
a system of capital punishment that has far-reaching consequences. The 
pivotal question about capital punishment is not whether Aum offend-
ers such as Asahara Shoko and Nakagawa Tomomasa deserve to die. The 
pivotal question is whether it is possible to construct a system of capital 
punishment that reaches only the rare right cases without also condemn-
ing the innocent or the undeserving.8 This book argues that the answer 
is no.
Honolulu, USA David T. Johnson
7On Aum’s crimes and their criminal justice consequences, see Mori Tatsuya, A3 
(Shueisha Intanashunaru, 2010), and Nempo Shikei Haishi 2018, Oumu Shikeishu kara 
Anata e (Impakuto, 2018). And on the problems with seemingly “exemplary executions” 
in the United States, see David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in 
an Age of Abolition (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 1–8.
8Scott Turow, Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing with the Death 
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Praise for The CulTure of CapiTal 
punishmenT in Japan
“This superb book, by an eminent scholar of criminal justice, provides 
many original insights about capital punishment in Japan. I welcome its 
publication, and I hope it moves Japan closer to abolition by informing 
readers in the rest of the world about the problems that afflict the death 
penalty in my country, and about the impossibility of administering capi-
tal punishment in a manner that is fair, just, and accurate.”
—Koichi Kikuta, Professor Emeritus, Meiji University
“There is a saying in the board game of Go that ‘on-lookers see more 
than players.’ In this insightful book, David Johnson analyzes Japanese 
capital punishment from a variety of external perspectives. He also identi-
fies obstacles to abolition, and he illuminates a path forward as well.”
—Sadato Goto, Attorney at Law, Osaka
“David Johnson brings two rare capacities to this masterful essay—a 
deep and sympathetic knowledge of the law and culture of the Japanese 
criminal process, and an expert’s understanding that civilizing state 
killing as a legal punishment is an impossibility in Japan or any other 
nation.”
—Franklin E. Zimring, Simon Professor of Law, University 
of California at Berkeley, USA
“This brilliant book sheds light on many mysteries concerning Japan’s 
machinery of death. It is the most interesting and provocative work on 
the subject. By combining empirical and sociological analysis, it shows 
how Japan’s death penalty is peculiar in its own way, and it reveals trou-
bling truths about Japanese criminal justice more generally.”
—Kana Sasakura, Professor of Law, Konan University
“Japan’s death penalty is shrouded in secrecy, because the Japanese gov-
ernment refuses to disclose many details about it. But this book lets the 
world know many disturbing realities. Its greatest achievement is that it 
reveals the reality of barbarous hangings in Japan—and of many other 
problems that plague Japanese capital punishment. Our NGO, ‘Forum 
90’, recommends that this book be read widely in the United States and 
around the world. We have been calling for the abolition of Japanese 
capital punishment since 1990, and we request support from the rest of 
the world in pursuing this objective.”
—Forum 90 for the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming 
at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (http://forum90.net)
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Abstract  Japan retains the death penalty for three main reasons: because 
it missed a major opportunity for abolition in the postwar Occupation, 
because of the long hegemony of the (conservative) Liberal Democratic 
Party, and because (like the United States and China) it has sufficient 
size, economic influence, and political clout to enable it to defy human 
rights norms. Capital punishment also persists in Japan because it performs 
welcome functions for politicians, prosecutors, media, and the public. 
Despite widespread belief to the contrary, capital punishment in Japan does 
not deter homicide better than long terms of imprisonment do.
Keywords  Karenina principle · Politics of retention · Abolition · 
Deterrence · Via negativa (negative path)
Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina (1878) begins by observing that “All 
happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own 
way.” On this view, for a marriage to be happy it must succeed in several 
ways, while failure in a single respect may mean a marriage is doomed. 
The “Karenina principle” has been applied in many fields, from business 
entrepreneurship and the domestication of animals to ecology and ethics. 
In some human activities, success requires avoiding many separate causes 
of failure.
CHAPTER 1
Why Does Japan Retain Capital 
Punishment?
© The Author(s) 2020 
D. T. Johnson, The Culture of Capital Punishment in Japan, 
Palgrave Advances in Criminology and Criminal Justice in Asia, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32086-7_1
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There is a parallel with respect to capital punishment, for “abolitionist 
nations all seem alike, but every death penalty nation is retentionist in its 
own way.”1 On this version of the Karenina principle, abolition can fail 
for many reasons. Much has been written about why the United States 
retains capital punishment—and about why abolition has failed in this 
Western democracy when it has succeeded in every other one.2 Some 
analysts emphasize the legacy of slavery and the role of “vigilante val-
ues,” especially in the American south, where capital punishment is most 
commonly used.3 Others stress the decentralized nature of American 
government, which makes it difficult to exercise national leadership on 
controversial questions of law and policy.4 Still others argue that death 
penalty decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court diverted the country from 
the path of human rights that was followed by the developed democ-
racies of Europe.5 From this perspective, America would be abolitionist 
today if the Supreme Court had not declared in Furman v. Georgia in 
1972 that capital punishment was unconstitutional because law failed to 
provide jurors with adequate guidance about how to exercise their sen-
tencing discretion in life-or-death cases. The Furman decision also held 
that if states revised their laws to give jurors better guidance, the new 
capital punishment regimes could be constitutional. In this way, Furman 
triggered legal reforms and the resurgence of capital punishment in many 
American states. Conversely, if the U.S. Supreme Court had not inter-
vened in this way, American capital punishment might have continued to 
wither away (there were no executions in the country from 1967 until 
Furman was reversed by the Supreme Court’s Gregg v. Georgia decision 
1 David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 22.
2 On explanations for America’s death penalty exceptionalism, see Moshik Temkin, “The 
Great Divergence: The Death Penalty in the United States and the Failure of Abolition 
in Transatlantic Perspective”, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series, 2015, pp. 1–65, at https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publica-
tions/great-divergence-death-penalty-united-states-and-failure-abolition-transatlantic.
3 Franklin E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment (Oxford 
University Press, 2003).
4 Andrew Hammel, Ending the Death Penalty: The European Experience in Global 
Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
5 Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death: The Supreme Court and 
Capital Punishment (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).
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in 1976). On this view, there is nothing inevitable about America’s con-
tinued commitment to capital punishment. Retention has been a contin-
gent outcome, and history could have turned out differently.6
This book focuses on how Japan is “retentionist in its own way.” It is 
based on my fieldwork in Japan over the past 30 years and on my read-
ing of many works by journalists, legal professionals, and scholars about 
the death penalty in Japan and other countries.7 My analysis of Japan’s 
culture of capital punishment reveals that this developed democracy han-
dles the gravest issue in criminal law in ways that are deeply problematic. 
The rest of this chapter explains why Japan retains capital punishment, 
and it debunks the belief that capital punishment in Japan deters homi-
cide better than long terms of imprisonment do. Chapter 2 then shows 
6 Evan J. Mandery, A Wild Justice: The Death and Resurrection of Capital Punishment in 
America (W. W. Norton, 2013).
7 There is a large literature on capital punishment in Japan in the Japanese language. 
Interested and able readers may find these works especially instructive: Kikuta Koichi, 
Shikei: Sono Kyoko to Fujori (Meiseki Shoten, 1999); Mori Tatsuya, Shikei: Hito wa Hito 
o Koroseru. Demo Hito wa, Hito o Sukuitai tomo Omou (Asahi Shimbunsha, 2008); Aoki 
Osamu, Koshukei (Kodansha, 2009); Horikawa Keiko, Shikei no Kijun: “Nagayama 
Saiban” ga Nokoshita Mono (Nihon Hyoronsha, 2009); Mori Honoo, Naze Nihonjin wa 
Sekai no Naka de Shikei o Ze to Suru no ka: Kawariyuku Shikei Kijun to Kokumin Kanjo 
(Gentosha, 2011); Yomiuri Shimbun Shakaibu, Shikei: Kyukyoku no Batsu no Shinjitsu 
(Chuo Koronshinsha, 2013); Sato Daisuke, Shikei ni Chokumen Suru Hitotachi: Nikusei 
kara Mita Jittai (Iwanami Shoten, 2016); and the Nempo Shikei Haishi (“Annual Report 
on the Abolition of Capital Punishment”) series, which is published by Impakuto Press in 
Tokyo. Forum 90 (Shikei Haishi Kokusai Joyaku no Hijun o Motomeru Forum 90), Japan’s 
largest abolitionist organization, publishes an informative newsletter (“Chikyu ga Kimeta 
Shikei Haishi”) and webpage (http://forum90.net/). Forum 90’s headquarters is in the 
Minato Godo Horitsu Jimusho law office of Yasuda Yoshihiro, in Tokyo. Yasuda, who 
worked as Asahara Shoko’s lead defense lawyer and who has been one of Japan’s aboli-
tionist leaders since the 1980s, has written a fascinating memoir about his own death 
penalty work and activism: Shikei Bengonin: “Ikiru” to Iu Kenri (Kodansha, 2008). For 
representations of capital punishment in Japanese popular culture that explore various val-
ues and positions, see the manga series Mori no Asagoe (written by Gouda Mamora and 
published by Futabasha, 2005–2010), and the manga-based “Mori no Asagoe” television 
series that was originally broadcast on TV Tokyo and that is now available on DVD (Asmik 
Ace Entertainment, 2011). For a pro-death penalty book by a prison inmate who is serving 
a life sentence for murder, see Mitatsu Yamato, Shikei Zettai Koteiron: Mukichoekishu no 
Shucho (Shinchosha, 2010). And for works about death sentencing standards and execution 
methods by a scholar who supports capital punishment, see Kansai University Professor 
Nagata Kenji’s website at https://penology.jimdo.com/.
4  D. T. JOHNSON
that Japan’s jurisprudence of capital punishment does not treat death as 
a “different” (tokubetsu) form of punishment requiring special proce-
dures and protections for criminal defendants. Chapter 3 explains how 
and why the Japanese state kills in secret. Chapter 4 examines a culture 
of denial in Japanese criminal justice that produces wrongful convictions 
but makes their discovery difficult. Together, Chapters 2–4 help explain 
why there has been little reform in Japanese capital punishment over the 
past several decades.8 When death is not deemed to be a different form 
of punishment, judges seldom find reason to worry about how the death 
penalty is administered, and legislators see little need to push for reform. 
When the state kills in secret, few people learn about the awful realities 
of execution, and fewer still perceive a need to change execution meth-
ods. And when the possibility of error in criminal justice decision-making 
is denied, complacency reigns supreme. After providing this account of 
stasis in Japanese capital punishment, Chapter 5 explores the prospects 
for change that could be stimulated by two new forms of citizen par-
ticipation in the criminal process: the lay judge reform, and the victim 
participation system. Both of these reforms are less than a decade old, so 
it will take more time to discern their full effects, but so far the evidence 
suggests they may be doing more to entrench capital punishment than 
to dismantle or downsize it. Chapter 6 concludes by analyzing the loose 
links between public opinion and political leadership in Japanese capital 
punishment. It argues that a “democratic” approach to death penalty 
policymaking requires more than majority rule. Humans are not good at 
predicting the future (and experts are little better than amateurs),9 but 
my own view is that in the long run there will be reforms which perma-
nently deprive the Japanese state of the authority to kill its own citizens. 
If this happens, a variety of benefits will likely follow, as the concluding 
pages of this book suggest.
8 David T. Johnson, “Retention and Reform in Japanese Capital Punishment”, 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Summer 2016), 
pp. 853–889; and David T. Johnson, Koritsu Suru Nihon no Shikei (Gendaijinbunsha, 
2012, translated by Tagusari Maiko).
9 Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? 
(Princeton University Press, 2005).
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the Puzzle of JaPanese retention
In worldwide perspective, the most striking death penalty trend is 
decline.10 As of 2019, more than two-thirds of the countries in the world 
have abolished the death penalty in law or practice, and the large major-
ity of executions take place in only a handful of countries—China, North 
Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. A few countries have been carrying 
out executions more frequently in recent years (including Iran, Pakistan, 
and Vietnam), and a few others have been sentencing more people to 
death (Egypt and Nigeria), but the overall trend toward abolition is 
clear. In the United States as well, nine states have abolished capital pun-
ishment since 2007, and death sentences and executions have fallen to 
their lowest levels in a quarter-century.11 In Texas, which has carried out 
more executions since 1976 than the next six most frequent executing 
states combined, executions have dropped dramatically, there have been 
fewer than 5 death sentences per year in recent years, and the size of the 
state’s death row has declined by more than 40 percent since 1999. In 
2017, just 3 counties out of more than 3000 in the nation accounted for 
more than 30 percent of America’s 39 death sentences. In the same year, 
Harris County (Houston), Texas, which long was known as the “capital 
of capital punishment,” imposed no death sentences and carried out no 
executions for the first time in 40 years.
In the context of all this death penalty decline, Japan’s retention of 
capital punishment is puzzling in several respects. For starters, Japan is, 
with the United States, one of only a few developed democracies that 
retain capital punishment and continue to carry out executions on a reg-
ular basis. Most other rich and democratic countries have abolished the 
death penalty in law (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and all the coun-
tries of Europe except the dictatorship of Belarus) or practice (South 
Korea last executed in 1997, and the last execution in Hong Kong 
occurred in 1966). But Japan does not have a decentralized democ-
racy of the kind that has made abolition difficult in the United States, 
10 David T. Johnson, “A Factful Perspective on Capital Punishment”, Journal of Human 
Rights Practice (2019, forthcoming).
11 Death penalty developments in America and the world are summarized at 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/.
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nor does it have a history of race relations like that which has shaped 
the death penalty in America. Conversely, Japan does have many of 
the structural characteristics that help explain the abolition of capital 
punishment in European countries such as Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom, including a centralized state, a uniform penal code, 
a multi-party parliamentary system which helps insulate elected repre-
sentatives from public opinion, and a civil law system with bureaucratic 
professionalization of the judiciary and the procuracy.12 Despite these 
significant similarities, Japan has not converged toward abolitionist 
Europe in death penalty policy or practice.
The puzzle of Japanese retention deepens when one considers the 
two political circumstances that precipitated abolition in Western 
Europe after World War II, for those circumstances can also be found 
in recent Japanese history. In Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, the 
fall of an authoritarian leader (Hitler, Mussolini, Salazar, and Franco) led 
to the abolition of the death penalty in 1944, 1949, 1976, and 1978, 
respectively. But after Japan’s authoritarian political system collapsed in 
1945, the death penalty did not disappear. Similarly, in Austria, Great 
Britain, and France, the election of a left-liberal government led to the 
abolition of capital punishment in 1950, 1965, and 1981, respectively.13 
But after the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took control of Japan’s 
central government in 2009, the death penalty was neither abolished nor 
significantly reformed.
Japanese retention also seems strange in light of two social facts 
connected to capital punishment in studies of the United States. First, 
Japan’s homicide rate is about one-tenth the homicide rate for the 
United States and is lower than the homicide rates in all the abolition-
ist countries of Europe. In transatlantic comparisons, America’s high 
murder rate is often invoked to explain why it retains capital punishment 
while European nations do not. On this explanation, the fear and out-
rage that murder inspires and that fuel public support for capital punish-
ment are far more prevalent in the United States, where homicide is more 
12 Andrew Hammel, Ending the Death Penalty: The European Experience in Global 
Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
13 Franklin E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment (Oxford 
University Press, 2003).
1 WHY DOES JAPAN RETAIN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?  7
common.14 Yet this logic cannot explain retention in Japan, a country 
that has long had one of the lowest homicide rates in the world.15
The other social fact concerns inequality. In Japan, socioeconomic 
inequality grew after the economic bubble burst in 1990, but Japan 
remains more equal than America, where racial and social disparities help 
explain several death penalty facts, including the retention of the insti-
tution, the number of capital sentences and executions, and their geo-
graphical distribution.16 Japan is like the United States and other death 
penalty nations in that the people most likely to be condemned to death 
and executed are poor and poorly connected, but inequality cannot 
explain the failure of abolition in this country.
the Politics of JaPanese retention
What, then, does explain the retention of capital punishment in Japan? 
The most persuasive explanations for the death penalty’s trajectory focus 
on state institutions and the political and cultural processes that bear on 
state action.17 The death penalty is always and everywhere an exercise of 
state power, and one must attend to the nature of the state and the con-
texts of state action in order to understand stability and change in any 
death penalty system. In the present case, a focus on the Japanese state 
produces three insights about the puzzle of retention in Japan.
First, Japan has the death penalty now partly because it missed a major 
opportunity for abolition in the postwar Occupation.18 As described 
above, the death penalty was abolished in several nations of Europe 
shortly after authoritarian regimes fell. Similar abolitions have occurred 
in Asia too: in Cambodia after the fall of the Khmer Rouge (1989), in 
the Philippines after Marcos was overthrown (1987), and in East Timor 
17 David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 127.
18 David T. Johnson, “Why Does Japan Retain the Death Penalty? Nine Hypotheses”, 
in Lill Scherdin, editor, Capital Punishment: A Hazard to a Sustainable Criminal Justice 
System? (Ashgate, 2014), p. 141.
14 Scott Turow, Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing with the Death 
Penalty (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 42.
15 Dag Leonardsen, Crime in Japan: Paradise Lost? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
16 Charles J. Ogletree and Austin Sarat, editors, From Lynch Mobs to the Killing State: 
Race and the Death Penalty in America (New York University Press, 2006).
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after it gained independence from Indonesia (1999). In these coun-
tries, abolition was a way of symbolically distancing new governments 
from the state killing performed by their predecessors. Japan experi-
enced regime change following its surrender in 1945, but the death 
penalty endured throughout the subsequent process of state transfor-
mation even though the reform agenda in the America-led occupation 
was highly ambitious. That agenda included land reform, gender equal-
ity, new rights for criminal suspects and defendants, and the downsizing 
of the emperor from god to a mere mortal. But capital punishment was 
not a reform priority. This distinguishes the occupation of Japan from 
the parallel occupation of Germany (which abolished the death penalty 
in 1949), and it also helps explain why Japan remains retentionist today. 
One key part of this retentionist story is the desire of American officials 
to condemn Japanese “war criminals” to death in the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial (seven persons were executed in 1948). When a country is defeated 
in war, the desire to exact revenge against leaders of the losing regime 
can cause capital punishment to become more durable than it otherwise 
would be. The hanging of Saddam Hussein in 2006 and the subsequent 
resurgence of executions in Iraq illustrates the continued relevance of 
this possibility.
Second, the persistence of capital punishment in Japan after the occu-
pation ended can be explained by the long and conservative hegemony of 
the Liberal Democratic Party and by the inability of other political parties 
to change death penalty policy and practice when they briefly controlled 
government.19 The LDP gained control of Japan’s central government in 
1955, three years after the Occupation ended. Over the following 60 years 
it maintained control for all but 50 months. The first interregnum lasted 
only 8 months (in 1993–1994), and the coalition government of seven 
parties was too brief and fractious to enable reform of capital punishment. 
The second interruption of LDP rule started in August 2009, when the 
Democratic Party of Japan gained control of central government and kept 
it until it lost power in the landslide election of December 2012. In this 
period, too, there was no move toward abolition or a moratorium on 
executions despite DPJ promises to proceed more cautiously with capital 
punishment than the LDP had done. In 2010, after signing two execution 
19 David T. Johnson, “Why Does Japan Retain the Death Penalty? Nine Hypotheses”, 
in Lill Scherdin, editor, Capital Punishment: A Hazard to a Sustainable Criminal Justice 
System? (Ashgate, 2014), p. 142.
1 WHY DOES JAPAN RETAIN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?  9
warrants and attending those executions, DPJ Minister of Justice Chiba 
Keiko opened the gallows in Tokyo to select members of the media and 
formed a death penalty study team in her Ministry, but the gallows were 
not in use when reporters visited, the research team produced no con-
crete proposals for action on capital punishment, and Chiba provided no 
clear explanation for her decision to order executions after having pub-
lically opposed capital punishment during the quarter-century or so that 
she served in the Diet before becoming Minister. I will return to this epi-
sode in Chapter 6, where I discuss the relationship between public opin-
ion and political leadership in death penalty policymaking. Two of Chiba’s 
seven successors as Minister of Justice under the DPJ (Ogawa Toshio and 
Taki Makoto) also authorized executions. In total, these three Ministers 
ordered 16 executions during the 40 months of DPJ rule. European expe-
rience suggests that abolition is more likely to occur under the leadership 
of a liberal party than a conservative one (see Austria, Great Britain, and 
France), and something similar can be said of the recent moratoria on exe-
cutions in South Korea and Taiwan.20 In the United States as well, aboli-
tion has seldom occurred in conservative states, though in 2015 Nebraska 
did become the first predominantly Republican state to abolish the death 
penalty in 40 years. In comparative perspective, the durability of Japan’s 
death penalty reflects not only the long-term hegemony of its ruling party 
but also the fact that the other parties that have held power were almost 
indistinguishable from the conservative LDP in their policy preferences 
and commitments. In short, conservative politics has contributed to the 
conservation of capital punishment in Japan.
The third aspect of my explanation of Japanese retention stresses 
the state’s geopolitical position, especially in the years after 1980, when 
Japan emerged as an economic power. Like the United States, China, 
and India, Japan has sufficient size, economic influence, and political 
clout to make it difficult for external forces such as international law, 
human rights norms, and United Nations resolutions to impose mean-
ingful sanctions for noncompliance.21 Powerful states seldom cede to 
supranational entities; they tend to endorse international norms that 
21 Sangmin Bae, When the State No Longer Kills: International Human Rights Norms and 
Abolition of Capital Punishment (State University of New York Press, 2007).
20 David T. Johnson and Franklin E. Zimring, The Next Frontier: National Development, 
Political Change, and the Death Penalty in Asia (Oxford University Press, 2009), see espe-
cially Chapter 5 (on South Korea) and Chapter 6 (on Taiwan).
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serve their own purposes and reject those that do not. There are many 
examples of this selectivity: the United States’ use of torture in the “war 
on terror,” China’s limits on freedom of expression, Japanese whal-
ing, caste-based discrimination in India, and the retention of capital 
punishment in all of these countries. In these large nations, it is more 
difficult for the “human rights dynamic”22 that has been driving aboli-
tion in many parts of the world to influence death penalty policy and 
practice than it is for the same dynamic to have an effect in Gabon, 
Latvia, Bolivia, Congo, Fiji, Madagascar, Suriname, Benin, Nauru, and 
Guinea, ten countries that have abolished capital punishment since 2010.
In many respects, Japan remains committed to a model of law and 
government that considers “self-sufficiency” a virtue and that resists and 
resents attempts at outside influence. Japan is also ruled (once again) by 
a Liberal Democratic Party, some of whose members believe that human 
rights are not universal. Of course, Japan does follow America’s lead in 
some matters of foreign policy. Indeed, Japan’s subordination in this 
sphere is sometimes so extreme that it has been called a “puppet state.” 
In this sense, Japan’s retention of capital punishment may depend on 
American retention, for when a superpower that sees itself as the arche-
typal liberal democracy continues to kill its own citizens, it provides 
cover and legitimacy for other nations that want to do the same. If the 
United States abolishes capital punishment, as some analysts predict,23 
Japan could continue to resist pressure to conform to the emerging 
norm of abolition, as it has done with respect to whaling ever since the 
International Whaling Commission’s moratorium on commercial whal-
ing went into effect in 1986. But in my view, a more likely response to 
American abolition would be for Japan to do what it has often done in 
its modern history: adapt to the changing circumstances of its external 
environment24—and abolish capital punishment. But of course, this possi-
bility is premised on the big “if” of American abolition. As of 2019, that 
has not happened, and Japanese leaders perceive little pressure to abolish, 
either from foreign actors and abolitionists or from their own domestic 
22 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, “Abolishing the Death Penalty Worldwide: The 
Impact of a ‘New Dynamic’”, Crime and Justice, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2009), pp. 1–63.
23 Charles J. Ogletree and Austin Sarat, editors, The Road to Abolition? The Future of 
Capital Punishment in the United States (New York University Press, 2009).
24 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (Public 
Affairs, 2007).
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constituencies. Unlike Europe, Asia has no regional organizations to 
nudge Japan toward abolition, as the European Union and the Council 
of Europe did to countries in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold 
War ended. In the geopolitics of capital punishment, Asia is not Europe, 
and Japan is not Latvia or Lithuania.
does the death Penalty deter homicide in JaPan?
Prosecutors, politicians, and the public frequently claim that the death 
penalty must be retained in Japan because it deters homicide.25 But does 
it really perform this function?
In the United States, a blue-ribbon panel of scholars reviewed dozens 
of peer-reviewed studies on this subject, and they concluded that there 
is no good evidence that the death penalty deters homicide.26 In Japan, 
a recent study focused on the period 1990–2010.27 The study has two 
main strengths. First, it employs monthly homicide statistics instead of 
annual figures, which enables us to discern the consequences of death 
sentences and executions over time. Without monthly homicide data 
(which Japan’s National Police Agency seldom releases), associations 
between fluctuations in homicide and capital punishment cannot be reli-
ably discerned. Without monthly homicide figures, the annual homicide 
total (one number per year) provides too few data points to satisfy the 
assumptions of statistical models. And without monthly homicide data, 
statistical models of the death penalty and deterrence can only generate 
crude annual estimates.
The second strength of the Japan study is that it employs sepa-
rate statistics for homicide and robbery-homicide, two kinds of kill-
ing that differ in crucial respects. In Japan, robbery-homicide 
is about 15 times less common than homicide. In Japan, robbery- 
homicide offenders are about 7 times less likely to know their victims. In 
Japan, robbery-homicide offenders are about 15 times more likely to be 
25 Petra Schmidt, Capital Punishment in Japan (Brill, 2002), pp. 102–113.
26 National Research Council Committee on Deterrence and the Death Penalty, Daniel S. 
Nagin and John V. Pepper, editors, Deterrence and the Death Penalty (National Academies 
Press, 2012).
27 Kanji Muramatsu, David T. Johnson, and Koiti Yano, “The Death Penalty and 
Homicide Deterrence in Japan”, Punishment & Society, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 2018), 
pp. 432–457.
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motivated by greed. And in Japan, persons convicted of robbery- homicide 
are about 15 times more likely to be sentenced to death than persons con-
victed of homicide. These differences in frequency, motivation, context, 
and the severity of punishment make robbery-homicide the best pos-
sible crime candidate for finding a deterrent effect from the death 
penalty. Yet even for this thin slice of heinous murder, there was no 
discernible deterrent effect from death sentences or executions—nor was 
there a deterrent effect on homicide more generally.
In short, the best available evidence suggests that death sentences and 
executions do not deter homicide or robbery-homicide in Japan. This 
double-negative is striking because Japanese criminal justice punishes 
robbery-homicide harshly, and because robbery-homicide is a crime of 
calculation. This finding is also consistent with findings about the death 
penalty and deterrence in other countries—including Singapore, which 
long was the world’s most aggressive executing state28—and with crime 
and capital punishment patterns in postwar Japan.29 Japan’s homicide 
rate has declined by more than 80 percent since the 1950s.30 Over the 
same period, Japan’s annual execution average dropped from 25 hang-
ings per year in the decade of the 1950s to less than 5 per year in the 
2000s—a decline of more than 80 percent during a period in which 
the country’s population grew more than 50 percent. Killers have been 
vanishing in Japan, especially young male killers, who currently commit 
(per capita) approximately one-tenth as many homicides as their youth-
ful counterparts did in the 1950s.31 In fact, at present Japan’s homicide 
rate is higher among men in their 50s than among men in their 20s—an 
age-crime distribution seldom seen in other societies. It may be possi-
ble to construct an explanation for Japan’s vanishing young killer that 
posits capital punishment as a signal to which young males are especially 
28 Franklin E. Zimring, Jeffrey Fagan, and David T. Johnson, “Executions, Deterrence, 
and Homicide: A Tale of Two Cities”, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 
(March 2010), pp. 1–29.
29 See David T. Johnson and Franklin E. Zimring, The Next Frontier: National 
Development, Political Change, and the Death Penalty in Asia (Oxford University Press, 
2009), especially Chapter 3 (on Japan).
30 David T. Johnson, “Comparative Reflections on American Crime Declines”, Berkeley 
Journal of Criminal Law, No. 23–3 (Fall 2018), pp. 25–45.
31 David T. Johnson, “The Homicide Drop in Postwar Japan”, Homicide Studies, 
Vol. 12, No. 1 (February 2008), pp. 146–160.
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sensitive, but such an explanation would seem to contradict the general 
criminological truth that criminal risk-taking tends to decline with age.
There are two more points to emphasize about the death penalty and 
deterrence. First, after publication of the article cited in footnote 27, 
Japanese officials cannot credibly claim there is empirical evidence to 
support the view that the death penalty deters homicide—though they 
might continue to contend that “common sense” leads to their pre-
ferred conclusion. Once upon a time, “common sense” also held that 
the earth is flat. Second, in abolitionist countries, evidence about deter-
rence has been largely irrelevant to the ultimate decision about whether 
to retire the executioner. Decisions to abolish are determined mainly by 
political developments and moral sentiments, not by utilitarian consider-
ations. Japan does not need the death penalty in order to prevent hom-
icide. The question its leaders and citizens need to confront is why they 
want a sanction that is unnecessary for public protection. Is it to reflect 
public opinion, which is ill-informed by the policies of secrecy and silence 
that surround capital punishment? Is it to serve victims, which makes 
application of the ultimate penalty depend on the intensity of survivors’ 
anger? Or does Japan retain the death penalty mainly to achieve retribu-
tion, which is often a form of vengeance-in-disguise? Calls for revenge  
form one of the least discussed but most powerful forces in Japan’s con-
tinued use of capital punishment. Should its political leaders indulge 
demands for vengeance, as they have increasingly done in recent years, or 
should they try to tame such impulses because they are dangerous and 
undemocratic? I will return to these questions in the final two chapters of 
this book.
conclusion
There is a triumphalist tone in much writing about capital punishment. 
Some of it is in response to the truly remarkable progress toward abo-
lition that has occurred in the world, and some of it is in anticipation of 
a future that is believed to hold the certainty of abolition everywhere. 
According to some prominent analysts, “great progress” has been made 
toward worldwide abolition of capital punishment,32 and “it seems 
32 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, “Progress Made for Worldwide Abolishment of 
Death Penalty”, International Affairs Forum: Capital Punishment Around the World, 
Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 2015), p. 8.
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nothing can stop continued progress towards universal abolition.”33 I 
would like to see abolition spread further, and I favor reforms that would 
restrict the scope and scale of capital punishment in Japan. I also believe 
that, eventually, Japan will abolish. But in death penalty scholarship there 
have been few serious studies of failures of abolition.34 This chapter has 
explained the failure of abolition in Japan, one of three major democra-
cies in the world that retain capital punishment (along with the United 
States and India). I have stressed the importance of state institutions and 
the political and cultural processes that bear on state action. I do not 
claim that Japan retains capital punishment because Japanese people sup-
port it, for as explained in Chapter 6, the experience of other countries 
shows that public opposition to capital punishment is not a necessary 
condition for abolition. When the leaders of a country decide to abolish 
the death penalty, they do so despite majority public support for the insti-
tution—and they do so to get on “the right side of history.”35
The case of Japan suggests that abolition might not be near in 
some societies. This insight is instructive in two ways. For 
one thing, there are contingencies and complexities in the future trajec-
tory of capital punishment. For the foreseeable future, all roads do not 
necessarily lead to abolition. For another, a focus on Japan’s failure of 
abolition may help death penalty opponents discern how to move toward 
reforms they favor by identifying obstacles to change. One challenge for 
Japanese abolitionists is how to make the language of “human rights” 
more relevant in a society where this framework is not as salient as in 
nations that have already abolished (as in Germany and South Africa) or 
moved toward abolition (as in South Korea and Taiwan). A second chal-
lenge is how to overcome the presumption among Japanese politicians 
that the public would not tolerate abolition. Research suggests that the 
33 William A. Schabas, “Universal Abolition of Capital Punishment Is Drawing Nearer”, 
International Affairs Forum: Capital Punishment Around the World, Vol. 6, No. 1 
(Summer 2015), p. 13.
34 For an exception, see Moshik Temkin, “The Great Divergence: The Death Penalty 
in the United States and the Failure of Abolition in Transatlantic Perspective”, Harvard 
University Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 
2015, pp. 1–65, at https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/great-divergence-death- 
penalty-united-states-and-failure-abolition-transatlantic.
35 Kevin M. Barry, “The Law of Abolition”, Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 
(Fall 2017), p. 556.
1 WHY DOES JAPAN RETAIN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?  15
Japanese public would accept abolition, and with little or no damage to 
legal legitimacy or political authority.36 The third challenge for Japan’s 
abolitionists is how to persuade politicians—especially those who are 
conservative—that Japan does not need the death penalty, for one lesson 
from developed democracies that have abolished the death penalty is that 
shifts in elite opinion are key. Public opinion on capital punishment is 
largely resistant to abolitionists’ attempts to change it, and the straightest 
road to abolition may involve “bypassing public opinion entirely.”37
Focusing on how Japan “is retentionist in its own way” should also 
create curiosity about the positive effects of capital punishment, which 
many abolitionists ignore. The notion that capital punishment “rep-
resents the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal 
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes”38 may be 
inspiring rhetoric to opponents of the death penalty, but it is bad soci-
ology. So is the sweeping claim that “even when its aims are modest, 
capital punishment fails to achieve them.”39 As New York University 
Professor David Garland demonstrates in his masterful account of 
American capital punishment:
If we insist…on a positive account of capital punishment’s uses and util-
ities, even those that at first seem marginal or unimportant, then a pic-
ture emerges that turns the [abolitionists’] conventional wisdom upside 
down. What becomes apparent is that the state’s power to kill is actually 
productive, performative, and generative – that it makes things happen – 
even if much of what happens is in the cultural realm of death penalty dis-
course rather than in the biological realm of life and death (emphasis in 
original).40
In Japan, too, capital punishment persists partly because it performs 
positive functions. For prosecutors, it is a practical instrument that 
36 Mai Sato, The Death Penalty in Japan: Will the Public Tolerate Abolition? (Springer VS, 
2014).
37 Andrew Hammel, Ending the Death Penalty: The European Experience in Global 
Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 193.
38 Justice John Paul Stevens in Baze v Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 85 (2008).
39 Mario Marazziti, 13 Ways of Looking at the Death Penalty (Seven Stories Press, 2015), 
p. 201.
40 David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 285–286.
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enables them to harness the power of death in the pursuit of criminal 
convictions, harsh punishments, and public support. For politicians, it is 
a way to gain votes, stay in office, and receive publicity—that is, it is a 
tool to be used in electoral games that are played before viewing and 
voting audiences. For the media, it is a prurient entertainment and a 
morality play that pits good against evil. For the public, it is an oppor-
tunity to express emotions (such as anger, hatred, and vengeance) that 
normally are prohibited. And for victims and survivors of crime, capi-
tal punishment is believed to be a mechanism for achieving retribution, 
atonement, and deterrence. Although these beliefs are founded as much in 
faith as in fact, they are sociologically and practically significant because 
they are subjectively meaningful to the believers.41
In short, the retention of capital punishment in Japan stems partly 
from the positive functions it performs for various actors and audi-
ences. Opponents of capital punishment would be wise to recog-
nize this reality. At the same time, Japanese retention reflects what is 
not found in and around the institution of capital punishment. As I will 
show in the rest of this book, Japan has not operationalized the prin-
ciple that death is a different kind of criminal punishment requiring 
special procedures and protections (Chapter 2). A lay judge panel can 
convict and condemn a defendant to death by a vote of 5 to 4. Does 
this reflect the “caution” about capital punishment that Ministers of 
Justice routinely emphasize in their post-execution pronouncements? 
Similarly, the Japanese state is not open about how it kills (Chapter 3). 
In fact, the main purpose of the secrecy surrounding Japanese executions 
is the protection of capital punishment from protest and criticism that 
would occur if executions were announced in advance. Is this transpar-
ent and democratic? And Japan has not discovered many wrongful con-
victions (Chapter 4). Is this because Japanese criminal justice produces 
few of them, or because the system is ill-equipped to find them? In all of 
these respects, what Japan does not do can be contrasted with the United 
41 The analysis in this paragraph echoes David Garland’s analysis about the positive func-
tions of American capital punishment in Chapter 11 (“Death and Its Uses”) of his Peculiar 
Institution (2010). For an essay about Garland’s magnificent book, see David T. Johnson, 
“American Capital Punishment in Comparative Perspective”, Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 
36, No. 4 (Fall 2011), pp. 1033–1061.
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States, where markedly more death penalty reform has occurred as the 
result of concerns about due process violations, botched executions, and 
the revelation of wrongful convictions.
Although Japan is retentionist “in its own way,” there are some ways 
in which other retentionist countries resemble it. In Singapore, which 
long has employed one of the most aggressive death penalty systems in 
the world and which is far from a model of due process, an article in the 
country’s leading law journal claims that “no sweeping reforms are nec-
essary” to reduce the risk of wrongful conviction.42 That claim is clap-
trap. In Taiwan, where the number of executions dropped dramatically 
as the country democratized but where executions have rebounded 
in recent years, death is not different as a matter of law or practice, and 
major mistakes have been made in the administration of capital punish-
ment—including the wrongful execution of an innocent man (Chiang 
Kuo-ching), which Taiwan’s government acknowledged in 2011.43 
And in the People’s Republic of China, the world’s biggest user of cap-
ital punishment, debate about the death penalty has deepened in recent 
years, yet its death penalty system remains shrouded in secrecy, includ-
ing a prohibition on disclosing how many executions are performed 
each year.44
The Karenina principle suggests that success at abolishing cap-
ital punishment requires avoiding many separate causes of fail-
ure. It also implies that the road to abolition is not merely a positive 
path embracing the “human rights dynamic” and “leadership from 
the front” in the face of public support for capital punishment, though 
these have been important causes of change in many death pen-
alty nations. The road to abolition is also a “negative path”—what 
the ancient Greeks called via negativa—leading away from doctrines 
and practices that present obstacles to ending the death penalty.45  
42 Chen Siyuan and Eunice Chua, “Wrongful Convictions in Singapore: A General Survey 
of Risk Factors”, Singapore Law Review, Vol. 28 (2010), pp. 98–123.
43 Cindy Sui, “Executed Taiwan Airman Chiang Kuo-ching Innocent”, BBC News, 
September 13, 2011.
44 David T. Johnson and Michelle Miao, “Chinese Capital Punishment in Comparative 
Perspective”, in Bin Liang and Hong Lu, editors, The Death Penalty in China: Policy, 
Practice, and Reform (Columbia University Press, 2015), pp. 300–326.
45 Rolf Dobelli, The Art of Thinking Clearly (Harper, 2013), p. 299.
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As in the pursuit of happiness and professional success, so too, perhaps, in 
the pursuit of a world free from state killing: negative knowledge (what 
not to do) can be as potent as positive knowledge (what to do). In the 
end, thinking about what makes Japan “retentionist in its own way” 
might have the welcome effect of improving our understanding of why 
the death penalty endures in one of the world’s most developed countries. 
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Abstract  This chapter describes how capital cases are handled in Japan 
and the United States—the two largest developed democracies that 
retain capital punishment and continue to carry out executions on a 
regular basis. The comparison shows that death penalty law can fail in 
two ways. In the United States, where the Supreme Court has ruled 
that “death is different,” law fails by not fulfilling many of its promises 
to provide special procedures and protections for capital defendants. In 
Japan, by contrast, law fails by not making many promises at all.
Keywords  Capital jurisprudence · Death is different ·  
Super due process · Factual accuracy · Moral accuracy · Legal failure
Despite frequent claims by Japanese officials to the contrary, Japan is not 
“careful” about how it administers capital punishment. In Japan, poten-
tially capital cases are treated much the same as less serious cases. Yet if 
“a single life weighs more than the entire earth,” as Japan’s Supreme 
Court asserted in a 1948 decision upholding the constitutionality of cap-
ital punishment, then why doesn’t Japanese criminal procedure reflect 
this reality?
This chapter describes how death penalty cases are treated in Japan 
and the United States, the two most prominent developed democracies 
that retain capital punishment and continue to use it on a regular basis. 
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The comparison shows that the law can fail in two ways. In the United 
States, law fails by not fulfilling many of its promises to provide special 
procedures and protections for defendants in capital cases. In Japan, law 
fails by not making any promises at all.
is JaPan careful about caPital Punishment?
In the murder trial of Tateyama Tatsumi that took place in Chiba District 
Court in 2011, defense lawyers made two extraordinary appeals to 
the three professional judges and six lay judges who decided whether 
Tateyama should be condemned to death for the offenses—includ-
ing one murder—that he committed during a two-month rampage 
which started two weeks after he was released from Tsukigata prison 
in Hokkaido, where he had served a seven-year sentence for robbery. 
On the first day of this trial, defense lawyer Urazaki Hiroyasu began 
his opening argument by telling the court that this would probably be 
a capital trial and that the people sitting in judgment should therefore 
pay careful attention to the proceedings which would follow. “The death 
penalty is an extremely severe punishment,” Urazaki observed. “It ought 
to be used carefully, and it should only be imposed if it cannot possibly 
be avoided.”
Two weeks later, on the last day of Tateyama’s trial and a few minutes 
after prosecutors had stated for the first time that they wanted Tateyama 
sentenced to death, defense lawyer Murai Hiroaki asked the court to 
impose a capital sentence if and only if everyone on the panel agreed that 
death was the appropriate penalty. Under Japan’s lay judge law, five votes 
are enough to convict a defendant and sentence him or her to death, 
a decision rule that Tateyama’s defense team believed was insufficiently 
cautious. “The death penalty must be administered very carefully,” 
Murai implored the court. “If you cannot reach a consensus, then please 
do not impose the ultimate penalty.”
Urazaki’s prediction proved prescient, and Murai’s request was 
ignored. During the press conference following the trial session where 
Tateyama was sentenced to death, one lay judge wondered: “Is this really 
the right thing to do? I still have doubts” (honto ni kore de yokatta no 
ka? mada gimon o motte iru). But before he could describe the nature 
of his misgivings, this lay judge was stopped by a clerk of the court who 
had been assigned the role of enforcing the confidentiality clause of the 
Lay Judge Law, which allows dissent only if it remains secret. A similar 
but unwritten rule discourages dissent on Japan’s Supreme Court when 
2 IS DEATH DIFFERENT? TWO WAYS LAW CAN FAIL  21
it finalizes a sentence of death.1 The net effect of these policies of secrecy 
and silence is to dissuade public discussion about the gravest decision a 
government can make.
The arguments by Tateyama’s defense lawyers were meant to encour-
age the Chiba court to be careful about employing death as a punish-
ment. In the United States their requests would have been unnecessary 
because American prosecutors are required to tell defense lawyers and 
the court—long before a trial starts—whether they intend to seek a sen-
tence of death, and because the decision rule in American capital trials is 
consensus: if even 1 juror out of 12 considers a capital sentence inappro-
priate, the defendant cannot be condemned to death.
In Japan, everyone associated with capital punishment—prosecutors, 
judges, lay judges, defense lawyers, Ministers of Justice, the media, pol-
iticians, and victims and survivors—acknowledges that life-and-death 
decisions should be made as “carefully” as possible (shincho ni), but the 
institutional and procedural reality is that capital cases are treated much 
the same as other criminal cases. In reality, death is not different in 
Japan.
“death is different” in the united states
Since the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “death is dif-
ferent” from other criminal punishments in two respects. First, death is 
different in its severity and enormity, for as “the ultimate punishment” 
it denies the offender’s humanity and the possibility of his or her reform. 
In addition, death is different because the finality of execution makes the 
consequences of error irreversible. The recognition that death is differ-
ent in these ways has generated an array of special procedural protections 
for capital defendants. Most fundamentally, ordinary due process is not 
enough; there must be “super due process” (and international human 
rights law proceeds from a similar premise).
Super due process has five implications in American criminal pro-
cedure.2 First, capital trials must be carried out in separate stages: first 
determining the guilt of a defendant, and then (if the defendant has 
1 Yamaguchi Susumu and Miyaji Yu, Saikosai no Anto: Shosuiken ga Jidai o Kirihiraku 
(Asahi, 2011), p. 51.
2 Robert M. Bohm, Ultimate Sanction: Understanding the Death Penalty Through Its 
Many Voices and Many Sides (Kaplan Publishing, 2010), pp. vi–ix.
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been convicted) deciding the sentence. Second, capital juries must be 
given direction in the form of “aggravating and mitigating factors” to 
help guide their discretion at the sentencing stage. Third, after a death 
sentence has been imposed it receives an automatic appellate review, 
regardless of the defendant’s wishes. In some American jurisdictions, 
defendants who have been sentenced to death cannot waive their right 
to appeal, as approximately one-third of death-sentenced defendants in 
Japan do. Fourth, American appellate courts engage in proportionality 
review in order to identify inappropriate disparities in sentencing prac-
tice. The principle underlying this practice is that like cases should be 
treated alike, and different cases differently. Finally, in order to impose 
a capital sentence, all 12 jurors must agree that death is the appropri-
ate sanction. For the defense this means that a sentence of death can be 
prevented by convincing just one juror to oppose it. Clarence Darrow, 
one of the most highly esteemed defense lawyers in American history, 
defended more than 100 persons in capital trials, and not a single one 
was sentenced to death.3 But if Darrow had faced a majority rule like 
the one that prevails in Japan, he probably would have had a different 
record.
Although American law promises super due process, it often fails to 
deliver.4 A classic study of error rates in American capital cases found that 
serious error—error substantially undermining the reliability of capital ver-
dicts—had reached “epidemic proportions” in America’s death penalty sys-
tem. In this analysis, the “overall error rate” was defined as the proportion 
of fully reviewed capital judgments that were overturned on appeal due to 
serious error between 1973 and 1995. By this definition, the overall error 
rate was 68 percent, which means that approximately two out of every three 
capital sentences reviewed by appellate courts were reversed because they 
were found to be seriously flawed.5 As of 2017, only 15 percent of all death 
3 John A. Farrell, Clarence Darrow: Attorney for the Damned (Vintage Books, 2011).
4 Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital 
Punishment (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), especially Chapter 5 (“The 
Failures of Regulation”).
5 James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Valerie West, “A Broken System: Error Rates in 
Capital Cases, 1973–1995”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=232712.
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sentences imposed by American trial courts since 1977 had resulted in exe-
cution. By state, the range runs from less than 1 percent in Pennsylvania to 
more than 70 percent in Virginia. The most common errors in American 
death penalty trials include police and prosecutors who suppressed excul-
patory evidence or committed other professional misconduct, incompetent 
defense lawyers, jurors who were misinformed about the law, and biased 
judges and jurors. When America’s appellate courts find serious error, more 
than 8 out of every 10 cases sent back for retrial end in a sentence less than 
death—and 9 percent end in acquittal. The fundamental cause of all of this 
error is overuse. “The more often officials use the death penalty,” a subse-
quent study concluded, “the greater the risk that capital convictions and sen-
tences will be seriously flawed.”6
It is widely believed that Japan uses capital punishment less frequently 
than the United States, but this view is mistaken. In per capita terms 
(executions per million population), Japan’s execution rate has long been 
lower than that for the United States, and it has been much lower than 
the rates in high-rate American states such as Texas and Virginia. But the 
per capita rate of execution is a poor measure of frequency of use because 
(Stalinist nightmares aside) persons are not selected randomly for death; 
they are condemned and executed from a larger pool of potentially cap-
ital cases. In the United States and Japan, this pool consists entirely of 
homicide crimes. Hence, to assess the scale of capital punishment in a 
country, one must consider the size of the relevant capital-crime pool. 
In the United States, about 2 percent of all known murder offenders are 
sentenced to death, though this figure varies by state, from around 0.4 
percent in Colorado to 6 percent or so in Nevada. The probability of 
a known murderer being sentenced to death in Japan is not much dif-
ferent than in many American jurisdictions. From 1994 through 2003, 
the chance of a Japanese murderer being sentenced to death was 1.3 
percent—about the same rate as in the American states of California and 
Virginia. And in 2007, when Japan had 14 death sentences in courts of 
6 James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Andrew Gelman, Valerie West, Garth Davies, and 
Alexander Kiss, “A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and 
What Can Be Done About It”, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html.
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original jurisdiction and the United States had 110, the ratio of death 
sentences to homicides was actually higher in Japan than in the United 
States. By measures such as these, Japan is not “careful” in its use of cap-
ital punishment. It is a vigorous killing state, on par with some of the 
most aggressive death penalty states in America.7
death is not different in JaPan
Japanese officials claim to administer capital punishment carefully and 
cautiously, but reality contradicts their claims. For starters, Japanese law 
makes no promise of super due process. More specifically, there are at 
least 12 ways in which death is not different in Japan.8 The net result is a 
legal system that is careless about capital punishment.
• 1. No Advance Notice About Whether a Case Is Capital: Japanese 
prosecutors make no advance announcement as to whether they will 
seek a sentence of death. The disclosure is only made on the penul-
timate day of trial, after all the evidence has been presented and just 
before the defense makes its closing argument. This non-disclosure 
policy makes it difficult for Japanese bar associations to provide 
institutional support of the kind that many American capital defend-
ers take for granted. The non-disclosure policy also means that 
while Japan has a system of capital punishment, it does not really 
7 David T. Johnson, “American Capital Punishment in Comparative Perspective”, Law & 
Social Inquiry, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 2011), p. 1052.
8 David T. Johnson, “Progress and Problems in Japanese Capital Punishment”, in Roger 
Hood and Surya Deva, editors, Confronting Capital Punishment in Asia: Human Rights, 
Politics, and Public Opinion (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 175–180. In addition to 
the 12 problems summarized in the text, Japan has not signed several international treaties 
related to capital punishment, including the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was created by the United Nations in 1989 
and has been ratified by more than 70 nations, and it has not established the punishment of 
life without parole. All American states that retain capital punishment provide for the pen-
alty of life without parole, as do America’s federal and military justice systems. Life without 
parole would give judges and lay judges in Japan a harsh sentencing option between life 
with the possibility of parole and the penalty of death. Its availability in America is one rea-
son why death sentences and executions have dropped sharply since 2000.
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have “capital trials” because, until a trial ends, nobody but the pros-
ecutors know whether the defendant’s life is at stake.9
• 2. No Separate Stage for Sentencing: Capital trials in Japan are not 
bifurcated into separate guilt and sentencing phases, even when the 
defendant denies guilt, as defendant Ino Kazuo did in a murder trial 
in Tokyo in 2011. Ino was ultimately sentenced to death by a lay 
judge panel that learned almost nothing about what kind of person 
the 60-year-old defendant was, or what kind of life he had lived. For 
a system that purports to value “precise” decision-making (seimitsu 
shiho) as one foundation for its criminal process, this is a peculiar 
way to make judgments about life and death. In the murder trial 
of Tateyama Tatsumi in Chiba, the Chief Judge did not even allow 
an expert witness to appear for the defense to testify about one of 
the central issues in the trial: whether Tateyama has a cognitive and 
developmental disorder. The Chief Judge ruled in the pretrial pro-
cess that such testimony would confuse the lay judges.
• 3. Victims’ Demands for Punishment Distort Fact-Finding: Since cap-
ital trials are not bifurcated in Japan, victims and survivors are allowed 
during the fact-finding procedure to make statements about what 
punishment they want. This is a dangerous practice for two reasons: 
because research shows that courts are more likely to convict defend-
ants if they are permitted to hear punitive sentencing requests, and 
because victims’ wishes about punishment are supposed to be irrele-
vant with respect to the question of guilt. There is no principled way 
to justify this practice, and in fact the Code of Criminal Procedure 
gives judges ample discretion to prevent it from happening. Yet 
Japanese judges routinely allow it to occur. The Victim Participation 
System, which expands the rights and amplifies the voices of victims 
and survivors, also raises the risk that emotional demands for harsh 
punishment will distort truth-finding at trial (see Chapter 5).10 In the 
murder trial of Ino Kazuo in Tokyo, the victim’s bereaved son was 
9 David T. Johnson, “Capital Punishment without Capital Trials in Japan’s Lay Judge 
System”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 7 (March 16, 2009), pp. 1–40, at 
https://apjjf.org/-David-T.-Johnson/3461/article.html.
10 David T. Johnson, “Does Capital Punishment Bring Closure to Victims?”, in Ivan 
Simonovic, editor, Death Penalty and the Victims (United Nations, 2016), pp. 75–82.
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permitted to state that he wanted the defendant sentenced to death—
and this was on the second day of trial, when fact-finding had barely 
begun. In the murder trial of Tateyama Tatsumi in Chiba, two surviv-
ing parents, their attorney, four victims, and two prosecutors—9 peo-
ple in all—spent 195 minutes in the final trial session demanding that 
Tateyama be sentenced to death. The allotted time for the defense’s 
closing argument was 60 minutes.
• 4. Simple Scripts and Rough Justice: The lay judge system which 
took effect in 2009 has reduced the importance of “precision” 
(seimitsusa) in Japan’s criminal process, and this is especially con-
spicuous in capital trials. Before 2009, capital trials lasted for many 
months or years; trial sessions were held discontinuously, with one 
every few weeks or months, which gave all of the parties time to 
examine issues repeatedly while the trial inched toward the finish 
line. There were costs to that method of course—justice delayed can 
be justice denied, and some judges were transferred in mid-trial—
but whatever its flaws, the previous system could not be accused 
of being insufficiently deliberate. In contrast, many capital trials in 
the lay judge system follow simple scripts, and many judges insist 
that trials stay “on schedule.” This stress on efficiency may satisfy a 
Supreme Court that has instructed judges to finish lay judge trials 
efficiently, but surely concerns about convenience should not trump 
the imperative to administer capital punishment carefully.11
• 5. Vague Sentencing Standards: The “Nagayama standards” enu-
merated by Japan’s Supreme Court in 1983 provide little guidance 
to the judges and lay judges who make life-and-death decisions. 
Many lay judges have noted this in post-trial press conferences, 
and many legal professionals regard the nine Nagayama factors as 
little more than a list of talking points for courts to consider. The 
Nagayama precedent also provides no direction about how to 
weigh the various factors, leaving life-and-death decision-making 
largely ungoverned by rules of law.12
11 David T. Johnson, “Capital Punishment without Capital Trials in Japan’s Lay Judge 
System”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 7 (March 16, 2009), pp. 1–40, at 
https://apjjf.org/-David-T.-Johnson/3461/article.html.
12 See, for example, Horikawa Keiko, Shikei no Kijun: ‘Nagayama Saiban’ ga Nokoshita 
Mono (Nihon Hyoronsha, 2009); and Nagata Kenji, Shikei Sentaku Kijun no Kenkyu 
(Kansai Daigaku Shuppanbu, 2010).
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• 6. No Automatic Review: In Japan, there is no automatic appellate 
review for defendants who have been sentenced to death. In recent 
years, about one-third of all death sentences have been finalized 
without review by the Supreme Court. Most of these involve con-
demned inmates who have abandoned their appeals.13 This is not 
only careless, it also injects an element of arbitrariness in life-and-
death decision-making. Are people who volunteer to be executed 
somehow more deserving of death than those who insist on their 
own innocence? Moreover, half or more of death row inmates in 
Japan file requests for retrial in order to avoid execution, but these 
requests have no legal effect on the Minister of Justice’s author-
ity to order a hanging, and some condemned inmates are hanged 
despite a pending petition. The lack of mandatory review in Japan 
increases the risk of executing the innocent or the undeserving. 
This risk is magnified because no inmate on death row has received 
executive clemency in Japan since Ishii Kenjiro had his death sen-
tence commuted to life imprisonment in 1975. Unlike Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and other death penalty countries in Asia, 
executive clemency in capital cases in Japan is all but dead.14
• 7. No Special Procedures for Selecting Lay Judges: In Japan, there 
are no special procedures for selecting lay judges to serve in mur-
der trials. The defense and the prosecution each receive several 
rights to challenge prospective lay judges, but their use in the pre-
trial process is little more than a guessing game because the par-
ties receive almost no information about the citizens who have 
been called to serve, and because the parties are not allowed to ask 
meaningful questions about the lay judge candidates during the 
selection procedure. Moreover, some lay judges are replaced while 
a trial is in session. In the capital trial of Ino Kazuo, a lay judge 
who asked many questions to the witnesses during trial was replaced 
13 The Death Penalty Project in association with the Centre for Prisoners’ Rights, The 
Death Penalty in Japan (London: The Death Penalty Project, 2013), p. 27. By comparison, 
in recent years about 11 percent of death-sentenced prisoners in the United States hastened 
their own executions by abandoning their appeals. See Meredith Martin Rountree, “‘I’ll 
Make Them Shoot Me’: Accounts of Death Row Prisoners Advocating for Execution”, 
Law & Society Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 589–622.
14 Daniel Pascoe, Last Chance for Life: Clemency in Southeast Asian Death Penalty Cases 
(Oxford University Press, 2019).
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during the deliberations that followed the final trial session, but the 
Chief Judge did not take the trouble to inform the parties about 
the change, and the defense only discovered it after Ino was sen-
tenced to death. In the capital trial of Tateyama Tatsumi, one lay 
judge slept repeatedly during the first eight trial sessions. Defense 
lawyers asked the Chief Judge to address this fundamental issue of 
fairness, but the Chief Judge (who also dozed during trial) refused 
to act until the day before the final trial session, when his hand was 
forced by a written petition from the defense that was supported by 
statements from several persons who were watching the trial with 
dismay over how much the lay judge slumbered during a murder 
trial. An American federal court judge (Reggie Walton) who warned 
jurors to stay awake during a trial said “I don’t think God has given 
us a supernatural ability to sleep and listen at the same time.” Some 
Japanese judges apparently have a different view.15
• 8. Law Is Not Explained in Open Court: In Japan, the presiding 
judge instructs (setsuji) lay judges about the law in the privacy of 
the deliberation room, not in open court where the prosecu-
tion, the defense, and trial watchers can assess these important 
directives. There is reason to worry that some judges present a 
pro-prosecution—and pro-death penalty—version of the law to lay 
judges. The failure to instruct lay judges in open court may also 
violate the defendant’s Constitutional right to a public trial. In 
August 2010, a well-known defense lawyer (Takano Takashi) who 
was offering a training course in trial advocacy happened to eat 
lunch in a deliberation room used by Osaka District Court Chief 
15 Here is one passage from my own letter to the Chief Judge in Tateyama’s trial, which 
the defense included in its petition to the court: “On the afternoon of June 14, I decided 
to count how many times Lay Judge 2 slept. From 1:15 to 1:45 PM, he fell asleep at least 
33 times. Yes, that’s right: 33 times in 30 minutes. Lay Judge 2 was sleeping almost con-
stantly during this period of time (and at other times as well). I could have kept track for 
a longer period but, frankly, watching people sleep is not very interesting, so I stopped 
watching and counting at 1:45 PM. If Lay Judge 2 had been driving a car, he would have 
crashed.” At the end of this letter I told the Chief Judge that “I also have noticed you 
sleeping during this trial, but because your sleeping is not as obvious or as frequent as that 
of Lay Judge 2, I will not request that you recuse yourself… But I do think it is a good idea 
for you to stay awake during murder trials. Do you agree with my view?” The Chief Judge 
did not reply to my letter.
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Judge Higuchi Hiroaki and his colleagues. On entering the room, 
Takano was initially pleased to see that “Rules for Criminal Trials” 
had been posted on a whiteboard, presumably to instruct lay judges 
who are amateurs in the law. But the more closely Takano read the 
rules, the more concerned he became. Incredibly, the whiteboard 
presented guidelines for convicting defendants but omitted lan-
guage about when it is appropriate to acquit. In Takano’s words, 
“I was amazed. I trembled a little. And I was indignant. You mean 
they’ll even do shit like this?! This is what I cried out in my heart. If 
judges feel like it, they can use clever methods in the secrecy of the 
deliberation room to lead lay judges to their preferred conclusion 
without anyone noticing.”16
• 9. Death by Majority: In Japan, there is no requirement that all 
judges and lay judges agree that a death sentence is deserved, nor 
is there a requirement that a “super-majority” of seven or eight of 
the nine people on the panel agree before the ultimate penalty is 
imposed. A “mixed majority”—five votes, with at least one from a 
professional judge—is enough to condemn a person to death. This 
decision rule is hardly “cautious” about capital punishment. In all 
American jurisdictions that retain capital punishment, a death sen-
tence can only be imposed if all 12 jurors agree that death is the 
appropriate sanction.
• 10. Passive Defense Lawyers: The assumption that death is not dif-
ferent also influences Japanese defense lawyers, mainly by inhibit-
ing them from aggressively challenging the state’s case for death. 
In some of the capital trials I have watched, defense lawyers were 
strikingly passive about contesting the state’s case against the 
defendant, and they also were reluctant to directly challenge the 
propriety of capital punishment.17 Even more striking is the fact 
that for the past half-century, Japanese lawyers have almost never 
17 David T. Johnson, “War in a Season of Slow Revolution: Defense Lawyers and Lay 
Judges in Japanese Criminal Justice”, Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 9 (June 29, 
2011), pp. 1–11.
16 Quoted in David T. Johnson, “War in a Season of Slow Revolution: Defense Lawyers 
and Lay Judges in Japanese Criminal Justice”, Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 9 
(June 29, 2011), pp. 1–11.
30  D. T. JOHNSON
challenged the constitutionality of capital punishment in general or 
hanging in particular.18 There are several reasons for this passivity, 
including the fact that Japan’s Supreme Court has long been con-
servative. But in comparative perspective, the reluctance of Japanese 
lawyers to raise legal challenges that are routinely made in American 
jurisdictions seems to reflect tacit acceptance of the legitimacy of 
capital punishment. Until recently, Japanese defense lawyers rarely 
presented detailed evidence about the defendant’s life history. Such 
presentations are often made in the sentencing stage of American 
capital trials. One key cause of the dramatic decline in American 
death sentences has been the ardent efforts of “mitigation special-
ists,” who thoroughly investigate a capital defendant’s “life story” 
and then tell it in detail to the jurors who decide whether to con-
demn the defendant to death. Japan has more than 30,000 lawyers 
but not a single mitigation specialist. The guidelines for paying 
state- appointed attorneys (kokusen bengonin), who do the bulk of 
criminal defense work in Japan, create little incentive to expend the 
arduous effort that is needed to construct a persuasive account of 
a defendant’s life. The senior defense lawyer for Tateyama Tatsumi 
was paid no more for his work in that case than he was paid for 
work in other criminal cases where the stakes were much lower. 
That defense lawyer asked for a more appropriate fee, but his 
request was rejected by the court because there is no rule about 
capital cases in the fee guidelines. In this economic sense too, death 
is not different in Japan.
• 11. Prosecutors Can Appeal Non-death Decisions: In Japan, prose-
cutors are allowed two bites of the death penalty apple. If a District 
Court does not impose the ultimate penalty, prosecutors can ask 
an appellate court to reverse the original decision. This is what 
occurred in the case of a juvenile who was sentenced to death by 
the Hiroshima High Court in 2008 for killing a mother and her 
infant daughter in Hikari City nine years earlier.19 The right of 
18 As explained in Chapter 3, there is one significant exception: the murder trial of 
Takami Sunao in 2011, in which Japanese defense lawyers raised the issue of whether hang-
ing is unconstitutionally cruel. In this case, the Osaka District Court held that hanging is 
constitutional.
19 Masuda Michiko, Fukuda kun o Koroshite Nani ni Naru: Hikari-shi Boshi Satsugai 
Jiken no Kansei (Tokyo: Inshidentsu, 2009).
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prosecutors to appeal non-death sentences serves the value of 
 consistency by allowing appellate courts to check whether like cases 
are being treated alike, but criminal trials at the appellate level tend 
to be far faster and rougher than the first-instance trials where oral 
testimony is heard. Here, too, one sees evidence of the assumption 
that capital cases do not require special procedures or protections.
• 12. Secrecy and Democracy: As will be explained in more detail 
in the next chapter, the administration of hanging in Japan is sur-
rounded by secrecy and silence to an extent seldom seen in other 
death penalty nations. The main function of Japan’s policy of 
secrecy is to protect the system of capital punishment—including 
the premise that death is not different—from outside scrutiny and 
criticism. There is also a problem of secrecy related to lay judges, 
who by law are not permitted to disclose “confidential” informa-
tion about their experiences at trial. This coerced silence prevents 
the public from knowing and talking about how life-and-death 
decisions are made. The secrecy and silence that surround Japanese 
capital punishment belie official claims that it is administered in a 
manner that is cautious and careful.
two ways law can fail
In the years leading up to the start of Japan’s lay judge system in 2009, 
more than 500 “mock trials” were held. The main objective was to 
 anticipate the problems that might occur in the new trial system and 
to prepare for the complexities that inevitably accompany  fundamental 
reforms of this kind. Despite this seemingly meticulous preparation, 
not a single mock trial was held in which prosecutors sought a sentence 
of death and a tribunal was asked to make a life-or-death decision. Here 
again is evidence of the assumption that death is not a different form of 
punishment in Japan.
The assumption that there is nothing special about capital cases is 
manifest at every level of Japanese adjudication, including the Supreme 
Court. I once asked a veteran journalist (Yamaguchi Susumu, the co- 
author of a fine book20 on Japan’s Supreme Court) whether the 
20 Yamaguchi Susumu and Miyaji Yu, Saikosai no Anto: Shosuiken ga Jidai o Kirihiraku 
(Asahi, 2011).
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country’s highest court considers death a “different” (tokubetsu) form of 
punishment. He said “yes,” but when I asked how death is deemed dif-
ferent by the Supreme Court, he offered two replies, neither of which 
provides meaningful support for the assertion that the country’s top 
court regards death as a special form of punishment. His first point was 
that before deciding whether to finalize (kakutei) a sentence of death, 
the Supreme Court gives defense lawyers an opportunity to make an oral 
argument—a privilege rarely granted to defense lawyers in other crim-
inal cases. When I asked whether these oral arguments are little more 
than “empty rituals” (as many defense lawyers assert), Yamaguchi con-
ceded that they are largely ceremonial, and that they seldom have a sig-
nificant effect on the Justices’ thinking. The second part of his answer 
was that the Justices on Japan’s Supreme Court read the relevant docu-
ments “carefully” in capital cases. This response is revealing in two ways. 
For one thing, it suggests that Justices might not read records carefully 
in other kinds of cases. For another, trusting Justices to read the record 
“carefully” assumes there is no need for special procedures and protec-
tions in capital cases—much less for “super due process.” I have studied 
criminal justice in Japan for the past thirty years, and I see no good rea-
son to trust Justices on the Supreme Court (or any other judges) in this 
way. Like other scholars of Japanese criminal justice, I see many reasons 
to worry that judges will continue to defer to the prosecution, as they 
have done for decades.21
What happens to Supreme Court Justices in the United States 
and Japan as the result of hearing capital appeals? In a decision by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1972 (Furman v. Georgia), Justice Thurgood 
Marshall famously observed that if the American people were bet-
ter informed about the reality of capital punishment, they would find 
it “shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.” His hunch, which came to be 
known as the “Marshall hypothesis,” has been the subject of much study, 
and its clearest confirmation comes from the death penalty conversions 
that many Justices have experienced while sitting on the U.S. Supreme 
21 See, for example, Hirano Ryuichi, “Diagnosis of the Current Code of Criminal 
Procedure”, Law in Japan, Vol. 22 (1989), pp. 129–142; and Daniel H. Foote, 
“Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice Field,” Hoshakaigaku, 
No. 72 (2010), pp. 6–45.
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Court.22 For example, in 1976 America’s highest Court held (in Gregg 
v. Georgia) by a 7 to 2 majority that the new capital statutes enacted by 
states after the Furman decision had found capital punishment uncon-
stitutional (because its arbitrary administration was like “being struck by 
lightning”) were now constitutional. The Gregg decision restarted the 
American machinery of capital punishment that had been stopped by 
Furman four years before, and three of the seven votes in the majority 
were cast by Justices Powell, Stevens, and Stewart. By the end of their 
tenures on the bench—after many years of confronting the kinds of 
“capital error” described earlier in this chapter—these three Justices had 
come to conclude that it is impossible to administer the death penalty in 
a manner that is fair, just, and accurate. Their knowledge of the actual 
practice of capital punishment had converted them into opponents of the 
sanction.23
One leading scholar of American capital punishment has said that the 
actual practice of capital punishment in America is so inconsistent with 
the country’s core legal values that “if you love the law, you must hate 
the death penalty.”24 Similarly, in 2009, the American Law Institute, the 
most prestigious law reform organization in the United States, with-
drew its approval for the death penalty standards it had created in the 
Model Penal Code of 1963 because those standards had failed to provide 
adequate guidance for the juries who must decide which defendants 
should die. As another scholar observed,
Now that the creators of the modern system of death penalty sentenc-
ing have disowned that system, there is no support for distinguishing the 
current death penalty lottery from the lawless system that Furman con-
demned [in 1972]. The apparatus that the Supreme Court rushed to 
embrace in [the Gregg decision of] 1976 has been exposed as a conspicu-
ous failure.25
22 Carol S. Steiker, “The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited”, Howard Law Journal, Vol. 52, 
No. 3 (2009), pp. 522ff.
23 Evan J. Mandery, A Wild Justice: The Death and Resurrection of Capital Punishment in 
America (W. W. Norton, 2013), pp. 432–440.
24 Austin Sarat, When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition 
(Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 253.
25 Franklin E. Zimring, “Pulling the Plug on Capital Punishment”, The National Law 
Journal (December 7, 2009).
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In sum, here is the conclusion about capital punishment in the United 
States: lots of legal promises to administer the ultimate penalty fairly, 
justly, and accurately—and broken promises galore. Yet law can fail in 
more than one way. If the law of capital punishment in America fails to 
fulfill many of its promises, law in Japan fails by refusing to make many 
promises at all. This can be called a failure of aspiration and political will.26 
The low ideals Japan has established for the administration of capital pun-
ishment help explain why Justices on its Supreme Court (unlike Justices 
on the U.S. Supreme Court) do not change their mind about this issue. 
When there are few requirements to satisfy before imposing a sentence of 
death, there is little room for frustration or failure, and there is no need to 
change one’s mind.27
In the years to come, Japan could reform its approach to capital 
punishment in two ways. On the one hand, the courts and the country 
could start to take seriously the assertion its Supreme Court made seven 
decades ago—that “a single life weighs more than the entire earth.” 
This road to reform would require significant changes in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, but an even more fundamental requirement would 
be greater fidelity to existing law on the part of Japanese judges. At the 
top of my own list of necessary reforms are the introduction of a separate 
stage for sentencing in capital cases, and a decision rule requiring more 
than a mere majority in order to condemn a person to death.
In the second path to reform, Japan would renounce capital pun-
ishment on the grounds that it is impossible to administer it in a man-
ner that is fair, just, and accurate. America has tried much harder than 
Japan to construct such a death penalty system, and the most reasonable 
conclusion to reach is that it has failed, badly. As U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Harry Blackmun concluded in 1994,
26 David T. Johnson, “The Death Penalty in Japan: Secrecy, Silence, and Salience”, in 
Austin Sarat and Christian Boulanger, editors, The Cultural Lives of Capital Punishment: 
Comparative Perspectives (Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 261–264.
27 The other reason there are so many death penalty “conversions” among Justices on 
the U.S. Supreme Court and so few in Japan is that American Justices serve an average of 
26 years, compared with just 6 years for Justices in Japan. The longer term of service means 
that American Justices encounter more capital cases and more capital error. See Andrew 
Cohen, “Why Don’t [U.S.] Supreme Court Justices Ever Change Their Minds in Favor of 
the Death Penalty”, The Atlantic, December 2013.
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From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of 
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored…to develop…rules that 
would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death pen-
alty endeavor…Rather than continue to coddle the court’s delusion that 
the desired level of fairness has been achieved…I feel…obligated simply to 
concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-ev-
ident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive 
regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional 
deficiencies… [T]his court eventually will conclude that the effort to elim-
inate arbitrariness while preserving fairness in the infliction of [death] is so 
plainly doomed to failure that it and the death penalty must be abandoned 
altogether…I may not live to see that day, but I have faith that eventually 
it will arrive.28
If Japan spends as long as America—almost half a century—trying to 
construct its own system of “super due process,” I suppose the outcome 
could be a little less disappointing than Blackmun’s lament suggests. 
Perhaps, but I doubt it. Comparative research should stretch our minds 
about what is possible and impossible. America’s long experiment with 
capital punishment suggests that it may well be impossible to construct 
a system of capital justice that reaches only the rare right cases without 
also occasionally condemning the innocent or the undeserving.29 In my 
view, this is the pivotal issue in every country that still has capital punish-
ment, and Japan would be foolish to ignore the abundant evidence from 
the United States. Whatever road Japan chooses to travel in the future, 
one thing is clear: the present presumption that death is not different 
is deeply problematic. It may turn out that Japan can do little better at 
administering capital punishment than it is doing now. But if the country 
continues to employ capital punishment, surely it should try.
28 Callins v Collins 510 US 1141 (1994).
29 Scott Turow, Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing with the Death 
Penalty (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 114.
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Abstract  The secrecy that surrounds executions in Japan is taken to 
extremes seldom seen in other nations. To describe the reality of hanging 
in Japan (its sole method of execution since 1882), this chapter discusses 
two sources of evidence. First it summarizes recently discovered docu-
ments from the American Occupation of Japan (1945–1952), which 
reveal facts about hanging that have long been obscured by the country’s 
secrecy policy. Then it describes a capital trial that occurred in Osaka 
in 2011, where the defense directly challenged the constitutionality of 
hanging for the first time since Japan’s Supreme Court declared this 
method “constitutional” in 1955. These sources of information raise a 
question about execution that is hard to answer in the affirmative: Is it 
possible to hang a human being humanely?
Keywords  Execution · Hanging · Secrecy · Silence ·  
Occupation of Japan · Trial of Takami Sunao
In Japan and many other countries, executions used to be staged in 
public so that rulers could communicate to their subjects the politi-
cal and cosmic forces at work when doing justice. Today, by contrast, 
executions are often represented as nonevents in which power is made 
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minimally visible.1 In most nations that continue to carry out executions, 
officials try to do so silently and invisibly, though there are large differ-
ences in the degree to which this aim is achieved. In Japan, the secrecy 
and silence that surround capital punishment are taken to extremes not 
seen in other nations.2 The secrecy “gap” between Japan and the United 
States has narrowed in recent years, as American death penalty states 
have become increasingly clandestine in response to concerns about 
their lethal injection protocols and practices, but in many respects Japan 
remains an outlier with respect to openness.3 Consider the following fea-
tures of capital punishment in Japan—the state that kills in secret.
• Inmates on death row are not notified of the date or time of exe-
cution until an hour or two before it occurs, and some may be 
given no notice at all. One former prison official has said that cer-
tain condemned inmates are extracted from their cells on the ruse 
that they are “wanted in the office.”4 This sudden “your-time-has-
come” policy has been called a “surprise attack” (damashi-uchi). 
Many death row inmates live for years or decades in high anxiety, 
wondering whether the present day will be their last. Menda Sakae, 
who was exonerated and released in 1983 after spending 34 years 
on death row, had this to say about Japan’s prior notification policy: 
“Between 8:00 and 8:30 in the morning was the most critical time, 
because that was generally when prisoners were notified of their 
execution… You begin to feel the most terrible anxiety, because 
you don’t know if they are going to stop in front of your cell. It 
is impossible to express how awful a feeling this was. I would have 
shivers down my spine. It was absolutely unbearable.”5
1 David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 52.
2 David T. Johnson, “The Death Penalty in Japan: Secrecy, Silence, and Salience”, in 
Austin Sarat and Christian Boulanger, editors, The Cultural Lives of Capital Punishment: 
Comparative Perspectives (Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. 251–273.
3 Robin Konrad, “Behind the Curtain: Secrecy and the Death Penalty in the United 
States” (Death Penalty Information Center, 2018), pp. 1–85, at https://files.deathpenalty-
info.org/documents/pdf/SecrecyReport-2.f1560295685.pdf.
4 Sakamoto Toshio, Shikei wa Ika ni Shikko Sareru ka (Nihon Bungeisha, 2003), p. 69.
5 Menda Sakae, Menda Sakae Gokuchu Noto: Watakushi no Miokutta Shikeishu-tachi 
(Impakuto, 2004).
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• Relatives of the condemned are told of the execution after 
the fact—as are defense lawyers, the media, and everyone else 
in Japanese society except for a handful of state officials. This 
minimizes protest and limits debate.
• In some cases, members of the execution team are given little 
prior notification, partly out of concern that if told in advance they 
may not show up for work. Corrections guards who participate in 
an execution receive extra pay of 20,000 yen ($180). Sakamoto 
Toshio, a former guard who witnessed hangings, has described the 
execution process as “unbearable.” “It’s awful,” he recalls. “The 
body bounces like a 70 kilogram object on a nylon rope…There is 
no worse job.” Guards on the execution team receive no counseling 
and, according to Sakamoto, are expected to “digest” the execution 
themselves.6
• No outsiders are permitted to attend hangings: no journal-
ists, no relatives or friends of the victim or the condemned, and 
no members of the general public. Research in the United States 
has revealed that approximately 3–5 percent of all executions are 
botched, leading to prolonged suffering by the condemned dur-
ing the execution process.7 The botch rate in Japan is unknown 
because those who would be willing to say do not know, for they 
are excluded from the execution scene.
• Scholars and reporters are denied access to many official death pen-
alty documents. This discourages research and reporting about capi-
tal punishment.
• Citizens and members of the media are almost never allowed to 
view the gallows, even when it is not in use. In 2010, Japanese 
authorities did permit a few selected reporters to make one 
30-minute visit to the glass-walled execution room in the Tokyo 
Detention Center.
• A “spiritual advisor” can attend a hanging, but condemned persons 
are not free to choose who it will be. Advisors are selected from a 
list of state-approved clergy, none of whom is openly abolitionist. 
6 Miwa Suzuki, “Cruel, Secretive and Politically Popular: Japan’s Death Penalty”, Japan 
Times, September 12, 2018.
7 Austin Sarat, Gruesome Spectacles: Botched Executions and America’s Death Penalty 
(Stanford University Press, 2014).
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Activity deemed “political” will result in removal from the list.8 
Proscribed behavior includes actions that might cultivate hope in 
the condemned.
• Prosecutors in the Ministry of Justice select execution dates strate-
gically, to minimize the possibility of protest and debate. Among 
other calculations, executions frequently occur when Parliament 
is in recess, often on a Thursday or Friday, near the end of the 
news week, when people are becoming preoccupied with weekend 
activities.
• The Ministry of Justice provides no explanation or justification for 
why certain death row inmates are selected for hanging while oth-
ers are permitted to continue living. After the 13 Aum executions 
in July 2018, 110 inmates remained under a finalized sentence of 
death. By law, any of them could be chosen to die at any time, lead-
ing critics to contend that the officials who make execution deci-
sions (mostly prosecutors) are “playing god.” In most years, only a 
few death row inmates are chosen for execution, according to crite-
ria that are not made public.
• Between imposition of a death sentence and execution, inmates 
on death row are socially extinguished through the state’s severe 
restrictions on meetings and correspondence. The stated reason 
for this policy is to promote “stable feelings” (shinjo no antei) in 
inmates and thereby help them “prepare for death.” But one func-
tion of killing socially before killing physically is the facilitation 
of “smooth” executions in which demoralized inmates do not 
resist.9
In recent years the administration of executions in Japan has taken 
a few steps toward transparency. The Ministry of Justice, which 
legally and practically decides who among Japan’s inmates with a final-
ized sentence of death will be executed (and when), now makes a brief 
post-execution announcement stating the name of the person exe-
cuted and describing the crimes for which he or she was hanged (until 
1999, the government made no announcement at all). And as described 
9 David T. Johnson, “Where the State Kills in Secret: Capital Punishment in Japan”, 
Punishment & Society, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 251–285.
8 Adam Lyons, Karma and Punishment: Prison Chaplaincy in Japan (Harvard University 
Asia Center Press, forthcoming).
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in Chapter 1, in 2010, then-Minister of Justice Chiba Keiko created a 
study group in her Ministry to discuss Japan’s death penalty policy, occa-
sionally in sessions that were open to selected members of the public 
(the study group ended with a whimper of irrelevance, not a bang of 
reform). Minister of Justice Chiba also opened the gallows in Tokyo to 
a small group of journalists, one of the seven places in the country where 
condemned inmates are hanged. In my view, allowing a few selected 
reporters to view the gallows when not in use is like sitting in the Tokyo 
Dome when no one is playing baseball, for it reveals little about how the 
activity of interest is actually performed.
Despite these modest changes, the wall of silence surrounding execu-
tions in Japan remains largely intact.10 Figure 3.1 illustrates this “capital 
blackout” with a photograph of a document that the Ministry of Justice 
provided to a defense lawyer who used the Disclosure of Information Act 
to request information about what had transpired at several recent hang-
ings. In other released documents, the lopsided ratio of white space to 
black resembles that shown here. This execution record (shikei shikko shi-
matsusho) provides the date of execution (2007), but it obscures almost 
everything else, including the name of the person who was hanged, the 
location of the hanging, the court that imposed the sentence of death, 
the persons who attended the hanging and their organizational affilia-
tions, and (in the largest blacked out section) notes that may or may not 
have been taken about the execution process.
Japanese officials seldom explain the state’s policy of secrecy as it 
relates to capital punishment. That, after all, would be inconsistent with 
the policy. But occasionally they do offer justifications. None is compel-
ling. Sometimes officials say secrecy is in the condemned inmate’s inter-
est, but research shows that most inmates on Japan’s death row want to 
know their execution day in advance, so that they can better prepare for 
death, and because it eliminates the “is today the day?” anxiety they wake 
up with every morning. Sometimes officials say secrecy is a Japanese tra-
dition, but officials have consciously and strategically expanded the reach 
of secrecy in the postwar period. In reality, this “tradition” is a recent 
invention. Sometimes officials say secrecy is in the interest of the exe-
cution team, but this amounts to an admission that the state’s policy 
10 David T. Johnson, “Japan’s Secretive Death Penalty Policy: Contours, Origins, 
Justifications, and Meanings”, Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 
2006), pp. 62–124.
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Fig. 3.1 Japanese Ministry of Justice execution record, 2007
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Fig. 3.1 (continued)
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of secrecy serves the state’s interest in seeing that executions are done as 
impersonally, bureaucratically, and non-controversially as possible. These 
are not democratic values. And sometimes officials claim the American 
way of execution—including the last-minute appeals and the “Forgive!” 
and “Kill him!” demonstrations that often occur outside prison walls—is 
unseemly and unattractive. It is, but claiming “the USA is worse” does 
not mean the Japanese way—“your time has come!”—is alright. Indeed, 
this Japanese justification reminds me of what my mother used to say 
(“don’t change the subject!”) when I excused my own bad behavior by 
suggesting that my brother had done something worse. It is, in a word, 
irrelevant.11
The French philosopher Albert Camus observed that “Instead of say-
ing that the death penalty is first of all necessary and then adding that 
it is better not to talk about it, it is essential to say what it really is and 
then say, whether, being what it is, it is to be considered as necessary.”12 
Fig. 3.1 (continued)
11 David T. Johnson, “Where the State Kills in Secret: Capital Punishment in Japan”, 
Punishment & Society, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 264–268.
12 Albert Camus, “Reflections on the Guillotine”, in Resistance, Rebellion, and Death 
(Vintage, 1960), p. 178.
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State officials in Japan have long practiced a “better not to talk about 
it” strategy. The lay judge tribunals that started in 2009—3 professional 
judges and 6 lay persons who adjudicate guilt and determine sentence in 
serious criminal cases—means that ordinary citizens are now responsible 
for making life-and-death decisions in murder trials. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 5, with this responsibility there has been more public discus-
sion about some death penalty issues. Most notably, questions about the 
propriety of capital punishment have received increased attention, and 
there has been a push for more information about the death penalty to 
be revealed by state officials—especially those in the Ministry 
of Justice who function as gatekeepers to the gallows—so that more 
meaningful discussions can occur about fundamental questions, such as 
whether the state should kill, and who, and how many.13 In this context, 
the question of how Japan executes has received more attention in recent 
years.
This rest of this chapter presents two sources of evidence to describe 
how the reality of hanging (Japan’s sole method of execution since 
1882) is depicted and discussed. It first summarizes recently discovered 
documents from the American Occupation (1945–1952) that reveal 
realities about hanging that long have been obscured by Japan’s secrecy 
policy. It then describes a capital trial that occurred in Osaka in 2011, 
where the defense directly challenged the constitutionality of hanging for 
the first time since Japan’s Supreme Court declared this method “con-
stitutional” in 1955. These sources of information raise a question for 
the fifteen Justices and thirty-some research clerks on Japan’s Supreme 
Court, and for the large majority of Japanese citizens who say they 
support capital punishment.14 Is it possible to execute a human being 
humanely?
13 See, for example, Taguchi Masayoshi, editor, Saibanin no Atama no Naka: 14nin 
no Hajimete Monogatari (Gendai Jinbunsha, 2013); and Fukui Atsushi, editor, Shikei to 
Mukiau Saibanin no Tame ni (Gendaijinbunsha, 2011).
14 In recent public opinion polls, approximately 80 percent of Japanese adults have said 
that the death penalty is “unavoidable.” As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the survey ques-
tions that elicit these answers are worded and framed in problematic ways. See Mai Sato, 
The Death Penalty in Japan: Will the Public Tolerate Abolition? (Springer VS, 2014).
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occuPation truths
States that practice capital punishment have a legitimation challenge: 
They need to distinguish how their killing differs from the criminal kill-
ing they aim to condemn.15 In the United States, one major legitima-
tion strategy has been the effort to kill more “softly” and “humanely.” 
This approach—to give the condemned a “kinder and gentler” death—
helps explain the frequent changes in execution method that America has 
experienced over the last century or so—from hanging to electrocution 
to the gas chamber to lethal injection. The American quest to kill with-
out imposing more pain than “necessary” is not so much about sparing 
the condemned from suffering as it is about convincing the administra-
tors and spectators of death that capital punishment is “civilized.”16
The Japanese state faces a similar legitimacy challenge but answers the 
call quite differently. There have been no significant changes in execution 
method in Japan since 1873, when a new gallows was introduced after 
an old-fashioned hanging was botched. Today, hanging remains the only 
method in each of Japan’s seven execution centers, and since a Supreme 
Court opinion in 1955 upholding the constitutionality of hanging, there 
has been little discussion of alternative methods of execution. The lack of 
debate is not because the Japanese way of hanging is humane. In Japan 
as in India, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, Iran, and Iraq, the point of 
hanging is to cut or crush the spinal cord by tearing it from the brain 
stem. If the initial shock of the drop is not fatal, death is completed by 
strangulation.17
Some hangings are botched in Japan, as they are in other coun-
tries. A former prosecutor once told me that a prison official told him 
that following one bungled hanging, a member of the execution team 
finished the job with a judo hold. But the secrecy surrounding capital 
16 David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 268–272.
17 Nakagawa Tomomasa Bengodan and Walter Rabl, editors, Koshukei wa Zangyaku na 
Keibatsu de wa Nai no ka? Shimbun to Hoigaku ga Kataru Shinjitsu (Gendaijinbunsha, 
2011).
15 Austin Sarat, When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition 
(Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 21.
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punishment in Japan helps explain the absence of controversy over exe-
cution methods. In effect, “killing secretly” instead of “killing softly” has 
been the Japanese state’s legitimation strategy. If one meaning of 
lethal injection in the United States is that state killing is different than 
ordinary murder because it is done humanely, the message conveyed in 
Japan has long been that state killing is state business.
The U.S. Occupation (1945–1952) bequeathed two death pen-
alty legacies to Japan. The first is the retention of capital punishment. 
As explained in Chapter 1, Occupation authorities could have abolished 
capital punishment in Japan as they did in Germany after World War II, 
but they elected not to, in large part because they were determined to 
put “war criminals” to death in the Tokyo War Crimes Trial.18 The sec-
ond Occupation legacy is a policy of “censored democracy” which has 
fostered a political consciousness of passive acquiescence to the silences 
dictated by Japan’s death penalty secrecy.19 Viewed historically, Japan’s 
policy of secrecy and silence is partly an American invention.
The documents discovered by Professor Nagata Kenji on microfiche 
in Japan’s National Diet Library contain the records of 46 persons who 
were hanged between July 1948 and March 1951, a period during which 
Japan was occupied by the American military and ruled by General 
Headquarters (GHQ) and General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).20 The documents include 
execution planning papers (shikei shikko kiansho), execution reports 
(shikei shikko shimatsusho), and letters. Most of the documents were com-
posed by prison wardens or by chiefs of the Japanese detention facilities 
where executions occurred. They are significant because they provide a 
peak behind the veil that has shrouded Japanese hangings since the pol-
icy of secrecy was established in the 1960s and 1970s. The 46 hang-
ings are a little less than 40 percent of all the hangings that occurred 
during this 33-month period. They may be unrepresentative in some 
respects, albeit in ways one cannot know because no records have been 
20 Nagata Kenji, GHQ Bunsho ga Kataru Nihon no Shikei Shikko: Kobunsho kara Semaru 
Koshukei no Jittai (Gendaijinbunsha, 2013).
18 Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Charles E. Tuttle 
Company, 1971); and Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in 
the Wake of World War II (Harvard University Asia Center, 2009).
19 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (W. W. Norton, 
1999), Chapter 14.
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discovered for the rest of the hangings carried out in this period. Still, 
the records that are available tell important truths about the age and 
social status of the condemned, their last words, and the duration of 
their executions.21
The Occupation records show that the age of the condemned at the 
time of execution has increased dramatically since the 1950s. In the 
Occupation sample, the median age at hanging was 27, with the young-
est person hanged being 23 and the oldest 63. By contrast, in recent 
decades the median age at hanging was 56—more than double the 
median age in the Occupation. In the 20 years between 1993 and 2012, 
almost 40 percent of all persons executed were over 60 years of age. It 
appears Japan has one of the most geriatric death rows in the world, and 
there seem to be two main reasons for this graying of its gallows. First, 
Japan’s homicide rate has dropped dramatically since the 1950s. The 
main proximate cause of the decline is a large decrease in the percentage 
of homicides committed by young men. As young killers have been van-
ishing, older killers have come to constitute a larger proportion of hom-
icide offenders.22 Second, in the 1940s and 1950s, executions in Japan 
were usually carried out within a few months of a finalized sentence of 
death. Today, by contrast, a sentence of death is often the prelude to a 
long appeals process. The secrecy that surrounds executions means lit-
tle media attention gets focused on how senior citizens are hanged. On 
Christmas Day in 2006, for example, the two people hanged in Tokyo 
were ages 75 and 77, respectively. Neither could walk to the gallows on 
his own, and both were in the process of appealing for retrial at the time 
of execution. These facts passed almost unnoticed in the perfunctory 
media coverage that followed their executions.
The Occupation documents also provide evidence that in Japan as 
in other death penalty nations, persons who get executed tend to be 
poor and poorly connected. Seven of the 46 persons hanged were eth-
nically Korean (15 percent). Since Koreans constituted only about 3 
percent of Japan’s total population at the end of the Pacific War, they 
are “overrepresented” in this execution sample by a factor of 5. In some 
22 David T. Johnson, “The Vanishing Killer: Japan’s Postwar Homicide Decline”, Social 
Science Japan Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1 (April 2006), pp. 73–90.
21 Kenji Nagata and David T. Johnson, “Hanging in Japan: What Occupation Era 
Documents and a Lay Judge Trial Teach About the State That Still Kills in Secret”, 
Punishment & Society, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 2014), pp. 227–257.
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capital cases, SCAP officials wondered whether Japanese judges discrim-
inated against Koreans in sentencing and therefore performed a special 
“Review of Sentences Imposed upon Koreans” after judicial appeals had 
been exhausted. More broadly, the Occupation records provide reason 
to believe there was capital bias against other have-nots, for nearly 70 
percent of the persons in the Occupation records (31/46) were unem-
ployed at the time they committed their capital offenses, and more 
than 30 percent (14/46) were homeless. These are far higher percent-
ages than the percentages of people in the general population who were 
unemployed and/or homeless.
In the Occupation records, communications between the condemned 
and their family and friends varied from case to case. Eight of the 46 
men in the GHQ/SCAP sample received no letters or visitors between 
the time their conviction was “finalized” (kakutei) and their execution, 
whereas a man who was hanged in 1950 received at least 14 visitors and 
66 letters in the 11 months preceding his execution (he also sent 280 
letters of his own). It appears there was substantially more freedom for 
death row inmates to communicate with outsiders in the 1940s and 
1950s than there is today. The secrecy that surrounds executions in 
Japan deepened in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the rise of an 
abolitionist movement, out of concern that the emergence of “support 
groups” for inmates on death row would make administering death more 
difficult for corrections officials, and out of a desire to prevent suicide by 
inmates who had been notified that soon they would be hanged.23
In contrast to death rows in the United States, where the culture of 
capital punishment finds expression in “last words,” “final meals,” and 
other “farewell” expressions, little is known about what the men and 
women on Japan’s death rows think and feel before their execution. But 
the Occupation documents do provide some insight into the Japanese 
past that can inform our musings about the present. In the Occupation, 
death row inmates’ “final words” took four main forms. Some inmates 
expressed thanks to officials of the correctional institutions for 
treat ing them kindly. Some left warnings for family members, as 
did a man hanged in Nagoya in 1951, who said his child should avoid 
gambling offenses of the kind that led to his own capital offense (rob-
bery-murder). Some offenders left haiku or tanka poems of the kind 
23 David T. Johnson, “Where the State Kills in Secret: Capital Punishment in Japan”, 
Punishment & Society, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July 2006), pp. 261–264.
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that have been composed by criminal offenders in Japan since the feudal 
period. A 33-year-old man hanged in Osaka in 1951 left the following 
forlorn poem:
The spring wind
Blew through the tree sprouts
But did not blow to this place
The last form of “final words” was the most common. In the Occupation 
records, 43 of the 46 persons (93 percent) expressed regret for their 
crimes. Regret, remorse, and apology have long been central values in 
Japanese culture and in Japan’s criminal court communities, but the 
extent of their presence in these Occupation documents is striking. The 
final words of the condemned were recorded by prison officials who may 
have omitted messages (“I am innocent”) they did not like and who may 
have highlighted messages (“Thank you, and I am sorry”) that were 
welcome, but the bias of the recorders probably cannot fully explain the 
widespread presence of regret in the final words of the condemned.24
Finally, the Occupation records enable us to make several observa-
tions about time and executions. For one thing, executions during the 
Occupation were less concentrated in time than they have been in recent 
years. In 1950, for example, hangings occurred on at least 21 different 
days during the year, resulting in a total of 31 executions. By compar-
ison, in 2008, when Japan executed 15 persons—the largest number 
of executions the country had carried out since 1975—all of the hang-
ings occurred on only five days. Moreover, 27 of the 46 persons in the 
Occupation records (almost 60 percent) were executed alone on the day 
of their demise. In recent years, executions in Japan have almost always 
involved two or more persons who get hanged on the same day—often 
at the same gallows. The increased “lumpiness” of executions appears to 
be designed to minimize the number of occasions when hangings could 
attract public and media attention.
Hangings in the Occupation, like hangings in subsequent decades, 
usually occurred in the morning. In the Occupation records, the exe-
cution start times ranged from 9:19 a.m. to 2:39 p.m., but 42 of the 
24 Kenji Nagata and David T. Johnson, “Hanging in Japan: What Occupation Era 
Documents and a Lay Judge Trial Teach About the State That Still Kills in Secret”, 
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3 WHEN THE STATE KILLS IN SECRET  51
46 hangings occurred before noon, and the four that occurred in the 
afternoon all occurred in Osaka. Hangings in Japan tend to be sched-
uled for the morning in order to reduce stress on the execution team 
and minimize the possibility of leaks to the media. Members of Japanese 
execution teams are typically told of their job assignment the day before 
a hanging, they are ordered not to tell anyone about it, and they are 
expected not to refuse the assignment. In some cases, executioners are 
only told of their assignment on the morning a hanging occurs, appar-
ently out of fear that if told in advance they might not show up for work.
The duration of hangings in the Occupation records ranged from 
10 minutes and 55 seconds (in Miyagi in 1950) to 21 minutes (in 
Nagoya in 1951). Thus, the longest hanging was almost twice as long 
as the shortest. The average length of all 46 hangings, from the time of 
the “drop” to the time a doctor confirmed death, was 14 minutes and 
15 seconds, with a median time of 14 minutes. In the United States, 
three criteria have been identified by courts to indicate whether an exe-
cution method provides “a death within constitutional limits”: the death 
must be painless, it must be non-lingering, and it must be instantane-
ous. Conversely, a death that is painful, lingering, or not instantaneous 
raises questions about “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It is difficult to discern whether 
Occupation executions were problematic in these ways, for the records 
are not exhaustive accounts of what transpired during executions, and 
they were written by state officials who may not have recorded certain 
problematic events. Some doctors may also have allowed inmates to hang 
for several minutes after all signs of life had disappeared before declaring 
the person dead. Still, the Occupation evidence is troubling, for all of the 
Japanese hangings exceed by at least a factor of five the “two minutes or 
less” American standard for a “non-lingering” death that has been used 
to assess executions, and the Japanese average is more than seven times 
longer than this American threshold.
Japan’s method of hanging has changed little since the Meiji 
period, so there is little reason to believe that execution lengths have 
become significantly shorter in the two-thirds of a century since the 
Occupation ended. If hangings in Japan are like executions in jurisdic-
tions where state killings are more transparent, then some surely have 
been “botched” because of problems with the length or placement of 
the rope, or with the depth of the drop, or with the physiology of the 
condemned (among other possibilities). Research in the United States 
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finds that botched executions take place with regular frequency. If 
we assume that hangings in Japan have been carried out no more and 
no less smoothly than executions in America (where research reveals a 
“botch rate” of 2.7–4.5 percent), then 19–32 of the 713 persons hanged 
between January 1946 and July 2017 would have had their executions 
botched. That would be, on the average, one botched hanging every 
two or three years. If capital punishment in Japan is “normal” in this 
respect, then the issue of hanging could be litigated under Article 36 
of the Constitution, which declares that “cruel punishments are abso-
lutely forbidden.”25 The next section examines the only significant effort 
in recent years to challenge the constitutionality of hanging in Japan.
hanging on trial
On July 5, 2009, 41-year-old Takami Sunao set light to a bucket of 
gasoline he had poured on the floor of a pachinko parlor in the city of 
Osaka. The subsequent blaze killed five people and injured 10 more. By 
Takami’s own account, his attack was motivated by anger over his life 
circumstances, including employment difficulties and financial debt, and 
by the desire to exact revenge on a woman he referred to as “Mihi,” 
who had been making his life miserable—and who did not exist. Despite 
his delusions, Takami admitted that his mass murder was premeditated. 
Moreover, before, during, and after his trial, he frequently said that he 
would like to die and that he would accept a sentence of death.
In Japanese criminal justice, premeditated murder that leads to the 
loss of more than two lives usually results in a death sentence— 
and so it did in Takami’s case when the Osaka District Court condemned 
him to death on October 31, 2011. But unlike many criminal trials in 
Japan, this one was more than a rubber stamp ratifying the outcome 
prosecutors sought. Takami’s trial lasted 60 days, making it the longest 
lay judge trial in the country up until that point. Two main issues were 
contested at his trial. First, the defense team argued that Takami lacked 
criminal responsibility (sekinin noryoku) because he was schizophrenic, 
while prosecutors argued (and the court ultimately concluded) that the 
defendant was mentally competent at the time of the crimes even though 
25 Kenji Nagata and David T. Johnson, “Hanging in Japan: What Occupation Era 
Documents and a Lay Judge Trial Teach About the State That Still Kills in Secret”, 
Punishment & Society, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 2014), pp. 240–242.
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he was delusional due to his frequent use of methamphetamines. Second, 
the defense argued that hanging violates the prohibition against “cruel 
punishments” in Article 36 of Japan’s Constitution. The court ultimately 
rejected this argument too, but it did so in language that recognized 
some of the realities of hanging that have been hidden from the Japanese 
public for decades.
Defense lawyers in this case wondered about the wisdom of challeng-
ing hanging because they knew that if the court rejected their claims, 
the effect might be to bolster the legitimacy of capital punishment. In 
the United States, efforts to “humanize” methods of execution have 
entrenched the death penalty, making what remains of this institution 
more resistant to repeal.26 But in a case that seemed like an evidentiary 
slam dunk for the prosecution (in addition to Takami’s confession, there 
was surveillance video of him starting the fire), defense lawyers believed 
that challenging hanging was one of the few ways his life might be saved. 
They also felt dismayed over how thoroughly Japanese defense attor-
neys had acquiesced to the legality of capital punishment over the past 
half-century.
The jurisprudence of capital punishment in Japan is easily summa-
rized because there is little of it. In 1948, the Supreme Court held that 
capital punishment is not necessarily a “cruel punishment” even though 
some methods of execution are, such as burning at the stake or boiling 
in a cauldron—methods that had been used in Japan before the Meiji 
oligarchs encountered Western sensibilities about criminal punishment 
in the last third of the nineteenth century and reformed them in order 
to appear more “civilized” to the outside world. The same decision 
declared that a method of execution such as hanging that is deemed 
“constitutional” at present could become a “cruel punishment” under 
Article 36 if social circumstances and human morality changed. In 1955, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed this position when it found that, com-
pared with other methods of execution then being used in the world 
(strangulation, beheading, shooting, the electric chair, and the gas cham-
ber), hanging is not an especially “cruel punishment” under Article 36.27 
26 Hugo Adam Bedau, “An Abolitionist’s Survey of the Death Penalty in America 
Today”, in Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul Cassell, editors, Debating the Death Penalty: 
Should America Have Capital Punishment? The Experts from Both Sides Make Their Case 
(Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 15–50.
27 Petra Schmidt, Capital Punishment in Japan (Brill, 2002), pp. 90–100.
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Between this opinion in 1955 and Takami’s arson attack in 2009—more 
than half a century—the constitutionality of hanging was never litigated 
in Japan.28 The presence of lay judges at Takami’s trial created a new 
opportunity to challenge the legal legitimacy of a method that has disap-
peared in the United States.29
Takami’s defense team persuaded the Chief Judge in Osaka to ask the 
Ministry of Justice for information about whether persons who had been 
hanged in the past were injured in the process, but the Ministry refused 
the request with an empty bureaucratic formula: “kaito itashikanemasu” 
(“we are unable to reply to your request”). An Austrian scientist named 
Walter Rabl did testify at trial about the research he had done follow-
ing the autopsies of approximately 300 persons who had committed sui-
cide by hanging. Rabl, the President of the Austrian Society of Forensic 
Medicine, agreed to testify because he “was shocked that in a modern 
civilized country like Japan judicial hanging…is accepted as a ‘non-cruel’ 
method of execution” and because “there are so many misunderstand-
ings and factual errors concerning death caused by judicial hanging.” 
Rabl said that “any method of execution is cruel and incompatible with 
the Hippocratic oath,” and he concluded that “judicial hanging is espe-
cially cruel in two respects”: because the consciousness of a hanged per-
son lasts at least 5–8 seconds and sometimes as long as 2–3 minutes, 
with severe injury and pain the norm; and because the result of judicial 
hanging for any individual is not predictable. Botched hangings, includ-
ing decapitation, which Rabl observed in 2 percent of the corpses he 
examined, can occur even when an execution is carried out “according to 
standards.”30
Former prosecutor Tsuchimoto Takeshi also testified for the defense 
in Takami’s trial. He had worked as a prosecutor for 30 years before 
30 Kenji Nagata and David T. Johnson, “Hanging in Japan: What Occupation Era 
Documents and a Lay Judge Trial Teach About the State That Still Kills in Secret”, 
Punishment & Society, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 2014), pp. 242–247.
28 Nakagawa Tomomasa Bengodan and Walter Rabl, editors, Koshukei wa Zangyaku na 
Keibatsu de wa Nai no ka? Shimbun to Hoigaku ga Kataru Shinjitsu (Gendaijinbunsha, 2011).
29 Until recently, hanging was authorized in the United States in Delaware, New 
Hampshire, and Washington, but the state Supreme Courts in Delaware (2016) and 
Washington (2018) have declared their capital sentencing procedures unconstitutional and 
resentenced all death-row prisoners to life without parole, while New Hampshire’s legis-
lature abolished that state’s death penalty in 2019. Hanging is not authorized in the U.S. 
federal and military death penalty systems.
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becoming a professor at Tsukuba University. After resigning from 
the procuracy, his conservative positions on crime control and crimi-
nal justice were frequently quoted in the media. But six months before 
Takami’s trial, a book was published about Tsuchimoto’s prosecution 
of a man who had committed murder in 1966 and who was executed 
in 1971 despite Tsuchimoto’s requests that he be granted clemency.31 
Tsuchimoto did not believe the offender was actually innocent, but he 
had exchanged letters with the inmate while the latter was on death row, 
and he had come to believe in the possibility of the inmate’s redemption 
and atonement. When Tsuchimoto spoke with Takami’s defense law-
yers before he testified at Takami’s trial, the former prosecutor expressed 
ambivalence about appearing as an expert witness. He had serious 
concerns about the propriety of hanging as an execution method, but he 
also supported capital punishment in principle and feared that he would 
be seen as betraying his friends and former colleagues in the procuracy 
if he testified for the defense. As he anticipated, when Tsuchimoto agreed 
to testify following persistent requests from the defense, prosecutors 
claimed he was violating the obligation of secrecy under Japan’s National 
Public Service Law. In the end, however, Tsuchimoto was permitted to 
testify, and this was his main message:
The death penalty itself is not unconstitutional, but death by hanging vio-
lates Article 36 of the Constitution…It is a gruesome and cruel punish-
ment that one cannot bear to look at directly…Following the sound of the 
footplate being removed, the rope cut into the death row inmate’s neck, 
leaving the inmate hanging in midair. A medical officer and other officials 
checked for the inmate’s pulse and other signs, then announced that the 
inmate had died…When I looked at the person, who just a few moments 
earlier was breathing and warm, having their hands and legs bound so they 
couldn’t resist and then swinging [on the rope], I thought it was grue-
some…[Hanging] may have been appropriate at the time [of the Supreme 
Court’s 1955 decision], but today it would be rash to judge that it is 
appropriate.32
31 Horikawa Keiko, Sabakareta Inochi: Shikeishu kara Todoita Tegami (Kodansha, 2011).
32 Mainichi Japan, “Japan Court Deliberates Hanging’s Unconstitutionality”, October 
11, 2011.
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Several victims and survivors of Takami’s crimes harshly rebuked his 
defense lawyers for having the temerity to challenge hanging for such a 
heinous offender. Ultimately, the Osaka District Court sentenced Takami 
to death by hanging. Three pages of its 27-page opinion addressed the 
method of execution, including these words:
The death penalty inevitably inflicts mental and physical pains on the 
inmate and involves brutality to some extent. But since the Constitution 
allows the death penalty to be retained, it evidently considers these pains to 
be unavoidable and inevitable. Therefore, an execution method constitutes 
‘cruel punishment’, which is prohibited by Article 36 of the Constitution, 
only when it is especially brutal among possible execution methods…
Obviously it is not required that an execution method relieve the mental 
and physical pains of the inmate to the utmost extent and keep them to 
some minimum, as if execution is a medical treatment…A method of exe-
cution should be considered a ‘cruel punishment’ only in the limited case 
when it is so impersonal and inhuman that it shocks a person with ordinary 
emotions. Otherwise, what kind of execution method is adopted is a mat-
ter to be decided through the discretion of the legislature.33
The idea in the Court’s opinion that came to stand for the whole is 
that an inmate who is hanged “naturally must endure some mental and 
physical suffering” (kutsu wa tozen kanju subeki). Yet this conception of 
so-called “forgivable cruelty” seems inconsistent with the absolutist lan-
guage of Article 36 of the Constitution, which states that “cruel punish-
ments are absolutely forbidden.”
As for the citizens who served as lay judges at Takami’s trial, two 
themes emerged from their comments at the post-sentencing press 
conference. First, the lay judges seemed resigned to the inevitability of 
“cruelty” in the hanging process. Humane execution may well be a prac-
tical impossibility, but this court diverged from some American jurispru-
dence by finding that it is not necessary to keep the mental and physical 
pains of an executed inmate “to some minimum.” Second, the lay judges 
stressed that Japan needs to encourage deeper debate about its death 
33 See “A Judgment of the Osaka District Court, October 31, 2011”, at The Law Office 
of Goto Sadato, http://sgotolaw.com/jd.html.
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penalty, so that policy and practice better reflect “citizens’ sensibilities” 
(shimin kankaku).34
In 2013 the Osaka High Court rejected Takami’s appeal and upheld 
his death sentence and the constitutionality of hanging. It held that 
Takami’s own conduct was “extremely cruel,” and that “hanging can-
not be called cruel because the duration of felt suffering by the con-
demned is brief.” The High Court also echoed the lay judges when it 
encouraged Japan’s Diet to promote public discussion of execution 
methods. It said “leaving hanging as it is for 140 years without legal 
change is certainly not a desirable legislative policy,” and it noted that 
the current method of hanging is “inconsistent in many respects” with 
the execution ordinance (fukoku) that was promulgated in 1873. Former 
prosecutor Tsuchimoto called the High Court’s decision “highly signif-
icant” because it exposed “the legislative branch’s negligence in failing 
to discuss execution methods,” but in 2016 the Supreme Court final-
ized Takami’s death sentence without seriously engaging the issue of 
hanging.35 As of this writing in July 2019, Takami is still alive, but he 
could be hanged any day. Except for a handful of government officials, 
no one will know until after it occurs.
Problems and Paradoxes
The Osaka District Court’s recognition that executions “unavoidably” 
involve some kind of cruelty is consistent with findings from American 
research which conclude that even a routine or “properly performed” 
execution can cause intense pain and lingering death, and which find 
that executions—no matter the method—are regularly botched. Japan’s 
jejune jurisprudence of executions seems more candid about the “inev-
itability” of cruelty than American courts have been, but the country 
34 For an insightful discussion of Takami’s case, see Horikawa Keiko, “Koshukei wa 
Zangyaku ka”, Sekai, No. 825 (January 2012), pp. 63–72, and Sekai, No. 827 (February 
2012), pp. 122–131.
35 Kenji Nagata and David T. Johnson, “Hanging in Japan: What Occupation Era 
Documents and a Lay Judge Trial Teach About the State That Still Kills in Secret”, 
Punishment & Society, Vol. 16, No. 3 (July 2014), p. 247.
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cannot escape some of the problems and paradoxes that have plagued 
execution methods in America. This conclusion focuses on four of 
them.36
First, there is no humane way to execute a human being. There is a 
large body of evidence documenting problems with capital punish-
ment in America, from wrongful convictions and racial bias to geo-
graphic disparities and failures of deterrence. The evidence about capital 
punishment in Japan is more limited because the subject has been less 
researched, but it points to a similar conclusion, that the death penalty 
involves godlike actions without godlike wisdom or skills. It is impos-
sible to construct a system of capital punishment that reaches only the 
rare, right cases, without also occasionally condemning the innocent or 
the undeserving. It is also impossible to construct a system of executions 
that takes the lives of heinous offenders in a manner that is humane. The 
United States has tried to do the latter—to realize the dream of a perfect 
execution—and it has failed.37 Japan has hardly tried at all. One might 
call the Japanese approach a prudential form of “legal realism” or a wise 
refusal to be seduced by an “impossible dream.” But one could also call 
it a failure of legal aspiration that parallels the tendency of the country’s 
courts (described in Chapter 2) to assume that death is not a “different” 
form of punishment requiring special procedures and protections for 
the accused. In law as in life, failures of aspiration can be even more 
troubling than failures of performance.
Second, hanging in Japan raises a question about the difference 
between criminal violence and the violence that law employs to punish 
crime. In the United States, frequent efforts to improve execution meth-
ods are partly a search for a way of taking life that signals the superiority 
of state killing over the killings that citizens commit. After more than a 
half-century of silence about the propriety of hanging, Japan may now 
be starting its own search for a method of execution that tries to sig-
nal “superiority” of this kind. It remains to be seen how diligent Japan’s 
37 Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, “Perfect Execution: Abolitionism and the Paradox of 
Lethal Injection”, in Charles J. Ogletree and Austin Sarat, editors, The Road to Abolition: 
The Future of Capital Punishment in the United States (New York University Press, 2009), 
pp. 215–251.
36 Kenji Nagata and David T. Johnson, “Hanging in Japan: What Occupation Era 
Documents and a Lay Judge Trial Teach About the State That Still Kills in Secret”, 
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search will be, but the American experience provides ample reason for 
pessimism about the results.38 At the same time, the Occupation docu-
ments and the Osaka trial suggest that as it relates to Japan, the question 
about the distinctiveness of law’s violence may no longer be hanging in 
oblivion.
Third, efforts to reform how the state kills confront death penalty 
opponents in Japan with the same paradox that their American counter-
parts face. On the one hand, if attempts to challenge hanging are aban-
doned, there will be gratuitous suffering by people who are executed. 
On the other hand, if legal challenges to hanging in Japan continue, 
“victory” in the form of reform of execution methods will prove pyr-
rhic if it means complicity in the state’s effort to accomplish the sort of 
anesthetized death that fosters collective amnesia about the violence of 
capital punishment. This, anyway, is what has happened in the United 
States.39 Japanese death penalty reformers would be wise to recognize 
the risk of trying to change their country’s execution method. Execution 
reform is often a two-edged sword, and “the better” (a “softer” method 
of execution) can be the enemy of “the best” (abolition).
Finally, the Japanese state continues to kill in secret, so little is known 
about how it hangs, but what we learn from the Occupation docu-
ments and the Osaka trial is troubling. Hanging in twenty-first-century 
Japan is no more humane than hanging in nineteenth-century Nagoya 
or Nagasaki. As for the future, there is little reason to expect Japan’s 
Supreme Court to find hanging problematic for the simple reason that 
it rarely finds anything constitutionally suspect. Since its creation in 
1947, Japan’s top court has struck down fewer than 10 statutes on con-
stitutional grounds.40 By comparison, Germany’s constitutional court, 
which was established several years later, has struck down over 600. The 
most promising venue for challenging the propriety of hanging in Japan 
is the court of public opinion. In the years to come, the country’s lay 
38 Austin Sarat, Gruesome Spectacles: Botched Executions and America’s Death Penalty 
(Stanford University Press, 2014).
39 Deborah W. Denno, “For Execution Methods Challenges, the Road to Abolition 
Is Paved with Paradox”, in Charles J. Ogletree and Austin Sarat, editors, The Road to 
Abolition: The Future of Capital Punishment in the United States (New York University, 
2009), pp. 183–214.
40 David S. Law, “The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan”, 
Texas Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 7, pp. 1545–1594.
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judge system will provide more opportunities for capital defendants and 
defense lawyers to raise questions about the legality and legitimacy of a 
method of execution that has hardly changed in a century and a half. 
Japanese governments have long acted as if state killing is state busi-
ness, but now that citizens are participating in decisions about who to 
send to the gallows, they are wanting to know more about what happens 
after a sentence of death has been imposed. Surely some members of the 
Japanese media should be permitted to watch executions so that they 
can provide information for citizens to make more enlightened judg-
ments about the reality of capital punishment. Until such reforms occur, 
secrecy will remain a problematic premise for administering the ultimate 
punishment.
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Abstract  On the surface, it appears the United States has a more  serious 
problem with wrongful convictions than Japan, for it has uncovered 
many more cases of this kind. Yet this gap is probably more apparent than 
real, for Japan does a poor job of discovering wrongful convictions. To 
reduce the problem of wrongful convictions in Japanese criminal justice 
and capital punishment, reformers must make structural reforms, but they 
must also confront a “culture of denial” (hitei no bunka) that makes it 
difficult to acknowledge mistakes.
Keywords  Hakamada Iwao · Wrongful conviction ·  
Miscarriage of justice · Structural reform · Culture of denial
Hakamada Iwao was sentenced to death in 1968 for the murder of four 
people. He was released in 2014 because of evidence of his innocence. 
At the time of his arrest he was a young man. At the time of his release 
he was 78 years old—diabetic, deluded about his identity, and dimly 
aware of his own situation. In the five years since he was released, pros-
ecutors have continued to claim that Hakamada is guilty, but as of this 
writing he remains free, living with his sister in the city of Hamamatsu, 
struggling to recover his health, and—as a matter of law—still a con-
victed killer under sentence of death. Time will tell whether Hakamada 
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is formally acquitted at a retrial (which may or may not occur), but the 
three judges on the Shizuoka District Court who ordered his release left 
little doubt about their view:
In addition to approving a retrial for the defendant, it is natural to suspend 
the execution of his death sentence. Moreover, based on this court’s dis-
cretion, we conclude that it is also appropriate to suspend the execution of 
the defendant’s confinement. This defendant has been convicted and incar-
cerated for an extremely long period of time under the threat of capital 
punishment based on important evidence that may well have been planted 
by the investigating authorities. At present, when the high probability of 
the defendant’s innocence has been made clear, detaining him any longer 
would violate justice to an intolerable extent.1
I believe that Hakamada is innocent and that his confinement for 
almost half a century is an abomination of justice. I also believe that his 
case is not an isolated accident.2 Wrongful convictions result from human 
and systemic errors that recur on a regular basis.3 Hakamada’s half-cen-
tury nightmare resulted from the interaction of several such errors:
• Hakamada falsely confessed to crimes he did not commit. His 
admissions of guilt were coerced through interrogation practices 
that lasted more than 250 hours and that broke his will to resist.
• Japanese police apparently planted evidence—clothes in a miso tank 
near the scene of the crime—in order to frame Hakamada.
• Japanese prosecutors concealed from the defense more than 100 
photographs and statements which might have cleared Hakamada 
decades before they finally acknowledged the existence of this 
 critical evidence.
• Japanese media coverage of the four murders put pressure on police, 
prosecutors, and courts to produce a conviction. It also contributed 
to the “tunnel vision” and “confirmation bias” that afflicted legal 
officials in this case.
1 David T. Johnson, “An Innocent Man: Hakamada Iwao and the Problem of Wrongful 
Convictions in Japan”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 13 (2015), pp. 1–38.
2 David T. Johnson, “Wrongful Convictions and the Culture of Denial in Japanese 
Criminal Justice”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 13 (2015), pp. 1–10.
3 Dan Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process (Harvard University 
Press, 2012).
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• Hakamada’s trial failed to ascertain the accuracy of the evidence pro-
duced by police and prosecutors, and his defense lawyers contributed 
to this failure. Criminal trials provide a number of mechanisms that 
are supposed to safeguard the accuracy of verdicts, including the 
presumption of innocence, a burden of proof “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” vigorous cross-examination, and assurances that the adjudi-
cators will be impartial and objective. All of these safeguards miscar-
ried in Hakamada’s case.
• For decades, Japan’s appellate courts failed to acknowledge prob-
lems in Hakamada’s case. In effect, they repeatedly ratified the fore-
going errors while Hakamada lost his mind on death row.
A criminal case can go wrong in two main ways. A person who com-
mitted a crime may escape punishment, or a person may be convicted 
and punished for a crime that he or she did not commit. Every crimi-
nal justice system makes mistakes of both kinds, and most cultures and 
criminal justice professionals believe that the worst mistake is the false 
conviction of people who are actually innocent. As British jurist William 
Blackstone observed in the eighteenth century, “it is better that ten 
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” An aversion to 
convicting the innocent is also well established in Japanese legal culture. 
Indeed, in Japan, even people who are arrested but not convicted are 
often deemed to be victims of a “miscarriage of justice” (enzai). This 
kind of criticism is seldom heard in the United States, where it is widely 
accepted that some people who get arrested will not be convicted. This 
difference suggests that in some respects Japanese people may be more 
sensitive than Americans to criminal injustice.
The problem of wrongful conviction in Japan cannot be understood 
without considering how it compares with other countries. Here as in 
many areas of social research, to know only one country is to know no 
country well. Comparison with the United States is especially instructive 
because there have been many studies of wrongful conviction there and 
because the United States and Japan are both developed democracies that 
retain capital punishment and continue to carry out executions on a reg-
ular basis. On the surface, the United States seems to have a more seri-
ous problem with wrongful convictions than Japan, for it has uncovered 
many more cases of this kind. But I believe this gap is more apparent than 
real, for Japan does a deplorable job of discovering wrongful convictions. 
To reduce the problem of wrongful convictions in Japanese criminal 
64  D. T. JOHNSON
justice, reformers must confront a “culture of denial” (hitei no bunka) 
that makes it difficult for police, prosecutors, and judges to acknowledge 
their mistakes and that makes the public and the media complicit in their 
own dimsightedness.4
wrongful convictions in america and euroPe
The United States has been the subject of more wrongful conviction 
research than any country in the world.5 The results are troubling. From 
1989 to 2017, more than 2100 persons were wrongfully convicted and 
subsequently released from prison because of evidence of their inno-
cence.6 That is 6 exonerations per month for 29 years (1 every 5 days). 
Forty-seven percent of these victims of wrongful conviction were African-
American even though African-Americans make up only 13 percent of 
the U.S. population. Victims of wrongful conviction spent an average 
of 9 years in prison before being released, and many spent two or three 
times that long. About three-quarters were wrongfully convicted of hom-
icide or sexual assault—crimes which tend to leave physical evidence 
behind that later can be tested, and crimes which attract more media 
attention than most criminal cases do. Less than one-quarter of these 
victims were exonerated based on DNA evidence, partly because bio-
logical evidence (saliva, semen, blood, and the like) is available in only 
10–15 percent of serious felony cases. The leading causes of wrongful 
4 There are several good documentaries about wrongful convictions in Japan. One is about 
Hakamada, directed by Kim Sung-woong: “Yume no Ma no Yo no Naka” (Kimoon Film, 
2016). See also Kim’s “Sayama: Mienai Tejo o Hazusu made” (2013), about a burakumin 
man named Ishikawa Kazuo, who was released in 1994 after serving 31 years in prison, and 
who has been seeking a retrial ever since his conviction for the kidnapping and murder of a 
16-year-old girl in 1963; and “Gokutomo” (2018), about friendships between five men, all 
of whom were convicted of murder: Hakamada Iwao (released from death row in 2014), 
Ishikawa Kazuo (released on parole in 1994), Sugaya Toshikazu (acquitted at retrial in 
2009), Sakurai Shoji (acquitted at retrial in 2011), and Sugiyama Takao (acquitted at retrial 
in 2011).
5 One exemplary work of scholarship on wrongful convictions in America is Mark Godsey, 
Blind Justice: A Former Prosecutor Exposes the Psychology and Politics of Wrongful Convictions 
(University of California Press, 2017). Another is Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the 
Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (Harvard University Press, 2011).
6 The National Registry of Exonerations, at https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoner-
ation/Pages/about.aspx.
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conviction in these cases were perjury and false accusation, official 
 misconduct, mistaken witness testimony, false or misleading forensic 
evidence, and false confessions. All of these causes were operative in the 
wrongful conviction of Hakamada Iwao, and they have shipwrecked jus-
tice in other Japanese cases too.
All wrongful convictions are tragic, but the most worrisome are those 
that result in a mistaken sentence of death. From 1973 to 2018, 164 
persons in 28 American states were released from death row because of 
evidence of their innocence.7 That is an average of 3.6 death row exon-
erations per year for 46 years. More than half of these exonerations (84) 
were of black men, and more than half (83) occurred in just five states: 
Florida (28), Illinois (21), Texas (13), Louisiana (11), and Oklahoma 
(10). Many analysts believe that some wrongly condemned persons 
have been executed. For example, Carlos DeLuna, a poor Hispanic man 
with childlike intelligence, was executed in Texas in 1989 based on one, 
nighttime, cross-ethnic eyewitness identification with no corroborating 
forensic evidence.8 There is a growing list of executed persons whose 
guilt has been called into serious doubt following post-execution inves-
tigations. America’s wrongful executions may also include Ruben Cantu 
(executed in Texas in 1993), Larry Griffin (Missouri, 1995), David 
Spence (Texas, 1997), Claude Jones (Texas, 2000), and Cameron Todd 
Willingham (Texas, 2004). In 2015, the U.S. Justice Department and 
the FBI formally acknowledged that nearly every examiner in an FBI 
forensic squad overstated forensic hair matches for two decades before the 
year 2000. Of 28 forensic examiners who testified to hair matches in a 
total of 268 trials, 26 were found to have overstated the evidence, and 
95 percent of the overstatements favored the prosecution. Defendants 
were sentenced to death in 12 percent of those trials.
While the foregoing figures are troubling, the true scale of America’s 
wrongful conviction problem cannot be known because some wrongly 
convicted persons are never discovered. Educated estimates of the 
 percentage of criminal cases resulting in wrongful conviction have been 
made, and they range from 3 to 5 percent in capital homicide cases, and 
7 Death Penalty Information Center, at https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and- 
death-penalty.
8 James S. Liebman and the Columbia DeLuna Project, The Wrong Carlos: Anatomy of a 
Wrongful Conviction (Columbia University Press, 2014).
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8 percent or more in cases of sexual assault.9 These estimates are much 
larger than criminal justice experts and professionals supposed before the 
“discovery of innocence” in the 1990s raised awareness of this problem 
in American criminal justice.10 The steep decline of capital punishment 
in the United States since 2000—death sentences and executions have 
plummeted—has several causes, including a sharp decrease in the hom-
icide rate and improved capital defense, but one of the most important 
causes seems to be concern about miscarriages of justice, which has made 
prosecutors, judges, juries, and governors more cautious about capital 
punishment.
The problem of innocence is hardly the only problem afflicting 
America’s death penalty system. As Chapter 2 described, death  sentences 
are also imposed on defendants who are guilty but do not deserve to 
be executed. A study of more than 4500 death sentences imposed 
between 1973 and 1995 found that 68 percent were overturned on 
appeal because of “serious reversible error” in the original trial. When 
these cases were retried, 82 percent resulted in a sentence less than 
death, and 7 percent ended in acquittal. Findings such as these suggest 
that the actual practice of American capital punishment has all the con-
sistency of a lottery. Errors in finding facts and assessing culpability are so 
widespread that American capital punishment must be called “a broken 
system.”11
The problem of wrongful convictions is serious in European countries 
too. In the former West Germany, for example, Dr. Karl Peters identified 
1415 wrongful conviction cases between 1951 and 1964—an average of 
101 wrongful convictions per year in a country that had 40 percent fewer 
people than Japan. The causes were much the same as those that have 
been identified by wrongful conviction researchers in the United States.12 
11 James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Valerie West, “A Broken System: Error Rates in 
Capital Cases, 1973–1995”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=232712.
12 See Nose Hiroyuki, et al., Gohan no Kenkyu: Nishi Doitsu no Saishin Jirei no Bunseki 
(Hokkaido Daigaku Toshokankokai, 1981). Dr. Peters’ study was originally published in 
Germany in 1974.
9 Dan Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process (Harvard University 
Press, 2012), p. 4.
10 Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna L. De Boef, and Amber E. Boydstun, The Decline of 
the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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The wheels of all criminal justice systems are turned by the same imper-
fect operations of human beings: memory, recognition, inference, social 
influence, self-interest, and so on. Criminal verdicts in Germany, the 
United States, Japan, and other countries can be no better than the com-
bined result of these flawed human activities.13
Yet the risk of convicting innocent people is not equal across nations. 
There is variation from country to country within the European Union, 
and the risk of wrongful conviction in the United States is probably 
greater than in most countries of Western Europe because American sys-
tems of adversarial criminal justice strike a different balance between the 
need to obtain convictions and the need to find the truth than do inquis-
itorial criminal justice systems on the European continent. American 
criminal justice also relies on plea bargaining to dispose of more than 90 
percent of all criminal cases, and errors in fact-finding may be more fre-
quent in cases handled this way than in those that go to trial. For these 
reasons, wrongful convictions appear to be more frequent in the United 
States than in countries such as Germany, France, and Holland, even 
when taking into account differences in population and caseload.14
wrongful convictions in JaPan
Nobody knows how many persons have been wrongfully convicted in 
Japan, and even educated estimates are rare because few decent stud-
ies have been done. One recent effort to count identified 162 cases of 
confirmed or strongly suspected wrongful conviction between 1910 and 
2010, all of which were discovered in the postwar period, and more than 
half of which involved homicide.15 See Table 4.1. In this century-long 
13 Dan Simon, In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process (Harvard University 
Press, 2012).
14 On wrongful convictions in comparative perspective, see the studies in these two 
books: C. Ronald Huff and Martin Killias, editors, Wrongful Conviction: International 
Perspectives on Miscarriages of Justice (Temple University Press, 2008); and C. Ronald Huff 
and Martin Killias, editors, Wrongful Convictions and Miscarriages of Justice: Causes and 
Remedies in North American and European Criminal Justice Systems (Routledge, 2013).
15 Makoto Ibusuki and Nichibenren Enzai Gen’in Kyumei Daisansha Kikan Wakingu 
Gurupu, editors, Enzai Gen’in o Chosa Seyo: Kokkai ni Daisansha Kikan no Setchi o (Keiso 
Shobo, 2012), pp. 155–168.
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survey, the average number of wrongful convictions per decade is 16, 
with a high of 37 in the 1950s and lows of 2 or fewer in the 1910s, the 
1920s, and the 1930s. But of course, 162 wrongful convictions in one 
century is surely a major undercount. In my view, this number probably 
represents the “tip of an iceberg” of wrongful convictions in Japan, for 
three reasons: because old wrongful conviction cases are difficult to doc-
ument (the prewar totals are implausibly low); because less serious crimes 
(such as drug offenses) fell outside the scope of this study; and most 
fundamentally, because many cases of wrongful conviction are never dis-
covered at all. We therefore need to ask: how big is the rest of Japan’s 
iceberg?
Since 1945, only ten persons have been sentenced to death or life 
imprisonment in Japan and subsequently acquitted at retrial. Hakamada 
Iwao could become number eleven, if he receives a retrial (prosecutors 
are resisting) and if he does not die before a retrial is completed. This is 
an average of one exoneration every seven years—a small fraction of the 
frequency in the United States. The tiny number allows two contrasting 
interpretations.16
Table 4.1 Wrongful 
convictions in Japan by 
decade, 1910–2010
Source Makoto Ibusuki and Nichibenren Enzai Gen’in Kyumei 
Daisansha Kikan Wakingu Gurupu, editors, Enzai Gen’in o Chosa 














16 David T. Johnson, “Wrongful Convictions and the Culture of Denial in Japanese 
Criminal Justice”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 13 (2015), pp. 3–4.
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On the one hand, Japanese prosecutors tend to be cautious about 
charging cases. In fact, a conservative charging policy—to avoid taking 
defendants to trial who could be acquitted—is one of the main reasons 
for the country’s high conviction rate. This charging policy is enforced 
through organizational mechanisms such as a kessai system of hierarchi-
cal consultation and review, whereby front-line prosecutors consult with 
their superiors about the propriety of their charge and sentence-request 
decisions, and a tendency to punish prosecutors who charge or try cases 
that end in acquittal—especially if their decision-making was deemed 
defective.17 On this view, Japan produces relatively few wrongful convic-
tions because prosecutors send fewer innocent persons to trial than do 
their counterparts in the United States and other countries with higher 
acquittal rates.
The second explanation for the low number of wrongful convictions 
revealed in Japan stresses their discovery, not their production. On this 
view, Japan has relatively few actors or institutions that focus on find-
ing wrongful convictions, and hence few are found. Japan has relatively 
few lawyers, only a handful of whom concentrate on criminal defense. 
The major national newspapers do little investigative reporting (con-
trast Yomiuri and Asahi with The New York Times or The Guardian). 
Few Japanese scholars seriously study the subject of wrongful convic-
tion. Japan’s appellate courts tend to defer to law enforcement interests 
and ratify the status quo.18 Japan has no exoneration registries and only 
established its first Innocence Project in 2016 (at Ritsumeikan University 
in Kyoto). And Japan has no case review commissions, except for the 
Japan Federation of Bar Association’s Committee for the Protection of 
Human Rights, which has done good work in some cases, and which has 
published two reports (in 1998 and 2009), but which is not capable of 
providing assistance to all of the victims of wrongful conviction in the 
world’s eleventh most populous country.
In sum, the number of wrongful convictions revealed in a coun-
try depends on how many have been produced and on how effectively 
17 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 237–242.
18 Daniel H. Foote, “Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice 
Field”, Hoshakaigaku, No. 72, pp. 6–45.
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they have been found. Japan’s institutional shortcomings suggest that its 
wrongful conviction problem is larger than it appears. When Kitani Akira 
was a judge in Japan, he sometimes acquitted two or three defendants a 
year—and he acquitted about 30 defendants throughout the course of 
his career. Not a single acquittal was overturned on appeal.19 Is it plausi-
ble that hundreds of other Japanese judges can go year after year without 
issuing an acquittal—and without wrongfully convicting a single defend-
ant? Surveys of Japanese lawyers in 1989 and 1999 suggest the answer 
is no, for in each of those years more than 40 percent of respondents 
said they had handled cases in which a wrongful conviction occurred.20 
Similarly, Takano Takashi (a prominent defense lawyer) believes Japan’s 
true total of wrongful convictions is much larger than the small number 
that has been officially recognized. On his analysis, Japan may produce 
as many as 1500 wrongful convictions (enzai) each year, almost none of 
which is officially recognized.21 In the years since Takano made this esti-
mate, Japan’s acquittal rate has not significantly changed, though prose-
cutors have become more cautious about charging cases in the lay judge 
system that took effect in 2009, as will be described in the next chapter.
structural reforms
Compared to the United States, Japan has not discovered many wrong-
ful convictions, but in recent years a small stream of wrongful convictions 
has surfaced, including Sugaya Toshikazu, Yanagihara Hiroshi, Govinda 
Mainali, Sakurai Shoji, Sugiyama Takao, Boku Tatsuhiro, and Aoki Keiko. 
To some observers, these cases suggest that Japan is where the United 
States was 25 years ago—just waking up to the problem of “actual inno-
cence” in its criminal justice system.22 Whether Japan experiences its own 
19 Kitani Akira, “Muzai” o Minuku: Saibankan Kitani Akira no Ikikata (Iwanami Shoten, 
2013), p. 247.
20 Japan Federation of Bar Associations, “Atarashii Seiki no Keiji Tetsuzuki o Motomete” 
(JFBA, 1999), p. 506.
21 Takano Takashi, “Jijitsu Nintei wa Shimin ni Makaseta Hoga Yoi”, Keiji Saiban o 
Kangaeru blog, January 7, 2007, and “Nihon no Kensatsu wa Hetare na no ka”, Keiji 
Saiban o Kangaeru blog, June 14 and June 23, 2009.
22 See the Japan Innocence and Death Penalty Information Center http://www.jiadep.
org/About_JIADEP.html, which is managed by Hyogo University Professor Michael H. Fox.
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“innocence revolution” will depend on what reforms occur in the years 
to come.23 In thinking about the future, it is important to remember the 
past. In the 1980s, four men—Menda Sakae, Taniguchi Shigeyoshi, Saito 
Sachio, and Akabori Masao—were released from death row because of 
evidence of their innocence. Afterward, many proposals were made for 
reform of Japan’s criminal justice system, but in all fundamental respects 
the system remained unchanged.24 A 229-page report by the Supreme 
Prosecutors Office did not even acknowledge that prosecutors were wrong 
to indict these defendants. In the aftermath of more recent miscarriages of 
justice, Japan’s penchant for conservative reform has been on display once 
again.25 In 2010, for example, who expected that the revelation of serious 
prosecutorial misconduct in the case of Muraki Atsuko, a senior official in 
the health ministry who was framed by prosecutors in Osaka and subse-
quently acquitted, would lead to expanded powers for prosecutors to plea 
bargain, wiretap, and grant immunity? Yet that is what happened in 2016, 
when Japan’s Code of Criminal Procedure was revised to further enable 
these practices. In Japanese criminal justice, the more things change, the 
more they stay the same.26
Wrongful convictions are often caused by conformity to standard 
operating procedures. In many respects, the problem is systems, not dev-
ils.27 Hence, addressing the problem of wrongful convictions requires 
systemic and structural reforms. For starters, Japan needs to develop bet-
ter institutions for finding wrongful convictions after they occur. In this 
respect, Japan remains well behind the United States and England. The 
study of wrongful convictions also needs to become more important in 
Japan’s legal academy. For this to happen, funders must make the subject 
a higher research priority.
23 Harada Kunio, Gyakuten Muzai no Jijitsu Nintei (Keizo Shobo, 2012).
24 Daniel H. Foote, “From Japan’s Death Row to Freedom”, Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1992), p. 102; and Daniel H. Foote, “The Door That Never Opens: 
Capital Punishment and Post-conviction Review of Death Sentences in the United States and 
Japan”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1993), pp. 367–521.
25 Suo Masayuki, Sore demo Boku wa Kaigi de Tatakau: Dokyumento Keiji Shiho Kaikaku 
(Iwanami, 2015).
26 As Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampudesa has the Prince’s nephew say in The Leopard, “If we 
want things to stay as they are, things will have to change” (London: Fontana, 1963), p. 27.
27 James M. Doyle, “The Real Culprits in the Central Park 5 Convictions”, The Crime 
Report, July 8, 2019.
72  D. T. JOHNSON
Wrongful convictions must also be prevented before they occur. To 
do so, Japan should implement internationally recognized “best prac-
tices” in its criminal justice system, the most important of which is a 
requirement to electronically record all criminal interrogations in their 
entirety. Japan has made progress in this direction, but much more 
needs to be done. The 2016 revision to the Code of Criminal Procedure 
made it mandatory for police and prosecutors to video record interro-
gation in cases that will be handled by lay judge trials and in cases that 
are independently initiated by prosecutors, but these account for only 2 
to 3 percent of all criminal cases in the country. The new law also allows 
investigators to forego recording if they believe recording will inhibit 
suspects from making meaningful statements, and it imposes no obliga-
tion to record statements made by people being questioned on a volun-
tary basis either prior to arrest or after indictment. These loopholes are 
so large that they could swallow the principle of transparency to which 
they are supposed to be exceptions.
When a wrongful conviction occurs in Japan, a false confession is 
usually the primary proximate cause. One study found that “a confes-
sion was part of the evidence marshaled against defendants in 84 percent 
(42 out of 50) of the confirmed enzai cases between 1945 and 1991 in 
which a conviction was later overturned.”28 This is a much higher per-
centage than in American exonerations. False confessions were also cen-
trally relevant in all four of the Japanese death penalty cases that ended in 
retrial and acquittal in the 1980s, and in Hakamada’s half-century night-
mare as well. Yet in the Special Committee on Criminal Justice for a New 
Era (Shinjidai no Keiji Shiho Seido Tokubetsubukai), which ostensibly 
aimed to address some of the problems exposed by the aforementioned 
prosecutorial scandal, “sweet-talking for the government” by promi-
nent Japanese professors resulted in remarkably lax recommendations 
for reform—reform that could have created substantially more trans-
parency and accountability in Japan’s interrogation rooms. But instead, 
28 John H. Davis, “Courting Justice, Contesting ‘Bureaucratic Informality’: The Sayama 
Case and the Evolution of Buraku Liberation Politics”, in Patricia G. Steinhoff, editor, 
Going to Court to Change Japan: Social Movements and the Law in Contemporary Japan 
(Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Michigan, 2014), p. 76.
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interrogation rooms remain some of the most closed and secretive spaces 
in Japanese society.29
There are many good reasons to record interrogations, and no good rea-
sons not to. Compared to other democracies, this need is especially great 
in Japan, where interrogations are long and the suspect’s right to silence 
is undermined by a “duty to endure questioning.”30 Because electronic 
recording is a medium for preserving the truth of interrogations and confes-
sions, it serves what is widely regarded as the cardinal objective of Japanese 
criminal justice: truth-finding. Recording also serves the interests of all the 
parties in the criminal process. Defendants and defense attorneys benefit 
because recording deters impermissible interrogation techniques and helps 
prevent wrongful convictions based on false confessions. Police and prose-
cutors benefit because recording protects them against false accusations of 
impropriety and abuse. And judges and lay judges benefit because recording 
gives them the information they need to assess the voluntariness and verac-
ity of confessions.
Prosecutors must also become more transparent about the evidence 
in their possession, and Japanese history suggests they will not do so vol-
untarily. Since the “Conspiracy at Matsukawa” case31 that resulted in the 
wrongful conviction of 20 men in 1950 and their subsequent acquittal, it 
appears that every exoneration in Japan has been preceded by the failure 
of prosecutors to disclose critical evidence to the defense. In Hakamada’s 
case, that failure endured for decades. In this respect, Japan’s procuracy 
may be less transparent today than it was before the Occupation, when 
prosecutors were required to disclose all dossiers to the defense, not just 
the statements they submitted as evidence at trial.32
The evidence in a criminal case is not owned by the state. It is a 
public good, and state officials should be required to share it with the 
29 Suo Masayuki, Sore demo Boku wa Kaigi de Tatakau: Dokyumento Keiji Shiho Kaikaku 
(Iwanami, 2015).
30 On criminal interrogation in Japan, see Setsuo Miyazawa, Policing in Japan: A Study on 
Making Crime (State University of New York Press, 1992); and Daniel H. Foote, “Confessions 
and the Right to Silence in Japan”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
Vol. 21 (1991), pp. 415–488. On criminal interrogation in the United States, see Richard A. 
Leo, Police Interrogation and American Justice (Harvard University Press, 2008).
31 Chalmers Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa (University of California Press, 1972).
32 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 272.
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defense.33 But prosecutors in Japan have worked hard to delimit the 
defense’s rights to discovery, and its justifications have been self-serv-
ing. For an organization that trumpets the importance of truth-telling 
so much, it is ironic that the procuracy opposes disclosing to the defense 
more of the building blocks—draft dossiers especially—that front-line 
prosecutors use to construct “the truth” they advocate at trial.34 The 
present system also relies inordinately on the goodwill of prosecutors to 
disclose relevant evidence to the defense, though occasionally they are 
spurred to do so by “recommendations” from the bench. In Shizuoka, 
repeated nudges by judges led to the belated disclosure of evidence to 
Hakamada’s defense lawyers and ultimately to release of the world’s 
longest incarcerated inmate on death row. To prevent more miscar-
riages of that kind, prosecutors should be required to disclose all of the 
evidence in their possession to the defense before a trial starts. In 
some parts of the United States and in other jurisdictions, this is called 
“full file disclosure.”
As described in Chapter 2, Japanese legal professionals— prosecutors, 
judges, and defense lawyers—frequently emphasize the need to be 
“cautious” (shincho) about capital punishment. But if Ministers of Justice 
and prosecutors were serious about this assertion, they would seek 
reforms that recognize how justice can miscarry. Recording interroga-
tions in their entirety and disclosing all evidence to the defense would 
reduce the risk of wrongful conviction in Japanese criminal justice. Until 
these reforms are realized, claims about the need to be “cautious” will 
sound like empty rhetoric.
a culture of denial
The structural reforms described above are essential, but without a 
change in Japan’s culture of criminal justice they will have limited 
impact. Reforming institutions is the main means of change in the mod-
ern approach to developing democracy, but the notion that structural 
33 Makoto Ibusuki, “Subete no Shoko Kaiji o Isoge: Hakamada Jiken no Kyokun”, Asahi 
Shimbun, May 9, 2014.
34 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 98–99.
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reform alters actual practice is more hope than fact.35 Research on 
“making democracy work” warns that the “designers of new institutions 
are often writing on water.”36 That is, culture and history strongly con-
dition the effectiveness of new rules and institutions, and long-estab-
lished norms can limit the possibilities for achieving structural reform. 
Because culture counts, addressing the problem of wrongful convictions 
must attend to this area too. The most important imperative concerns 
cultural assumptions that are relevant in many areas of Japanese society, 
from aviation and medicine to nuclear energy and criminal justice. Three 
principles are primary.37
First, in order to reduce error one must assume it is inevitable. When I 
started studying criminal justice in Japan in the early 1990s, prosecutors 
told me that the miscarriages of justice that happened in the first decade 
or so after the Pacific War “could not occur anymore” because they were 
caused by an immature system of criminal justice that had been radically 
reformed during the Occupation and that was still working out its prob-
lems in the early postwar period. Subsequent events revealed that claim 
to be false. Japan continues to have problems with wrongful conviction, 
and the most serious problem involves a culture of denial that makes it 
difficult for police, prosecutors, and judges to acknowledge their own 
mistakes and for the media and other external agents of accountability to 
conduct rigorous investigations.38 Because this culture of denial shields 
those actors from pain, humiliation, and change, it is easy to understand 
why they cling to it. Letting the culture of denial go and embracing the 
lessons that error can teach will require honor and courage. It also will 
require pressure from Japanese society—and from political leaders espe-
cially. Culture, not politics, often determines the success of legal reforms, 
though politics can change a culture and save it from itself.39
35 Bent Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice (University of Chicago 
Press, 1998).
36 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton 
University Press, 1993), p. 17.
37 For more details, see Kathryn Schulz’s brilliant book Being Wrong: Adventures in the 
Margin of Error (Ecco, 2010), pp. 304–307.
38 Hiromasa Ezoe, Where Is the Justice? Media Attacks, Prosecutorial Abuse, and My 13 
Years in Japanese Court (Kodansha, 2010).
39 Lawrence E. Harrison, The Central Liberal Truth: How Politics Can Change a Culture 
and Save It From Itself (Oxford University Press, 2006).
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Second, in fields like medicine and aviation, successful strategies for 
error prevention rely on principles of openness and transparency to 
identify and learn from mistakes.40 In contrast, Japan’s system of crimi-
nal justice is so hostile to outside scrutiny that it remains impossible to 
see or say what many of its problems are. Most interrogations are not 
electronically recorded. It is all but impossible to do field research on 
policing. Prosecutors possess broad discretion to withhold evidence from 
the defense, and they are not reluctant to hide evidence when it serves 
their own interests. Lay judges are not permitted to discuss case details 
or deliberations even after their service has ended. And Japan’s system 
for administering executions is surrounded by secrecy that is taken to 
extremes not seen in other nations. The insularity of Japanese criminal 
justice reflects the mistaken assumption that criminal proceedings are the 
special province of legal professionals. Whether Japan experiences its own 
“innocence revolution” depends partly on how transparent its criminal 
justice system becomes. At present, there may be no democratic country 
in the world where criminal justice is more closed.
The third cultural principle of error prevention is reliance on data so 
that criminal justice can be administered based on facts rather than on 
opinions, assumptions, and the prerogatives of power. But since empiri-
cal criminology is not well developed in Japan, little is known about how 
Japanese criminal justice is patterned. One key cause of this ignorance is 
the resistance of Japanese criminal justice officials to being studied in a 
serious way. Some Japanese scholars have experienced this resistance first-
hand—and so have I. Several years ago I went to Tokyo to do research 
about policing in Kabukicho in the Shinjuku district. I was relying on 
the promise of an executive in the National Police Agency, that I would 
be given meaningful access to study police patrol activity in Japan’s 
largest red light district. Despite several months of my best efforts, the 
promised access never materialized. I was given plenty of official police 
publications, and lots of bows and handshakes, but when I was permit-
ted to do any field research at all, it consisted of standing outside police 
boxes (koban) in safe suburban settings such as Fuchu, far removed from 
the action I was interested in. And all the while I was in the “field,” 
40 James M. Doyle, “Learning from Error in the Criminal Justice System: Sentinel Event 
Reviews”, in National Institute of Justice, Mending Justice: Sentinel Event Reviews (U.S. 
Department of Justice, September 2014), pp. 3–18.
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I was watched by police-handlers from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police 
Department, who seemed as bored with their assignment to manage this 
foreigner as I was with my own meager access to their world.
Police are the most understudied actors in Japanese criminal justice.41 
This is ironic and unfortunate, for they are also the most important 
actors in Japan’s criminal process. That criminal process is only as good 
as the evidence on which it feeds, and it is Japanese police who collect 
most of the evidence which informs criminal justice decision-making. Yet 
in Japan, hardly anyone studies police in a serious way. As one Japanese 
journalist observed:
If a prominent sociologist from the West…came here to research the 
Japanese police, that scholar undoubtedly would conclude that this country 
is ‘a strange land.’ First he would run into the police wall of secrecy, and he 
would be unable to investigate actual police practices and conditions. Next 
he would be informed that there is no investigative reporting about the 
police by newspaper or other mainstream journalists, and that there are very 
few free-lance journalists who follow police issues. Then he would learn that 
in Japanese colleges and universities there are no courses about the police 
(as there are in the West) and no scholars who seriously study them. In the 
end, our friend the sociologist would discover that citizens and taxpayers 
(who have entrusted their safety to the police) have an extremely weak 
consciousness to try to check the police. Such a scholar, I think, would be 
seized by this question: Is Japan really a democratic country?42
Two decades after this passage was published, Japan remains a “strange 
land” with respect to research on police. Without decent data about them, 
reporters, citizens, and elected officials will remain easily manipulated by 
the public relations efforts of Japan’s most powerful government agency.
toxic to Justice
Wrongful convictions are inevitable in all criminal justice systems, but 
they can be significantly curtailed. In the United States, police or pros-
ecutors initiate or cooperate in more than half of all exonerations, and 
41 David T. Johnson, “Policing in Japan”, in James D. Babb, editor, The Sage Handbook 
of Modern Japanese Studies (Sage, 2015), pp. 222–243.
42 M. Kobayashi, Nihon Keisatsu no Genzai (Iwanami Shoten, 1998), p. vi.
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about 30 prosecutors’ offices across the country have created “convic-
tion integrity units” (CIUs) to review wrongful conviction claims.43 Of 
the 166 exonerations that occurred in America in 2016, 70 came from 
CIUs. One of the first CIUs was created in Dallas in 2007 under Craig 
Watkins, an African-American District Attorney who grew concerned 
about the alarming number of miscarriages of justice that had been 
revealed in his jurisdiction. Since then, more than 90 percent of CIU 
exonerations have occurred in four large counties: Harris (Houston, 
Texas), Dallas (Texas), Cook (Chicago, Illinois), and Kings (Brooklyn, 
New York). The concentration of exonerations in a few CIUs suggests 
that some CIUs are more effective than others at uncovering wrongful 
convictions. One of the best models is in Brooklyn, where 10 full-time 
prosecutors work on more than 100 cases at any given time. As of the 
end of 2017, 23 people had been exonerated in Brooklyn, and of the 
cases reviewed there, 50 involved the bad behavior of a single retired 
detective named Louis Scarcella, who put away innocent people on false 
charges, over decades, by whatever means necessary—forced confessions, 
witness tampering, and a callous disregard for fairness and justice.44
The more open orientation to mistakes now seen in American CIUs is 
a marked break from the culture of denial that long characterized pros-
ecution in the United States, and it also helps explain why there have 
been so many more exonerations in America than in Japan. America still 
has a long way to go to adequately address its problem with wrongful 
convictions, but the increased willingness to acknowledge error and learn 
from mistakes must be reckoned one of the most welcome developments 
in the past half-century of American criminal justice. By contrast, exon-
erations in Japan are almost always achieved despite strong resistance 
from police and prosecutors, and Japanese judges are frequently slow to 
acknowledge error as well (while Hakamada Iwao was detained on death 
row, more than a dozen judges rejected his appeals). If prosecutors in 
Japan are really the champions of justice that they claim to be, shouldn’t 
they be creating CIU-like institutions that proactively search for errors?
43 See “Conviction Integrity Units”, at the National Registry of Exonerations webpage, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Conviction-Integrity-Units.aspx.
44 For more on recent changes in American prosecution, see Emily Bazelon, Charged: 
The New Movement to Transform American Prosecution and End Mass Incarceration 
(Random House, 2019).
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It is often said that “to err is human,” but once a mistake has been 
made, humans have a choice between “covering up” and “fessing up.” 
In June 2018, the Tokyo High Court overturned the ruling that had 
released Hakamada from death row because of evidence of his inno-
cence, though the octogenarian was allowed to retain his freedom until 
the case returns to the Supreme Court. The next month, Japanese pros-
ecutors exhorted the Supreme Court to reject Hakamada’s appeal and to 
“stop this situation in which his sentence of death is suspended unneces-
sarily.” Prosecutors’ position appears to have two main causes: a desire to 
protect their individual and collective reputations, and a tendency toward 
tunnel vision, which leads them to dismiss evidence that is inconsistent 
with their preferred outcome (“guilty!”) as irrelevant, incredible, or 
unreliable.
A path-breaking study of what it means to “be wrong” points out 
that if you recognize that errors are inevitable, you will not be surprised 
when they occur and you will have plans in place to correct them.45 
Conversely, if you refuse to admit that mistakes do occur, then every 
mistake—and every revelation of a wrongful conviction—becomes stark 
and humiliating evidence of how wrong you are. In this sense, Japan’s 
culture of denial is toxic to justice, and so is the self-righteous certainty 
of criminal justice officials concerning the propriety of their own con-
duct. Doubt is a skill they still need to learn, and error is a reality they 
must learn to acknowledge. But they will not learn these lessons on their 
own. How long will Japanese society tolerate the status quo? And when 
will this country take an interest in the iceberg?
45 Kathryn Schulz, Being Wrong: Adventures in the Margin of Error (Ecco, 2010), espe-
cially Chapter 14 on “The Paradox of Error”.
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Abstract  This chapter examines two new forms of lay participation in 
Japanese capital justice. The lay judge reform of 2009 has stimulated 
many changes in formal rules and standard operating procedures in 
Japan’s criminal process. These changes may be shifting the balance of 
power in Japanese criminal justice—a balance that has long favored law 
enforcement interests. Yet before and after the lay judge reform there 
are striking continuities in criminal justice outcomes, in conviction rates, 
punishment patterns, and death sentencing. The second reform is a vic-
tim participation system, which moves victims and survivors closer to 
center stage of Japan’s criminal process, and which reflects and reinforces 
a culture of vengeance. Together, these two forms of lay participation 
may be doing as much to entrench capital punishment in Japan as to 
challenge and change it.
Keywords  Lay judge system · Victim participation system · Burden · 
Closure · Culture of vengeance
One of the most striking facts about the death penalty in Japan is the 
dearth of significant change. The contrasts with America are stark. In the 
United States, public support for the death penalty has fallen to its low-
est levels since the 1960s. Death sentences and executions have declined 
by about 80 percent since the 1990s. Nine states have abolished the 
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death penalty since 2007 (making a total of 21), and in 4 other states 
governors have declared a moratorium on executions. Executions in sev-
eral other states have been stopped because of botched executions and 
problems obtaining the chemicals used in lethal injection. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has prohibited execution of the mentally disabled and 
of juveniles. And of the more than 8000 death sentences imposed in the 
United States between 1973 and 2013, only 16 percent—about 1 in 6—
resulted in execution. Most of the rest were overturned on appeal, com-
muted, or exonerated. So much change has occurred that some analysts 
believe the death penalty in America is “at the end of its rope” and that 
it will be abolished “not in a matter of generations, but in a matter of 
years.”1
In Japan one sees far more continuity in death penalty policy and 
practice. Public support for capital punishment remains around 80 
percent. Death sentences and executions continue to occur on a regu-
lar basis. There has been no extended moratorium on executions since 
a 40-month one ended in 1993—more than a quarter-century ago.2 
Japan’s Supreme Court has done little to develop a meaningful jurispru-
dence of capital punishment. Most people sentenced to death get exe-
cuted. And few serious observers believe abolition is near.
The previous three chapters explained why there has been so little 
death penalty change in Japan. When death is not deemed a different 
form of punishment, appellate courts seldom find reason to reverse death 
sentences, and the public remains convinced that capital punishment is 
a righteous response to heinous crime (Chapter 2). When the state kills 
in secret, nobody knows when executions are botched, and the public 
remains confident that the state kills decently (Chapter 3). And when a 
culture of denial results in the revelation of few wrongful convictions, 
most people remain untroubled by the possibility of error in life-and-
death decision-making, and most leaders do little to address problems in 
the system (Chapter 4). This chapter explores the possibilities for change 
in Japanese capital punishment that could come from two reforms that 
took effect in 2009: a lay judge system that gives citizens a direct voice 
1 Brandon L. Garrett, End of Its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can Revive 
Criminal Justice (Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 1.
2 Mika Obara-Minnitt, Japanese Moratorium on the Death Penalty (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016).
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in death penalty decision-making, and a victim participation system that 
moves crime victims and survivors closer to center stage of the criminal 
process. Since both reforms are relatively recent, it will take more time to 
discern their full effects. So far, however, they seem to be doing more to 
entrench capital punishment in Japan than to change or challenge it.3
a stone into the Pond?
In 2009, Japan began a new trial system in which six lay persons sit 
with three professional judges to adjudicate guilt and determine sen-
tence for murder and some other serious offenses.4 The lay judge sys-
tem puts citizen participation at the center of Japanese criminal trials 
(and death penalty decision-making) for the first time since 1943, when 
Japan’s original Jury Act was suspended after fifteen years of fitful use 
(fewer than 500 jury trials were held in the 15 years before suspen-
sion).5 Some analysts believe this trial reform will remake the country’s 
criminal justice system. As they see it, the lay judge system has thrown 
“a stone into the pond” of criminal justice, and the ripples are gradually 
spreading.6
Several changes in the criminal process have been stimulated by the 
lay judge reform.7 Since citizens cannot be asked to serve in court for 
long periods of time, a pretrial process was created to narrow and define 
the issues to be contested at trial. This has led to some improvement in 
the amount of evidence that prosecutors disclose to the defense before 
a trial begins, though more disclosure is needed. There also has been 
3 David T. Johnson, “Capital Punishment Without Capital Trials in Japan’s Lay Judge 
System”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 7 (2009), pp. 1–40.
4 David T. Johnson, “Japan’s Lay Judge System”, in Jacqueline E. Ross and Stephen C. 
Thaman, editors, Comparative Criminal Procedure (Elgar, 2016), pp. 396–421.
5 Dimitri Vanoverbeke, Juries in the Japanese Legal System: The Coming Struggle for 
Citizen Participation and Democracy (Routledge, 2015).
6 See, for example, Shinomiya Satoru, “Defying Experts’ Predictions, Identifying 
Themselves as Sovereign: Citizens’ Responses to Their Service as Lay Judges in Japan”, 
Social Science Japan, No. 43 (September 2010), pp. 8–13.
7 For impact studies of the lay judge reform in Japan, see Erik Herber, Lay and Expert 
Contributions to Japanese Criminal Justice (Routledge, 2019, especially Chapter 6 on “Lay 
Judges and Sentencing”); and Rieko Kage, Who Judges? Designing Jury Systems in Japan, 
East Asia, and Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2017, especially Chapter 9 on “The 
Impact of New Lay Judge Systems”).
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progress toward recording interrogations, though more should be done 
here too. Bail has become easier to obtain as judges recognize the dan-
gers of “kidnap justice” (hitojichi shiho), whereby pretrial detention is 
ruled necessary for most defendants who do not confess. Trials are eas-
ier to understand and more interesting than they used to be, for they 
are less reliant on the written statements (chosho) that are composed 
by police and prosecutors behind the closed doors of an interrogation 
room. Access to defense lawyers has improved, especially in the criti-
cal pretrial period when investigators focus on making suspects confess. 
One result is that suspects have become less cooperative, as more than 
80 percent of prosecutors affirmed in a 2011 survey. Bar associations are 
training defense lawyers to become more effective advocates at trial. And 
so on.8 These changes in procedure could transform death penalty deci-
sion-making by making citizens more aware of the reality of capital pun-
ishment. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall posited in 
1972, many people support capital punishment partly because they are 
ignorant about it. On this so-called “Marshall hypothesis”, when people 
learn more about capital punishment, they come to regard it as immoral 
and unnecessary. But this kind of learning takes time. If the lay judge 
reform is going to transform capital punishment, it will be by evolution, 
not revolution.9
Deep change in Japanese capital punishment is hardly guaranteed. 
For one thing, civilian participation could be marginalized by legal 
professionals—prosecutors and judges especially—who aim to main-
tain their standard operating procedures. Indeed, marginalization into 
obscurity has happened several times in the past when reforms tried to 
make citizen participation a more central part of Japan’s criminal process. 
The most striking examples are the prewar jury system and the postwar 
Prosecution Review Commissions, both of which had little effect on the 
actual practice of criminal justice.10
9 David T. Johnson and Setsuo Miyazawa, “Japanese Court Reform on Trial”, in Rosann 
Greenspan, Hadar Aviram, and Jonathan Simon, editors, The Legal Process and the Promise 
of Justice: Studies Inspired by the Work of Malcolm Feeley (Cambridge University Press, 
2019), pp. 122–138.
10 Kent Anderson and Mark Nolan, “Lay Participation in the Japanese Justice System: 
A Few Preliminary Thoughts Regarding the Lay Assessor System (saiban-in seido) from 
8 Shinomiya Satoru, “Kokumin no Shutai teki – Jisshitsu teki Sanka wa Jitsugen Shite Iru 
ka: Saibanin Seido Shikko 10nen to Kongo no Kadai”, Jiyu to Seigi, Vol. 70, No. 5 (May 
2019), pp. 8–17.
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There are three signs that lay judges may be getting marginalized in 
the new trial system too. First, Japan’s high conviction rate has not sig-
nificantly declined. In comparable cases, the conviction rate went from 
99.4 percent in 2006–2008 to 99.1 percent in 2009–2018.11 Second, 
sentencing patterns have changed for only a few offenses (sex crimes 
especially), and even then just a little.12 Third, when prosecutors seek 
a sentence of death, lay judge panels are actually more likely to impose 
the ultimate punishment than panels of three professional judges were in 
the old trial system. From 2010 to 2018, Japanese prosecutors sought a 
sentence of death for 53 defendants, and a death sentence was imposed 
on 36 of them (68 percent). By comparison, in the three decades that 
preceded the lay judge reform (1980–2009), prosecutors sought a sen-
tence of death for 346 defendants, and a death sentence was imposed 
on 193 of them (56 percent).13 Some of these signs of stasis in criminal 
justice outcomes result from adaptations to the lay judge system made 
by prosecutors and judges. Most notably, prosecutors have become more 
cautious about charging cases and seeking severe sentences, in order 
to avoid undesirable outcomes in a trial system that is unfamiliar and 
unpredictable.14 The judiciary has been conservative too, especially in its 
11 Takeda Masahiro, “Utagawashiki wa Muzai Tettei”, Fukui Shimbun, March 10, 2019, 
p. 19.
12 Stacey Steele, Carol Lawson, Mari Hirayama, and David T. Johnson, “Lay 
Participation in Japanese Criminal Justice: Prosecution Review Commissions, the Lay 
Judge System, and Penal Institution Visiting Committees”, Asian Journal of Law & Society 
(forthcoming, 2020).
13 Note, too, that the increased probability of a death sentence being imposed if prose-
cutors seek one partly reflects the fact that prosecutors have become more selective about 
seeking a sentence of death in the lay judge system. In the pre-reform period (1980–2009), 
prosecutors sought a sentence of death an average of 11.5 times per year. For the lay judge 
system (2010–2018), the comparable figure is 5.9. This decline in the number of death 
sentences sought not only reflects an increase in prosecutorial caution; it also reflects a 
decline in Japan’s homicide rate. The increased propensity to impose a sentence of death 
when prosecutors seek one is especially noticeable in homicide cases with 3 or more vic-
tims. See Takeda Masahiro, “Genbatsuka no Ippo de Yuyo Oku”, Kyoto Shimbun, March 
23, 2019, p. 6.
Domestic, Historical, and International Psychological Perspectives”, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 37 (2004), pp. 935–992.
14 Takeda Masahiro, “Saibanin Seido Kaishi kara 5nen: Kensatsu wa Taisho Jiken o 
Shincho ni Kiso: Saibanin Kohosha no Jitairitsu, 60% Koeru”, Journalism, September 
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reliance on benchmarks that are based on sentencing patterns from the 
pre-lay judge period.15
In sum, Japan’s lay judge reform has stimulated change in formal 
rules and standard operating procedures in many parts of the criminal 
process, and the net effect could be a shift in the balance of power in 
Japanese criminal justice—a balance that long has favored law enforce-
ment’s interest in obtaining confessions, convictions, and capital sen-
tences.16 The lay judge reform has also stimulated more public interest 
and trust in Japanese criminal justice.17 In these senses, the results 
of Japan’s lay judge reform do seem “quite remarkable.”18 Yet there 
are also striking continuities in Japanese criminal justice, in convic-
tion rates, in punishment patterns, and in death sentencing. Together 
they suggest that the changes in Japanese criminal procedure may be 
mostly incidental music. If the proof is in the pudding, then it needs to 
be acknowledged that Japan’s lay judge system has not changed much 
that matters in criminal justice outcomes generally, or in capital pun-
ishment outcomes specifically—so far.19 But the ripples of reform are 
continuing to spread. As the next section suggests, the future effects 
of the new trial system will depend on how judges and defense law-
yers respond to prosecutors’ efforts to maintain their control over case 
outcomes.20
15 Masahito Saeki and Eiichiro Watamura, “The Impact of Previous Sentencing Trends 
on Lay Judges’ Sentencing Decisions,” in Jianhong Liu and Setsuo Miyazawa, editors, 
Crime and Justice in Contemporary Japan (Springer, 2018), pp. 275–290.
16 Malcolm M. Feeley and Setsuo Miyazawa, editors, The Japanese Adversary System in 
Context: Controversies and Comparisons (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
17 See, for example, Masahiro Fujita, Japanese Society and Lay Participation in Criminal 
Justice: Social Attitudes, Trust, and Mass Media (Springer, 2018); and Ii Takayuki and 
Saibanin Raunji, editors, Anata mo Ashita wa Saibanin!? (Nihonhyoronsha, 2019).
18 Daniel H. Foote, “Citizen Participation: Appraising the Saiban’in System”, Michigan 
State International Law Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2014), p. 8.
19 David T. Johnson, “Japan’s Lay Judge System”, in Jacqueline E. Ross and Stephen C. 
Thaman, editors, Comparative Criminal Procedure (Elgar, 2016), pp. 396–421.
20 Takano Takashi, “Saibanin Seido no Koka: 10nen o Furikaette”, Jiyu to Seigi, Vol. 70, 
No. 5 (May 2019), pp. 18–29.
2014, pp. 136–143; and Takeda Masahiro, “‘Zaimei-Ochi’ Hinpatsu Kisoritsu Teika”, 
Kochi Shimbun, January 30, 2019, p. 12.
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dogs that do not bark
In Arthur Conan Doyle’s “Silver Blaze” story (1892), detective Sherlock 
Holmes notices that a dog did not bark during the theft of a horse. From 
this, he induced that the thief was not a stranger, which reduced the 
number of suspects to one. Case closed.
Inspector Gregory of Scotland Yard: You consider this to be important?
Sherlock Holmes: Exceedingly so.
Inspector Gregory: Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my 
attention?
Sherlock Holmes: To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.
Inspector Gregory: The dog did nothing in the night-time.
Sherlock Holmes: That was the curious incident.
The most curious thing about criminal justice reform in Japan is 
how much pressure for change has been directed at prosecutors—and 
how little has been directed at judges and defense lawyers. To be sure, 
prosecution does need reform. When more than one-quarter of prose-
cutors acknowledge that they have been directed by a superior to create 
a dossier (chosho) that differs from what a suspect or witness actually told 
them, the imperative of change is obvious.21 It is also obvious that pros-
ecutors and their allies will resist reform, for power seldom cedes control 
voluntarily.22 But prosecutors are only one part of a “criminal court com-
munity” that is also inhabited by judges and defense lawyers. If prose-
cutors dominate this community, it is partly because judges and defense 
lawyers have let them. Much talk about reform overlooks the crucial fact 
that judges and defense lawyers have frequently failed to perform their 
duty to check prosecutors’ power in the criminal process.23
Consider judges, who have the final word in the criminal process. 
They routinely use their authority to give prosecutors (and police) what 
they want: arrest warrants, detention warrants, evidence admitted at trial, 
23 David T. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 61–85.
21 Asahi Shimbun, “Kenji 26% ‘Shiji Sareta Keiken’: Jissai no Kyojutsu to Kotonaru 
Chosho no Sakusei,” March 11, 2011, p. 38.
22 Suo Masayuki, Sore demo Boku wa Kaigi de Tatakau: Dokyumento Keiji Shiho Kaikaku 
(Iwanami Shoten, 2015).
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convictions, and sentences. And when prosecutors do not get what they 
want from lower courts, they frequently get it on appeal. There is noth-
ing necessary or inevitable about this judicial tendency. Postwar reforms 
included many progressive provisions, from the right to due process 
and a fair trial to protection against self-incrimination. But in translat-
ing the “law on the books” into the “law in action,” Japan’s judiciary 
has “adopted, accepted, or silently acquiesced in a wide range of inter-
pretations that greatly circumscribed the protections for suspects and 
defendants, while granting broad authority to investigators.”24 This 
extraordinary deference of judges to prosecutors is why some defense 
lawyers say that if they could change only one thing about Japanese crim-
inal justice, it would be the tendency of judges to yield to prosecutors in 
their decision-making. On this view, judges defer to prosecutors so rou-
tinely that reforming the judiciary is even more urgent than reforming 
the procuracy. As one defense lawyer put it, “if judges change, prosecu-
tors will have to change too.”25
Like judges, defense lawyers have also been passive toward prosecu-
tors and police. Legally and ethically, their obligation is to try, by every 
fair and legal means, to get the best result for their clients, but this duty 
often goes unfulfilled. For decades, many defense lawyers have been little 
more than passive props in trial ceremonies that are scripted by prose-
cutors, certified by judges, and barely contested by the defense. There 
are many reasons for this passivity, including some over which defense 
lawyers have little control. Judicial interpretations of law have restricted 
what defense attorneys can do for criminal suspects and defendants. 
Moreover, all but a few criminal cases pay poorly in comparison to 
the other work opportunities that Japanese attorneys have (in criminal 
defense as in other areas of life, you often get what you pay for). But 
while law and economics are impediments to good defense lawyering in 
Japan, the cultural obstacles may be even more formidable. In my view, 
defense lawyers are complicit in a state of affairs that Hirano Ryuichi 
(former president of Tokyo University and the dean of criminal justice 
studies in Japan) described as “abnormal,” “diseased,” and “really quite 
24 Daniel H. Foote, “Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the Criminal Justice 
Field,” Hoshakaigaku, No. 72 (2010), p. 18.
25 David T. Johnson, “War in a Season of Slow Revolution: Defense Lawyers and Lay 
Judges in Japanese Criminal Justice”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 9 (June 
29, 2011), pp. 1–11.
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hopeless.”26 Traditionally, defense lawyers in Japan have seldom advised 
suspects or defendants to invoke their right to silence. In 1991, a survey 
of more than 1000 lawyers found that over 60 percent had never recom-
mended that a suspect or defendant exercise the right to remain silent. 
Not a single time. The same survey found that two-thirds of lawyers had 
never asked that a witness testifies in court when prosecutors sought 
to use written statements instead of live testimony, and three-quarters 
had never asked a court to compel prosecutors to disclose evidence. 
This level of passive acquiescence is like doing sumo with one hand tied 
behind your back.
Since it is often in a suspect’s best interest not to talk to interrogators, 
it is puzzling why there is so much reluctance to recommend this funda-
mental right. One cause is the difficulty of maintaining silence through 
Japan’s long interrogation process. As one attorney told me, “if I advise 
100 suspects to remain silent, only one or two would be capable of staying 
mute until the [long] interrogations end.”27 Still, in many criminal cases 
the best thing a defendant in Japan can do is what a full-page ad in the 
Boston Yellow Pages once urged (under “Attorneys”): JUST SHUT UP.
Even in trials where defendants claim innocence, it is striking how 
little vigorous advocacy there can be. During a rape trial in which the 
defendant insisted that the victim had consented to sex, I watched one 
defense lawyer scold his client in open court. “Who are you trying to 
kid?” he asked his befuddled client. “Do you really think anyone is 
going to believe your story? I don’t.” And in a murder trial in which 
prosecutors sought a sentence of death for a defendant who had a prior 
conviction for homicide, a pair of defense lawyers passed up numerous 
opportunities to press the prosecution’s key witnesses about weaknesses 
in their testimony. When prosecutors in this trial persistently pressed the 
defendant with incriminating questions despite the defendant’s complete 
silence, his lawyers barely uttered a word of protest. I was not surprised 
when that defendant was condemned to death. And I suppose he may 
have wondered about his own legal representation: with friends like this, 
who needs enemies?
26 Hirano Ryuichi, “Diagnosis of the Current Code of Criminal Procedure”, Law in 
Japan, Vol. 22 (1989), pp. 129–142.
27 David T. Johnson, “War in a Season of Slow Revolution: Defense Lawyers and Lay 
Judges in Japanese Criminal Justice”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 9 (June 29, 
2011), pp. 1–11.
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It is difficult to defend homicide cases in a country where the crim-
inal process is significantly tilted toward state interests. It also needs to 
be acknowledged that there is not one right way to do criminal defense. 
Culture counts, and in Japan’s legal culture, repentance and confession 
are salient themes.28 Criminal defense strategy should depend on the 
case and the context—and Japan is not the United States. But sometimes 
the best defense is a good offense, even in Japan.
Defending someone accused of murder is not a job for people seek-
ing approval. It is a job for those who are willing to rattle cages, make 
enemies, and raise a little hell. By raising hell, defense lawyers honor the 
law.29 The need to “rattle cages” is what defense lawyer Takano Takashi 
had in mind when he told me that the lay judge system gives Japanese 
defense lawyers a precious opportunity to improve a system that sorely 
needs change:
The advent of the lay judge system [in 2009] marks the beginning of a 
war against professional judges. Many professional judges want to min-
imize the scope and significance of the lay judge reform. But this is a 
power struggle. [If we are to fulfill our obligation to protect the rights of 
defendants,] we defense lawyers must empower lay judges to stand up to 
professional judges and defeat them in the deliberation room. For this to 
happen, defense lawyers must shed the feeling of uselessness that has been 
their big burden. Defense lawyers are habituated to being passive in the 
criminal process. We have been socialized to believe that what we do does 
not matter. But with lay judges in front of us, we are no longer talking to a 
wall. Now we have a real opportunity to make a difference, and we need to 
make the most of it. We must fight in open court to change a system that 
is stacked against us.30
Time will tell what Japanese defense lawyers make of the new 
opportunities the lay judge reform is giving them. By most accounts, 
defense lawyering has improved since the reform took effect in 2009. 
At the same time, lay judges routinely report that they found the trial 
28 Daniel H. Foote, “The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice”, 
California Law Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (1992), pp. 317–390.
29 Alan Dershowitz, The Best Defense (Vintage, 1983).
30 David T. Johnson, “War in a Season of Slow Revolution: Defense Lawyers and Lay 
Judges in Japanese Criminal Justice”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 9 (June 
29, 2011), pp. 1–11.
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presentations made by prosecutors clearer and more persuasive than 
those made by defense lawyers.31 And continued change for the better 
in Japanese defense lawyering is far from guaranteed, not least because of 
new challenges raised by the other major reform in civilian participation 
in Japan’s criminal process.
victims and the myth of closure
The second major reform in Japanese criminal justice is the creation 
of a victim participation system that moves victims and survivors close 
to center stage of the criminal process. One question is whether the 
increased salience of victims in Japanese capital punishment constitutes 
progress or regress. The answer depends on whether one regards capital 
punishment as a victim-service program.32
Victims have long been neglected and ignored in Japan’s criminal 
process, and they certainly deserve more support and consideration than 
they have historically received. But while efforts to help them are nec-
essary, Japan’s victims’ rights movement has been, for the most part, 
harshly punitive. Other models for thinking about how victims might be 
helped have been neglected and ignored, including some that are more 
“restorative” in the sense that they focus on healing the harms caused by 
crime rather than encouraging the venting of vengeful feelings.33
In Japan’s punitive approach to victims’ rights, victims and their fam-
ilies have taken on an almost sacred status in the criminal process, and 
this makes it difficult to cross-examine them or otherwise challenge their 
assertions.34 Since vigorous cross-examination is an indispensable tool for 
determining truth at trial, the difficulty of using it with victims and sur-
vivors is worrisome. In a murder trial in Tokyo, for example, the victim’s 
31 Erik Herber, Lay and Expert Contributions to Japanese Criminal Justice (Routledge, 
2019), p. 172.
32 David T. Johnson, “Killing Asahara: What Japan Can Learn About Victims and Capital 
Punishment from the Execution of an American Terrorist”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan 
Focus, Vol. 10 (September 9, 2012), pp. 1–15.
33 Danielle Sered, Until We Reckon: Violence, Mass Incarceration, and a Road to Repair 
(The New Press, 2019).
34 Maiko Tagusari, “Does the Death Penalty Serve Victims?”; and David T. Johnson, 
“Does Capital Punishment Bring Closure to Victims?”, in Ivan Simonovic, editor, Death 
Penalty and the Victims (United Nations, 2016), pp. 41–48 and pp. 75–82.
92  D. T. JOHNSON
mother testified that she missed her deceased daughter greatly even 
though (the defense lawyer knew) the mother and daughter had been on 
bad terms for years before the daughter was killed, and even though the 
mother collected a tidy life insurance sum after the loss of her daughter. 
The defense lawyer told me that he remained silent about this issue out 
of fear of being criticized for “re-victimizing” the mother. When victims 
are seen as sacred, some truths are hard to utter.
Many supporters of capital punishment believe death sentences and 
executions give victims “closure”—a satisfying feeling that something 
terrible has ended. But closure of this kind is a myth, for survivors are 
never “over and done with” their loss. The unfortunate truth is that their 
suffering does not end. A better conception of closure would see it as 
a process of “memory work” through which survivors construct mean-
ingful narratives about a killing and how they have dealt with it. In this 
sense, the quest for closure continues for as long as the survivor is alive, 
and recognizing the myth of closure reminds survivors that they should 
not hope for a finality that is illusory. The promise of closure as an end-
ing is a false comfort that is doomed to disappoint.35
Capital punishment seldom provides closure for persons bereaved 
by homicide, but it does create resentment among those whose cases 
are not deemed capital. In Japan, prosecutors seek a sentence of death 
in only about 1 out of every 100–200 murder cases. When the sever-
ity of a sentence is regarded as a measure of how much a victim is val-
ued—and when a death sentence is seen as a token of society’s esteem 
for a victim—the non-capital sentences that most defendants receive 
foster the perception among survivors that the victim they have lost is 
undervalued.36 To dispel this perception, prosecutors would need to seek 
capital sanctions as frequently as they were used in the Tokugawa era. 
Even the most ardent supporters of Japanese capital punishment do not 
want to go back to that future.
While closure is mostly a myth, it is a myth that performs important 
functions in the age of abolition. For one thing, closure paints over 
the disturbing reality of execution with a positive patina that people 
can endorse, for it is easier to say (and to be seen as saying) “I support 
35 Jody Lynee Madeira, Killing McVeigh: The Death Penalty and the Myth of Closure (New 
York University Press, 2012).
36 Scott Turow, Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing with the Death 
Penalty (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), pp. 47–56.
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victims” than “I want vengeance.” For another, when closure is a cen-
tral purpose of capital punishment, people do not need to worry about 
whether execution is an excessive use of power by government, because 
the closure frame “de-governmentalizes” the death penalty by depicting 
the state as the servant of society rather than its master. The language 
of “closure” also connects capital punishment to the history of commu-
nity control over punishment. In the United States, claims about closure 
are linked to bloody traditions of lynching and vigilantism. In Japan, 
the language of closure is connected to a rhetoric of “repentance” and 
“atonement” that has been salient for centuries. The essence of this rhet-
oric is: “I want the offender to repent and atone; I want him dead.” It 
is no coincidence that the rise of closure and its cognates corresponded 
with death penalty increases in Japan after 2000 and with death penalty 
increases in the United States a decade earlier. When the death penalty 
is framed as a matter of serving victims and helping them achieve clo-
sure, the ultimate effect is the legitimation of a sanction that has become 
increasingly difficult to justify on other grounds.37
victims and the culture of vengeance
Murder trials in Japan are emotionally intense. Tears are everywhere. 
Survivors cry when they testify and while observing the proceedings. 
Spectators and reporters weep. Prosecutors cry when they describe the 
suffering of the survivors. Defense lawyers cry while listening to the 
statements of the bereaved. Defendants cry—and when they are not cry-
ing they slump over in postures of anguish and shame. And the defend-
ant’s parents and relatives often cry while reading their statements to 
the court. One mother of a defendant asked the court for permission to 
apologize to the survivors. When it was granted, she turned to face them 
and said—while bowing 90 degrees and sobbing uncontrollably—“I am 
extremely sorry for what my son has done and for what you have had 
to go through” (at which point I had to wipe my own eyes). One of 
the judges cried as this mother spoke, and four of the lay judges also 
cried during this trial—two of them openly and often. These tears at trial 
37 Franklin E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 42–66.
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express a wide range of emotions, from sadness, sorrow, and regret to 
anguish, anger, and rage.38
While emotions are a fact of life, it is difficult to discern their proper 
role in a criminal trial. In 1977 the U.S. Supreme Court held that “it 
is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any 
decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on 
reason” (Gardner v. Florida). More broadly, one theme of American 
jurisprudence since the 1970s has been the effort to “rationalize” the 
sentencing process, which requires the substitution of rational princi-
ples and rule-of-law values for punitive passions and unguided jury dis-
cretion. But ironically, the U.S. Supreme Court also permits prosecutors 
to present “victim impact” evidence in the penalty phase of capital trials 
(though in America victims are not allowed to make specific sentencing 
requests such as “I demand a death sentence”). It is hard to imagine a 
rule that is more contrary to the Court’s rationalizing reforms.39
In Japan, the victim participation system permits the family and 
friends of homicide victims to lobby for death penalty outcomes, which 
they frequently do. But allowing the bereaved to beg for a capital sen-
tence can distort the court’s deliberations and the prosecutors’ decision 
about whether to seek a death sentence in the first place. In one mur-
der trial, a parade of two surviving parents, their attorney, four victims, 
and two prosecutors spent more than three hours of the final trial ses-
sion begging for the defendant to be given the death sentence that he 
eventually received. In another, the sister of a murder victim started her 
testimony by stating that she “hates” the defendant, and the longer she 
spoke the more passionate she became. She sobbed while reading her 
statement, and she emphasized how “vexed” she felt by the defendant’s 
“evil acts.” She even rebuked the defendant for trying to “trick” the 
court in his testimony. “You merely said what was convenient for you,” 
she insisted. “Give us the lives of our loved ones back!” Near the end 
of her statement she broke into gasping sobs and, when she could not 
continue, someone stepped forward to finish reading it to the lay judge 
panel. The final words were as follows:
38 David T. Johnson, “Capital Punishment Without Capital Trials in Japan’s Lay Judge 
System”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 7 (2009), p. 7.
39 David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 279.
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I went to visit my sister’s grave the other day, and I told her that the next 
time I come I will definitely bring news of a death sentence. My beloved 
sister is watching this trial, and I really want the court to give us a death 
sentence. I desire a death sentence. I hope you will do as I request.40
Japanese officials often justify capital punishment in terms of ret-
ribution, but retribution can be the victim’s vengeance in disguise. 
Moreover, proponents of capital punishment often hide behind vic-
tims by identifying with their wrath, because this is a more comforta-
ble expression of their own feelings than a direct statement would be. 
This kind of hiding is especially common among prosecutors, who claim 
they want to serve survivors when the latter’s preferences align with 
their own, but who ignore survivors’ preferences when they point in a 
different (non-capital) direction. Some prosecutors also fail to serve 
the bereaved by neglecting to inform them that a capital sentence will 
probably result in prolonged litigation before an execution can occur. A 
sense of an ending is unlikely to come for years or even decades. In some 
respects this is how it should be, for in the administration of capital pun-
ishment, the quick is the enemy of the careful.
Decisions about the death penalty are too important to be made by 
or for survivors. In a democracy, no minority, even those whose trage-
dies burn our hearts, should be empowered to speak for everyone.41 It is 
difficult to discern the proper role for citizens’ preferences in structuring 
the governance of punishment in democratic systems. The preferences 
of victims and survivors may be relevant, but they must not be allowed 
to marginalize other practical and jurisprudential considerations. Too 
often, though, the feelings of survivors are presented as trump cards that 
should take precedence over everything else.
At present, the hunger of victims for revenge remains one of the least 
discussed but most pervasive forces in Japanese capital punishment. 
Because Japanese law does not recognize that death is different, it pro-
vides little protection against the powerful push of survivors’ anger and 
anguish. And because of the central role that emotions play in Japanese 
murder trials, it is imperative to create a two-stage system of trial that 
40 David T. Johnson, “Capital Punishment Without Capital Trials in Japan’s Lay Judge 
System”, The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus, Vol. 7 (2009), p. 6.
41 Scott Turow, Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing with the Death 
Penalty (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 56.
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separates guilt-determination from sentence-determination. This is espe-
cially urgent when a defendant pleads not guilty, for research shows that 
the probability of a criminal conviction increases when judges and jurors 
hear victim testimony (“The defendant must atone with his life!”) that is 
unrelated to the question of guilt.42
The death penalty is often an act of revenge, and vengeance is not a 
principled justification for the ultimate punishment; it is a violent emo-
tion that insists on its own righteousness. It is, therefore, dangerous— 
not least to the person who feeds it. As sages have cautioned for centu-
ries, “Before you embark on a journey of revenge, dig two graves.”
entrenchment or change?
The number of countries to abolish capital punishment has increased 
remarkably in recent years. One cause of this surge in abolition is the 
emergence of a “human rights dynamic” that recognizes capital punish-
ment as a denial of the universal human rights to life and to freedom 
from cruel and inhuman punishment.43 The fate of capital punishment in 
countries that retain it will be shaped by the ongoing battle between two 
competing frames. Is the death penalty a matter of human rights? Or is it 
a victim service program?
During the last decade, victims have acquired more influence in 
Japanese murder trials and in the pretrial and appellate processes. 
The result is that Japanese capital punishment is shaped by a cul-
ture of vengeance. In this culture, vengeance is both an individual vic-
tim’s emotional reaction to loss and a form of public anger. In both 
forms, vengeance insists on its own righteousness—no matter what.44 
Because of this self-righteous certainty, vengeance has little regard 
for factual or moral complexity. Vengeance also promises a catharsis 
that cannot come through capital punishment (only the attachments 
that people have to each other can provide some sense of relief). And 
vengeance is undemocratic when it privileges the emotions of a handful 
42 Itoh Yuji, Saibanin no Handan no Shinri: Shinrigaku Jikken kara Semaru (Keio Gijuku 
Mitatetsu Gakkai, 2019), pp. 48–66.
43 Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle, “Abolishing the Death Penalty Worldwide: The 
Impact of a ‘New Dynamic’”, Crime and Justice, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2009), pp. 1–63.
44 Terry K. Aladjem, The Culture of Vengeance and the Fate of American Justice 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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of people. In thinking about capital punishment in the Japanese future, 
the tradeoff is not between “concern for victims” and some misplaced 
“compassion for offenders” (as many observers suppose). It is between 
vengeance and human rights.
Japan’s culture of vengeance can be resisted. One recourse is a more 
skeptical awareness of the disutility of anger in deciding criminal punish-
ments. Another is a willingness to buck the tides of popular sentiment—
an openness to doubting what others see as moral and factual certainties. 
But above all, challenging Japan’s culture of vengeance requires recog-
nizing that vengeance is a kind of “wild justice”: the more people run to 
it, the more law ought to weed it out.45 All of these forms of resistance 
presuppose personal and political courage. They will not be easy. But as 
Aristotle observed, courage is the first of human virtues because it makes 
all of the others possible. Without the courage that enables resistance 
to Japan’s culture of vengeance, the victim participation system could 
entrench capital punishment more deeply into Japanese law and society.
As for Japan’s lay judge reform, the future effects of this form of cit-
izen participation are difficult to discern. On the one hand, it is widely 
considered imperative not to “burden” (futan) lay judges unduly. 
Indeed, Japanese judges, journalists, and citizens are so concerned 
about the physical and emotional “burdens” purportedly imposed on 
lay judges that this secondary objective threatens to displace core aims 
of criminal justice, such as fairness, justice, and accuracy. The pre-
occupation with the well-being of lay judges can be seen in newspa-
per headlines such as these: Extreme Burden for Lay Judges (Nikkei); 
The Psychological Fatigue of Lay Judges (Mainichi); Lay Judge Duty 
Takes a Heavy Toll (Yomiuri); and An Appeal to Care for the Hearts 
of Lay Judges (Asahi). The central premise of any system of capi-
tal justice is that the ultimate punishment must be administered in a 
manner that is fair, just, and accurate. This is partly a question of fac-
tual accuracy—whether the defendant actually committed the crime 
for which he or she has been charged. But even if a system of justice 
were able to eliminate the possibility of sentencing an innocent person 
to death (and this is not possible, as explained in Chapter 4), another 
crucial question concerns the moral accuracy of death penalty decisions. 
Capital punishment ought to be administered in a manner that is both 
45 Susan Jacoby, Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge (Harper & Row, 1983).
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consistent (treating like cases alike) and individualized (treating differ-
ent cases differently). And capital punishment must also be administered 
based on a careful consideration of each defendant’s culpability, not on 
morally irrelevant factors such as class, the intensity of a victim’s anger, 
or judicial and public convenience. In Japan, factual and moral accu-
racy are being threatened by a jurisprudence which assumes that death 
is not different, and by the reluctance of judges to deviate from a pre-es-
tablished trial script that has been designed to minimize the “burdens” 
imposed on lay judges. An excessive concern with the emotional well-be-
ing of lay judges creates perverse incentives because it encourages judges 
to cut corners in the criminal process in order to protect the valuable 
time and vulnerable psyches of their lay colleagues on the bench—and 
in order to protect themselves from criticism, too. One analyst believes 
the end result of this misplaced focus will be a “dead culture of law” in 
which core criminal justice values are subordinated to the tertiary con-
cerns of convenience and efficiency.46 More broadly, the presence of lay 
judges in Japan conveys the impression that the public is making life-
and-death decisions when in fact state officials—prosecutors and judges 
especially—are still the voices that matter most. The perception that “the 
people” are doing it may bolster the legitimacy of capital punishment 
and make it more resistant to reform and repeal.
On the other hand, the full effects of legal reform will take many years 
to realize.47 If the lay judge reform is “a stone into the pond” of Japan’s 
criminal process, its’ ripples could slowly transform capital punishment 
by insisting that state killing is not just state business—it is the business 
of civil society too. The fresh eyes of society are important because, in 
law as in life, the more one looks at a thing, the less one sees it. As the 
English writer G. K. Chesterton observed a century ago:
It is a terrible business to mark a man out for the vengeance of men. But it 
is a thing to which a man can grow accustomed, as he can to other terrible 
things…The horrible thing about all legal officials—even the best—about 
46 Takano Takashi, “Saibanin Seido no Koka: 10nen o Furikaette”, Jiyu to Seigi, Vol. 70, 
No. 5 (May 2019), pp. 26–29.
47 David T. Johnson and Setsuo Miyazawa, “Japanese Court Reform on Trial”, in Rosann 
Greenspan, Hadar Aviram, and Jonathan Simon, editors, The Legal Process and the Promise 
of Justice: Studies Inspired by the Work of Malcolm Feeley (Cambridge University Press, 
2019), pp. 122–138.
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all judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that 
they are wicked (some of them are good), and not that they are stupid 
(several of them are quite intelligent). It is simply that they have got used 
to it. Strictly, they do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the 
usual man in the usual place. They do not see the awful court of judgment; 
they only see their own workshop.48
Many Japanese judges have “got used to” presuming that “the usual 
man in the usual place” deserves (more or less) the punishment that 
prosecutors propose.49 A conviction rate close to 100 percent testi-
fies to this terrible tendency, and so does a Mainichi newspaper survey 
(March 9, 2011) which found that not a single prosecutor (out of 40) 
believed Japan’s high conviction rate reflects problems in the judiciary. 
Defense lawyers have also grown “used to” being passive in the crimi-
nal process. Many seem not to appreciate how terrible “the awful court 
of judgment” can be for the person being judged. For criminal defend-
ants, the right to an attorney is the most fundamental right because it is 
the one that makes all other rights meaningful. If defense lawyers fail to 
seize the opportunities afforded by the lay judge reform, it will likely end 
in disappointment. Rights are rarely bequeathed by benevolent author-
ities; they emerge out of experience with injustice, and getting them 
recognized requires that defense lawyers raise a little hell. If the ripples 
of the lay judge reform do continue to spread, then the common sense 
of citizens could help correct the tendency of judges to see “the awful 
court of judgment” as their own familiar workshop—and defense law-
yers may realize they are no longer “talking to a wall.” This, anyway, is 
a scenario for the future that recognizes potential for change in Japanese 
capital punishment through the mechanism of citizen participation. Time 
will tell more. The final chapter of this book explores how public opin-
ion and politics could shape Japanese capital punishment in the years 
to come.
48 G. K. Chesterton, “The Twelve Men,” in Tremendous Trifles (1909).
49 Segi Hiroshi, Zetsubo no Saibansho (Kodansha Gendai Shinsho, 2014).
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Abstract  Many people in Japan argue that for abolition or signifi-
cant death penalty reform to occur, public discussion (giron) must first 
change public opinion. This belief is misleading, because public opinion 
about capital punishment in Japan is rooted in moral intuitions about 
retribution and atonement that are largely impervious to rational discus-
sion, and because death penalty abolitions and moratoria are invariably 
caused by political leadership from the front, not by changes in public 
perception. Claims that capital punishment reflects “democracy-at-work” 
are similarly simplistic because “democracy” means more than majority 
rule. If the abolition of capital punishment does occur in Japan, it will 
probably have several positive consequences for Japanese criminal justice 
and society.
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Why would an abolitionist Minister of Justice order executions? Chiba 
Keiko was the first of eight people to serve as Minister of Justice while 
the Democratic Party of Japan controlled Japan’s central government 
between August 2009 and December 2012. She held the post for one 
year, and she was one of three DPJ Ministers to authorize executions. In 
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July 2010, she ordered the hanging of two men, Shinozawa Kazuo, who 
was convicted of killing six persons, and Ogata Hidenori, who was con-
victed of killing two. In addition to signing their death warrants, Chiba 
attended their hangings at the gallows in Tokyo, something no modern 
Minister had done, and she permitted a few select journalists to view the 
Tokyo gallows when not in operation—a sharp break from the custom-
ary secrecy that shrouds executions in Japan. Then Chiba established a 
“Study Group about the State of Capital Punishment” in her Ministry 
of Justice, which released a report of its findings in March 2012 that 
included little information about the reality of execution.
These actions by Chiba—particularly the executions she ordered—
attracted much attention, especially from fellow abolitionists, many of 
whom believe she betrayed the cause of abolition. Some of her critics—
lawyers, politicians, and members of NGOs—expressed anger and 
dismay. In their view, Chiba accomplished nothing positive by ordering 
the executions, she violated her own beliefs about human rights and the 
sanctity of life, she greased the wheels of the machinery of death for her 
DPJ successors (two of whom would authorize executions in 2012), and 
she set back the cause of death penalty reform, which the DPJ said it was 
committed to in the campaign that culminated in its landslide victory in 
the summer 2009 election.
In 2016, Chiba provided her most detailed explanation for the exe-
cutions that she ordered.1 It is the third explanation she has given, and 
it is the clearest. In the previous two explanations—an essay in the Asahi 
newspaper, and an interview in an NHK documentary—Chiba’s words 
reminded me of George Orwell’s observation that “The great enemy 
of clear language is insincerity.”2 I do not know why Chiba’s third 
account is clearer, but I have two hunches. For one, repetition some-
times improves the clarity of an explanation (ask a teacher or preacher). 
For another, Horikawa Keiko, who conducted the interview of Chiba in 
2016, is a master journalist who possesses a knack for telling interesting 
stories. Whatever the reasons, Chiba should be commended for (finally) 
1 Chiba Keiko, interviewed by Horikawa Keiko, “‘Naze Shikko’ no Toi o Kakaete” 
[“Engaging the Question of ‘Why I Executed’”], Sekai, March 2016, pp. 160–170.
2 Chiba Keiko, “Shikko no Shomei wa Watashi Narino Koishi: Shikei - Nayami Fukaki 
Mori”, Asahi Shimbun, November 20, 2010; and “Shikei Shikko: Homu Daijin no Kunou” 
(NHK ETV Tokushu, broadcast on February 27, 2011).
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explaining why she authorized the hangings in 2010. She could have 
hidden behind silence and platitudes, as most Ministers of Justice do 
when it comes to capital punishment, and as most prosecutors and poli-
ticians do too. Here is what we learn from her interview with Horikawa.
 1.  Chiba’s main reason for authorizing the executions in 2010 was to 
stimulate “public discussion” (giron) about capital punishment in 
Japan.
 2.  Chiba planned to authorize executions from the moment she 
accepted the Minister of Justice job in September 2009, some ten 
months before the hangings occurred.
 3.  Chiba does not believe the executions she authorized actually 
advanced public discussion.
 4.  Chiba does not believe the executions served victims or the cause 
of justice.
 5.  Officials in the Ministry of Justice did not pressure Chiba to sign 
the death warrants.
 6.  Chiba believes many officials in the Ministry of Justice oppose 
capital punishment or feel ambivalent about it.
 7.  Before the 2010 executions, Chiba asked officials in the Ministry 
for information about the reality of hanging, but they refused to 
give it to her.
 8.  Ministry of Justice officials did not try to dissuade Chiba from 
attending the two hangings she authorized.
 9.  The executions Chiba observed were so “cruel” and “hideous” 
that she finds them difficult to describe.
 10.  Chiba believes Japan is slowly moving toward the abolition of cap-
ital punishment.
All of these assertions are interesting, but I shall focus on the first, for 
Chiba’s belief that executions would promote “public discussion” (giron) 
about capital punishment is surely the main point of her interview. 
Indeed, the term “public discussion” occurs 29 times in its 11 pages. 
The frequent repetition of this expression and its appearance in key 
parts of the text (including the subtitle of the article and the first section 
heading) reflects Chiba’s core conviction that for significant death pen-
alty reform to occur, public discussion must first change public opinion. 
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This belief is widely shared in Japan,3 but it is misleading in at least three 
ways, as the following section shows.4
on Public oPinion and caPital Punishment
First, more than 140 countries have abolished the death penalty in law 
or have gone more than ten years in a row without an execution, yet in 
none of these countries did the change result from majority public opin-
ion pushing for reform. There are few iron laws in socio-legal studies, 
but this may be one: when executions cease or the death penalty disap-
pears, the primary proximate cause is leadership by political elites, despite 
public support for capital punishment at the time of the reform.5 This 
pattern of “leadership from the front” suggests that efforts to convince 
a majority of Japanese people to oppose capital punishment are probably 
doomed to fail. In this sense, public education campaigns are a hollow 
hope—though of course they are not irrelevant. Their primary value is 
their influence on the views of elite decision-makers, who are the actors 
with the practical ability to secure abolition or a moratorium. Still, the 
main lesson from the rest of the world is that “the straightest road to 
abolition” often involves “bypassing public opinion entirely.”6 A paral-
lel lesson can be learned from Japan’s closest cousins, South Korea and 
Taiwan, both of which have experienced moratoria on executions in 
recent years (Taiwan from 2006 through 2009, and South Korea from 
1998 to the present). In both countries, the cessation of executions 
had “little to do with public opinion, which generally favors retaining 
the death penalty.”7 Executions ceased primarily because political leaders 
wanted to stop this form of state killing.
5 Franklin E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment (Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 17–26.
6 Andrew Hammel, Ending the Death Penalty: The European Experience in Global 
Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 236.
7 Sangmin Bae, “International Norms, Domestic Politics, and the Death Penalty: 
Comparing Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1, p. 41.
3 See, for example, Sato Mai, “Yoron to Iu Shinwa: Nozomu no wa ‘Shikei’ Desu ka”, 
Sekai, March 2016, pp. 183–191.
4 See also David T. Johnson, “Shikei no ‘Giron’ e no Gimon: Chiba moto Homu Daijin 
e no Intabyu o Megutte” [on the Interview of Former Minister of Justice Chiba Keiko in 
the March 2016 Issue of Sekai], Sekai, No. 882 (May 2016), pp. 228–235 (translated by 
Naoko Iwakawa and Makoto Ibusuki).
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A second stubborn fact is that public support for capital punishment 
in Japan is rooted in sentiments about retribution and atonement.8 As 
a result, the belief that death is deserved for certain heinous offenders 
is more a matter of emotion and intuition than reason or evidence. In 
this context, providing more information about capital punishment 
is unlikely to alter habits of the heart, for humans are adept at ignor-
ing contrary evidence and discounting or denying its significance.9 On 
hot-button issues such as capital punishment and immigration, facts can 
even be counter-productive, for research shows that the smarter a person 
is, the greater his or her ability to rationalize discordant information.10 
When people take the trouble to think about capital punishment at all, 
they often engage in post hoc justification, which tends to reinforce their 
bedrock beliefs in retribution and atonement.
Third, changing public opinion about capital punishment is always 
difficult and sometimes impossible. In a 1972 decision (Furman v. 
Georgia), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall famously 
stressed the importance of public opinion in settling questions about 
the constitutionality of capital punishment under the “cruel and unu-
sual” clause of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Marshall made three 
connected claims: (a) most Americans lack knowledge about capital pun-
ishment; (b) the more Americans learn about capital punishment, the 
less they will support it; and (c) commitments to capital punishment that 
are rooted in retribution are especially difficult to change. In a subse-
quent death penalty opinion (Gregg v. Georgia in 1976), Justice Marshall 
stated that if the American people were better informed about capital 
punishment, “they would find it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.” 
In his view, the key question about capital punishment is not whether 
8 See, for example, Mari Kita and David T. Johnson, “Framing Capital Punishment in 
Japan: Avoidance, Ambivalence, and Atonement”, Asian Journal of Criminology, Vol. 9, 
No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 221–240. See also Mai Sato, The Death Penalty in Japan: 
Will the Public Tolerate Abolition? (Springer VS, 2014); and Hamai Koichi’s book review 
in Social Science Japan Journal (January 2015), pp. 103–106 (arguing that “there is an 
extremely deep-rooted belief in Japan that criminals should receive heavy penalties”).
9 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion (Pantheon, 2012).
10 Tali Sharot, The Influential Mind: What the Brain Reveals About Our Power to Change 
Others (Henry Holt, 2017).
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“a substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, 
opine that [it] is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to 
be so in light of all information presently available” (emphasis added). 
The Marshall Hypothesis (as it came to be called) has been the subject 
of much study, and results are “decidedly mixed.”11 In some studies of 
American attitudes, more information about capital punishment does not 
lead to more distaste for it. In other studies, information alters opinion 
for a while, but opinion eventually rebounds back to its original posi-
tion. In still other studies, information persuades some people to become 
more opposed to capital punishment while persuading others to become 
more supportive of it. Research has also been done to explore the rele-
vance of the Marshall hypothesis in Japan. In one study, when Japanese 
citizens were given information about capital punishment and allowed 
to deliberate with other people about the issue, 11 out of 50 partici-
pants shifted their support from retention to abolition, while 9 of the 
50 changed their attitude in the opposite direction.12 More research is 
needed, but this finding suggests that “public discussion” (giron) may do 
little to alter overall support for capital punishment.
Before Japan’s lay judge reform took effect in 2009, some analysts 
predicted that the new trial system would result in fewer death sentences, 
because citizens on lay judge panels would be forced to think deeply 
about the death penalty, and because (some prognosticators supposed) 
the harder citizens thought about it, the more reluctant they would be 
to support it.13 As explained in Chapter 5, this has not happened. In 
fact, since 2009, lay judge panels have actually been substantially more 
likely to impose a sentence of death when prosecutors seek one than 
panels of three professional judges were in the homicide trial system 
that operated until 2009.14 The Marshall hypothesis also receives little 
14 Takeda Masahiro, “Genbatsuka no Ippo de Yuyo Oku”, Kyoto Shimbun, March 23, 
2019, p. 6.
11 Carol Steiker, “The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited”, Howard Law Journal (2009), 
pp. 525–558.
12 Mai Sato, The Death Penalty in Japan: Will the Public Tolerate Abolition? (Springer VS, 
2014), pp. 157–180.
13 Leah Ambler, “The People Decide: The Effect of the Introduction of the Quasi-
Jury System (Saiban-in Seido) on the Death Penalty in Japan”, Northwestern Journal of 
International Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Fall 2008), pp. 1–23.
6 THE DEATH PENALTY AND DEMOCRACY  107
support in America, where 80 percent of the citizens who serve as capital 
jurors do not change their mind about capital punishment, and where 
those who do change their mind are actually more likely to become more 
supportive of capital punishment than to become more opposed to it. In 
short, there is little empirical support for the premise about “public dis-
cussion” (giron) that motivated Minister of Justice Chiba Keiko to order 
executions in the summer of 2010.
Ironically, the strongest support for the Marshall hypothesis is found 
among the judges on the U.S. Supreme Court where Justice Thurgood 
Marshall served. Several American Justices who started their careers on 
the U.S. Supreme Court supporting capital punishment converted to 
anti-death penalty views after serving many years and considering many 
capital appeals.15 Most notably, Justices Lewis Powell, John Paul Stevens, 
and Potter Stewart voted in favor of capital punishment in a 1976 case 
(Gregg v. Georgia) that helped restart America’s machinery of death 
after the country had gone nearly ten years without an execution. By 
the end of their tenures on the bench—after many years of applying the 
American jurisprudence of “super due process” and after the discovery 
of “capital error” in numerous death penalty cases—all three came to 
conclude that it is impossible to administer the death penalty in a man-
ner that is consistent with the protections promised by American law. As 
Justice Powell remarked after his retirement, whatever attractions capital 
punishment might have in principle, its actual practice “serves no useful 
purpose and brings discredit on the whole legal system.”16 Other Justices 
on the U.S. Supreme Court have learned a similar lesson: to love the 
law is to hate capital punishment.17 Indeed, the growing recognition that 
supports for capital punishment is inconsistent with respect for law has 
led some American observers to predict that eventually the U.S. Supreme 
Court will “conclude that capital punishment and the promise of due 
process of law are incompatible”.18
15 Evan J. Mandery, A Wild Justice: The Death and Resurrection of Capital Punishment in 
America (W. W. Norton, 2013), pp. 432–440.
16 Quoted in Kathleen A. O’Shea, Women and the Death Penalty in the United States, 
1900–1998 (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), p. 29.
17 Austin Sarat, When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition 
(Princeton University Press, 2001).
18 Scott Turow, Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing with the Death 
Penalty (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p. 114.
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In contrast to the United States, there are three reasons why conver-
sion against capital punishment seems unlikely to occur among Justices 
on Japan’s Supreme Court. For one, persons appointed to that Court 
tend to be more conservative and less ideologically diverse than their 
counterparts in America.19 For another, Justices on Japan’s Supreme 
Court serve much shorter terms than American Justices do—an average 
of 6 years in Japan compared with 26 years in the United States. As a 
result, Justices in Japan encounter fewer capital cases—and fewer occa-
sions to find flaws in the way capital punishment is administered. Most 
fundamentally, since death is not “different” in Japanese law, and since 
“super due process” is not a legal requirement, error is seldom recog-
nized in capital cases (see Chapter 2). By contrast, capital cases have 
occupied one-quarter to one-half of all state criminal cases on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s docket in recent years, and nearly half of American 
death sentences never result in execution because they are reversed on 
appeal for prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, 
flawed jury instructions, and a host of other errors. In this comparative 
light, Japanese jurisprudence seems to reflect a perverse principle, that 
if law aims low in death penalty cases, judges and the general public will 
seldom be disappointed.
Two Qualifications
Although “public discussion” (giron) does not drive death penalty 
reform, this truth must be qualified in two ways. First, the limited impor-
tance of public discussion does not mean the Japanese state should 
continue withholding information about capital punishment from its 
citizens, especially in an era when citizens are being asked to make life 
and death decisions in lay judge trials. As many former lay judges have 
observed, for saibanin to carry out their responsibilities properly, the 
Ministry of Justice must provide citizens with “all relevant informa-
tion.”20 As explained in Chapter 3, the secrecy surrounding executions 
in Japan is deeply disconcerting. It is also more rooted in discretion than 
19 J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence: The 
Political Economy of Judging in Japan (University of Chicago Press, 2003).
20 See for example, former lay judge Taguchi Masayoshi, “Shikei to Mukiau Shimin: 
Saibanin Handan no Hatsushikko o Ukete”, Sekai, March 2016, pp. 194–199.
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law. Officials in the Ministry of Justice (the main architects and enforcers 
of this secrecy policy) can and should remove this wart from Japan’s body 
politic. The Japanese public deserves more information about how the 
death penalty is administered even if increased public oversight of execu-
tions will not end them, and even if increased transparency is unlikely to 
change many minds about the propriety of capital punishment. Increased 
openness is the right thing to do.
The second qualification is that education about the death penalty is 
not completely futile. As mentioned above, it is most effective when it 
is directed at the political elites who hold the fate of capital punishment 
in their hands. The best scholarly work on this subject finds that “the 
death penalty is always and everywhere an exercise of state power.”21 
In this sense, the trajectory of capital punishment is mainly determined 
by political actors and political processes. The cultural shifts that mat-
ter most are those that will influence the attitudes and beliefs of elites 
(politicians, bureaucrats, and business and legal professionals), by gen-
erating discourse among them, by weakening the intensity of support 
among those who favor retention, and by strengthening the intensity of 
opposition among those who favor abolition. To the extent that “pub-
lic discussion” shapes elite opinion in these ways, it can contribute to 
death penalty reform. Chiba Keiko seemed to recognize this when she 
advocated the creation of an organ in Parliament to gather and discuss 
information about the death penalty. Unfortunately, she also saw political 
action as causally subordinate to “public discussion.” Evidence from the 
rest of the world suggests that she got the dynamic backward.
on democracy
In sum, belief that “public discussion” (giron) will produce death pen-
alty reform contradicts three hard facts. Public opinion about the death 
penalty is difficult to change in every society. Public opinion about the 
death penalty in Japan is rooted in moral intuitions about retribution 
and atonement that are largely impervious to rational discussion. And in 
other countries, death penalty abolitions and moratoria have been caused 
by leadership from the front, not by changes in public opinion. But if 
21 David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition 
(The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 127.
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public discussion in Japan seems unlikely to lead to the end of capital 
punishment, what hope is there for abolition? Is “leadership from the 
front” undemocratic or even anti-democratic?
Richard Posner, a prominent federal judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago (who retired from the bench 
in 2017) and the most cited American legal scholar of all time, claims that 
the main reason America retains capital punishment long after the devel-
oped democracies of Europe abolished it is because America is “more 
democratic.”22 In his view, American government is permeated with pol-
itics, and elected officials find it more necessary to implement policies 
supported by a majority of voters than do their elected counterparts in 
countries without an American-style “hyper-democracy” that stresses local 
decision-making, popular participation, and electoral accountability. Other 
analysts also conclude that America’s “radically local version of democ-
racy” helps explain the persistence of capital punishment in the United 
States and the “peculiar” forms it takes in many American places.23
In Japan, too, prosecutors, politicians, and the public frequently claim 
that capital punishment is simply an expression of democracy at work.24 
On this view, death sentences and executions are the natural result of 
majority support for capital punishment. On this view, the death penalty 
is democratically ordained. And in the context of public support for capi-
tal punishment, to oppose it is to defy a central imperative of democratic 
governance.
Claims that capital punishment reflects “democracy-at-work” are sim-
plistic and misleading, both empirically and theoretically. Empirically, elec-
torates are not well-informed about many political issues, and elections 
seldom produce governments that are responsive to what (uninformed) 
voters say they want.25 What is more, research about “who rules?” 
22 Richard Posner, “Capital Crimes”, The New Republic, April 1, 2002, p. 32.
23 See, for example, David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age 
of Abolition (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), p. 309; and Andrew Hammel, 
Ending the Death Penalty: The European Experience in Global Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), especially Chapter 8, “Why the European Model Failed in the United States”.
24 Several such claims are discussed in Nempo Shikei Haishi 2017, Popyurizumu to Shikei 
(Impakuto, 2017), pp. 5–64; and in Mai Sato, The Death Penalty in Japan: Will the Public 
Tolerate Abolition? (Springer VS, 2014).
25 Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do 
Not Produce Responsive Governments (Princeton University Press, 2017).
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in democratic countries finds that the views of average people are seldom 
decisive in policymaking. In the United States, for example, one study 
tracked how well the preferences of the public and of various groups pre-
dicted the ways that Congress and the executive branch would act on 
1779 policies over a two-decade period. It found that economic elites and 
narrow interest groups succeeded in getting their favored policies about 
half the time, and they succeeded in stopping legislation to which they 
were opposed nearly all the time. In contrast, mass-based interest groups 
had little effect on public policy, while the views of ordinary citizens had 
virtually no effect at all. As the authors of this study concluded, “When 
the preferences of economic elites and the stands of organized interest 
groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear 
to have only a miniscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact 
upon public policy.”26 In Japan as well, organized interest groups and 
economic elites continue to shape public policy even after the basic rules 
of the political game have changed.27
The main theoretical problem with “democracy at work” claims is 
that “democracy” means more than majority rule. In fact, there are at 
least four ways in which “democracy” and the death penalty are related, 
because democracy can be representative, participatory, legal, or liberal. 
In representative democracy, death penalty policy reflects what citizens 
want, as indicated in elections, public opinion polls, and other expres-
sions of public sentiment. In participatory democracy, the administration 
of the death penalty allows citizens to perform certain roles in the crim-
inal process, as witnesses, as victims and survivors with a stake in case 
outcomes, and as lay judges who make life-and-death decisions at trial. 
In legal democracy, the death penalty aims to advance the rule of law by 
deterring murder and by being administered in a manner that is fair, just, 
and accurate. And in liberal democracy, criminal punishment is supposed 
to advance values such as dignity, liberty, equality, and the right to life.28
26 Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, 
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens”, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 
2014), pp. 564–581.
27 Matthew Carlson, Money Politics in Japan: New Rules, Old Practices (Lynne Rienner, 
2007).
28 This analysis relies on the fine work of Maximo Langer and David Alan Sklansky, editors, 
Prosecutors and Democracy: A Cross-National Study (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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As guides for thinking about what democracy requires, these four 
themes can be seen as different “strands” of democracy that could be 
tied together in various ways (some thicker than others), or they may 
be seen as different “lodestars” for guiding the death penalty toward 
democracy. In either case, discussions of the relationship between 
democracy and the death penalty in Japan have long been dominated 
by a narrow understanding of “democracy” that stresses its representa-
tive and participatory dimensions while marginalizing its legal and liberal 
ones. In most discussions, prosecutors, judges, lay judges, and victims 
are expected to participate in the death penalty system as representatives 
who are responsive to public opinion, but little is said about the rele-
vance of legal and liberal values. In this constricted view of democracy, 
legal values such as fairness and due process get discounted or ignored, 
as do liberal values such as human dignity and the right to life. A richer 
understanding of democracy and the death penalty would not marginal-
ize these legal and liberal values. It would recognize that many of Japan’s 
core values are legal and liberal, and it would acknowledge that the death 
penalty often undermines them. A richer understanding would also real-
ize that there is wisdom in moving beyond the “tough on crime” (gen-
batsuka) rhetoric that characterizes the culture of capital punishment 
in Japan, in order to be “smart on crime” (as discussed in Chapter 1, 
the death penalty does not deter homicide), and in order to respect the 
rights and dignity of all human beings—even those who have committed 
terrible crimes.29
The abolitions that have occurred in other developed democracies 
have expressed democratic values—including respect for human rights. 
I admire former Japanese Minister of Justice Chiba Keiko, who author-
ized the executions in 2010, but in some ways she has misunderstood 
the relationship between democracy and death penalty reform—as have 
many other leaders in Japanese society. Chiba is continuing the strug-
gle to abolish capital punishment, and I believe that, eventually, her side 
will prevail. After abolition, public support for capital punishment in 
Japan will probably decline (as it typically does after a country abolishes), 
Japanese lay judges will no longer be required to make life-and-death 
decisions, and Japanese victims and survivors will no longer feel the need 
29 For an eloquent defense of the right to life in the context of capital punishment, see 
Yasuda Yoshihiro, Shikei Bengonin: Ikiru to Iu Kenri (Kodansha, 2008).
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to beg state officials to kill the offenders who have caused their suffering. 
But until the day of abolition arrives, Japan’s leaders need to confront 
a question that is as fundamental as it has been neglected: Is a reform 
which permanently deprives a state of the legal authority to kill its own 
citizens undemocratic?
the JaPanese military and state killing
For most people most of the time, politics is less a matter of thinking 
deeply about democracy than it is a matter of social identity and partisan 
loyalty.30 Once this fact is recognized, politics can be seen as a parade of 
symbols and abstractions, and a political analysis will consider how peo-
ple are placated and aroused by capital punishment.
In Japan, one overlooked aspect of death penalty symbolism is its rela-
tion to national defense. Democracy in Japan differs from democracy in 
other industrial nations because, in several respects, the Japanese state 
lacks authority to use military power and martial policies.31 Japan’s post-
war occupation created a government that is pacifist by constitutional 
promise (Article 9), pledged neither to threaten force nor use force in 
international disputes. Of course, Japan’s Self Defense Forces are among 
the most technologically advanced armed forces in the world, and in 
2018 the nation’s aggregate military expenditures were the ninth high-
est in the world (just behind Germany and just ahead of South Korea). 
But when it feels threatened by hostile forces, Japan’s constitutional 
commitment to pacifism removes an important means of governmen-
tal assertiveness. For a conservative government, this pacifism in mil-
itary matters probably feels uncomfortably close to impotence. The 
restrictions on state killing imposed by Article 9 also help explain why 
Japan’s conservative governments seem determined to carry out execu-
tions every year. The constraints of Article 9 make capital punishment a 
symbol of government power that the country’s conservative leaders 
30 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion (Pantheon, 2012).
31 Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power (Harvard University 
Press, 2019).
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seem loathe to relinquish, for to them it is a potent symbol of state 
sovereignty and of the proper relationship between the state and its 
subjects.32
Death sentences and executions in Japan declined steadily from 
the 1950s through the 1980s, but starting in the 1990s, the LDP put 
increased emphasis on capital punishment as an instrument of govern-
ment, partly because of the absence of other martial options during a 
period in which many people (inside Japan and out) were calling on 
the country to develop a more assertive military posture in order to 
deal with new threats, such as the rise of China and the provocations of 
North Korea. Ironically, if the current LDP under Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzo succeeds in establishing a legal foundation for Japan’s military to 
be more assertive abroad, conservative governments in the future may 
feel less compelled to promote the symbolic politics of capital punish-
ment at home. There are countries (such as Costa Rica, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein) that are pacifist both in military matters and with respect 
to capital punishment, but they are all significantly smaller than Japan, 
and they are far less influential internationally. None of them has a his-
tory of militarism anything like Japan’s effort to create a “Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in the first half of the twentieth century, 
and most of them abolished the death penalty before they renounced 
the use of military force. No country as large and powerful as Japan has 
relinquished both the authority to use military force and the authority 
to use capital punishment. In this sense, Article 9 could be an obstacle 
to abolition in Japan. With respect to state killing, Japan is the mirror 
image of large countries in Europe (such as Germany and France) that 
retain the right to use military force while renouncing the right to use 
capital punishment. Time will tell how much longer Japan retains this 
distinctive status. For the time being, some Japan-watchers will con-
tinue to wonder why the Japanese state is permitted to kill its own cit-
izens while it is forbidden to kill foreigners who threaten the nation’s 
peace and welfare.
32 David T. Johnson and Franklin E. Zimring, The Next Frontier: National Development, 
Political Change, and the Death Penalty in Asia (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 82–84.
6 THE DEATH PENALTY AND DEMOCRACY  115
imagining abolition
Although the length of the struggle to end capital punishment in Japan 
is not known, the outcome seems inevitable in any but the most pes-
simistic view of the country’s future. What circumstances could push 
Japan toward abolition? Let us imagine two possibilities.
One precipitating cause of abolition could be the clear revelation of a 
wrongful execution. Wrongful executions were a proximate cause of abo-
lition in Britain in 1965, and in Japan following four death row exoner-
ations in the 1980s, a moratorium on executions ensued for 40 months, 
from November 1989 to March 1993. But this route to abolition is far 
from certain, for there was widespread political and public apathy about 
the risks of wrongful execution after Hakamada Iwao was released from 
death row in 2014, some 46 years after he was condemned to death. 
Hakamada’s case suggests that even a wrongful execution might result in 
little political resolve to end capital punishment—or even to substantially 
reform it. Moreover, prosecutors’ resistance to a retrial for Hakamada 
suggests that they may be willing to deny strong evidence of a wrongful 
execution if and when it emerges. When power and rationality collide in 
a legal system, power usually prevails.33
A second scenario is that abolition in the United States could stim-
ulate abolition in Japan. The retention of capital punishment in the 
world’s most influential democracy has long helped to legitimate cap-
ital punishment in democracies such as Japan, Taiwan, and India. And 
some analysts believe a nation-wide American abolition could occur in 
the near future. Professors Carol and Jordan Steiker suggest that “the 
death penalty will not last much longer in the United States,” mainly 
because many Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have renounced cap-
ital punishment after repeatedly seeing their efforts fail to regulate it in 
a manner that is consistent with the principles and promises of the U.S. 
Constitution.34 Similarly, Professor Brandon Garrett has concluded that 
American capital punishment “is at the end of its rope.” He believes 
it could be abolished “not in a matter of generations, but in a matter 
33 Bent Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice (University of Chicago 
Press, 1998).
34 Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death: The Supreme Court and 
Capital Punishment (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), pp. 4–5.
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of years.”35 And in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Glossip v. Gross decision 
(2015), Justice Stephen Breyer (joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg) 
stated that he believes it is “highly likely that the death penalty violates 
the Eighth Amendment” of the U.S. Constitution (prohibiting “cruel 
and unusual punishment”), because of three constitutional defects in its 
administration: unreliability in fact-finding, arbitrariness in application, 
and long delays between death sentences and executions that undermine 
the death penalty’s main penological purposes (deterrence and retribu-
tion). Because of these chronic problems, Breyer called for a full briefing 
before the U.S. Supreme Court on the question of whether American 
capital punishment violates the Constitution. If such a briefing occurs 
before a Court with one more member who has serious concerns about 
the constitutionality of capital punishment than is the case at the time 
of this writing (July 2019), then American capital punishment could be 
abolished judicially, with repercussions for Japan and other retentionist 
nations who will have lost their American cover for a practice that has 
become increasingly difficult to defend in an era of human rights.
Regardless of the precipitating circumstance, abolition in Japan will 
occur only if elites push for it. Since conservatives have ruled the coun-
try for all but 3 of the last 64 years, we may wonder whether it is realistic 
to expect a conversion of this kind. Why would conservative policymak-
ers embrace facts (about deterrence and wrongful convictions) they once 
shunned and adopt a position (abolition) they once abhorred, especially 
when changing minds on this subject is so difficult? Yet evidence from the 
United States, where many conservative leaders have turned against mass 
incarceration and capital punishment, suggests that the right circumstances 
could produce real reform in Japan too.36 One key to the conservative turn 
in America has been a major decline in crime over the past quarter-cen-
tury, which made it easier for politicians to support “right on crime” pol-
icies instead of posturing as “tough on crime.” In Japan, crime has been 
declining for more than a decade, and a once troubling turn toward penal 
35 Brandon Garret, End of Its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can Revive Criminal 
Justice (Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 1.
36 See, for example, David Dagan and Steven M. Teles, Prison Break: Why Conservatives 
Turned Against Mass Incarceration (Oxford University Press, 2016); and George F. Will, 
“Against the Death Penalty”, Washington Post, September 28, 2018.
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populism has decelerated as incarceration rates have fallen.37 Time will tell 
more, but the decline of crime in what is already one of the world’s saf-
est societies could eventually prompt some of the country’s conservative 
leaders to embrace “human rights” as a better frame for thinking about 
capital punishment in the twenty-first century than were the “crime con-
trol” and “atonement” frames that they routinely employed in previous 
decades.38
life after death
Let us also imagine what could change in Japan after capital punish-
ment is abolished. This exercise will not only highlight several incentives 
for abolition; it will reveal some of the effects capital punishment has 
on other parts of Japan’s criminal process. In terms of caseloads, capi-
tal punishment is a tiny part of Japan’s criminal justice system. Less than 
1 percent of all homicide offenders are sentenced to death, and homi-
cide comprises less than 1/1000th of all Penal Code offenses. But cap-
ital punishment in Japan attracts far more attention and has many more 
consequences than its small size seems to warrant. Its disappearance 
could have at least four positive consequences for Japanese criminal jus-
tice, in addition to one consequence that could present a challenge for 
progressives.39
First, the death penalty in Japan promotes the practice of using extreme 
penal sanctions as status rewards for crime victims and their families. This 
serves a public relations function for capital punishment, by reducing the 
discomfort of citizens who worry about the state’s power to kill. And ped-
agogically, the emphasis on punishment as a status reward for victims also 
implies that the more punishment is administered, the better off victims 
will be. The use of punishment as a status reward leads ever upward: it 
37 David T. Johnson, “Comparative Reflections on American Crime Declines”, Berkeley 
Journal of Criminal Law, Issue 23-3 (Fall 2018), pp. 25–45.
38 Mari Kita and David T. Johnson, “Framing Capital Punishment in Japan: Avoidance, 
Ambivalence, and Atonement”, Asian Journal of Criminology, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 
2014), pp. 221–240.
39 This analysis builds on the fine insights about life after the death penalty in the United 
States made by Brandon L. Garrett in End of Its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can 
Revive Criminal Justice (Harvard University Press, 2017), pp. 212–260.
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is a one-way penal escalator.40 If 5 years is good, 10 years must be better, 
and 15 years must be better still. In this way, when criminal punishment is 
employed as a symbolic currency, the sky is the limit. If Japan abolishes the 
death penalty, this impulse toward penal inflation would probably decline.
Second, Japan’s death penalty provides moral camouflage for other 
harsh criminal punishments—especially for the increasingly frequent 
practice of not releasing inmates who have been sentenced to an indef-
inite term of imprisonment (muki choeki). Japan does not have the 
penalty of life without parole, but in practice, persons sentenced to life 
with the possibility of parole serve extremely long sentences. As of the 
end of 2015, 1835 persons were serving a life sentence, which was 15 
times more than the number of persons detained on Japan’s death rows. 
Almost half of those “lifers” were over age 60, and 12 had been in prison 
for more than 50 years. For the past decade, fewer than 10 persons 
under a life sentence have been released on parole each year.41 In real-
ity, then, a life sentence in Japan often means “life without parole.” If 
death disappeared as a sentencing option in Japan, a life sentence would 
be seen for what it is: an extremely severe criminal sanction. And with-
out Japan’s punishment ceiling set at death, parole might become a more 
realistic possibility for persons under a life sentence, and fewer citizens 
and survivors would have reason to complain that the non-capital sen-
tence some heinous offender received is insufficiently severe.
Third, capital punishment in Japan diverts legal and judicial resources 
from the scrutiny of other criminal punishments and exercises of state 
power. Every nation has a limited number of lawyers with the political val-
ues and special skills required to defend against government excess in the 
prohibition of conduct and the punishment of crime. And in nations that 
retain capital punishment, the ultimate penalty is a magnet for lawyers con-
cerned with excessive governmental power. In Japan, the criminal defense 
bar is small, and lawyers with this commitment are few and far between. 
When a significant proportion of the country’s best attorneys concentrate 
40 Franklin E. Zimring and David T. Johnson, “The Dark at the Top of the Stairs: Four 
Destructive Influences of Capital Punishment on American Criminal Justice”, in Joan 
Peterselia and Kevin R. Reitz, editors, The Oxford Handbook of Sentencing and Corrections 
(Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 737–752.
41 Kanji Muramatsu, David T. Johnson, and Koiti Yano, “The Death Penalty and 
Homicide Deterrence in Japan”, Punishment & Society, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October 2018), 
p. 436 and p. 452.
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on capital punishment, the result is a shortage of resources to monitor 
how state authority is exercised in other realms. Few informed observers 
believe Japan’s bar performs adequately as a watchdog over state power 
(the task is large and the bar is small). Abolition of capital punishment 
would enable more progressive “cause lawyers” to confront criminal, con-
stitutional, and regulatory issues where their help is sorely needed.42
Fourth, the end of capital punishment could bring political benefits 
to Japan, both domestically and internationally. At home, debates about 
criminal justice policy are frequently distorted by the power of capital pun-
ishment to command public attention and political concern. The abolition 
of capital punishment would eliminate this distortion and enable more fre-
quent assessments of other criminal justice problems, such as the power of 
police, the discretion of prosecutors, and the deference of judges to law 
enforcement. Abolition would also reduce tensions between Japan and its 
international peers, especially the rich and democratic countries of Europe, 
which frequently complain about Japan’s unwillingness to regard capital 
punishment as a human rights issue.43 And the disappearance of the death 
penalty would permit Japan to avoid claims of hypocrisy when it criticizes 
countries such as China and North Korea for their human rights failures. 
In the long run, the abolition of capital punishment in Japan could even 
change the nation’s self-conception, from that of a country and culture 
that are ambivalent about state killing (“no” to war but “yes” to capital 
punishment) to one that stands consistently in support of life.
Research shows that American states that abolish capital punish-
ment do not experience the “parade of horribles” that death penalty 
proponents predict. In the six American states that abolished between 
2007 and 2014, murder rates in general did not increase, and neither 
did murder rates of police officers and correctional officials who were 
killed in the line of duty.44 There is little reason to suppose murder 
42 Daniel H. Foote, “Cause Lawyering in Japan: Reflections on the Case Studies and 
Justice Reform”, in Patricia G. Steinhoff, editor, Going to Court to Change Japan: Social 
Movements and the Law in Contemporary Japan (University of Michigan Center for 
Japanese Studies, 2014), pp. 165–180.
43 Sangmin Bae, “Friends Do Not Let Friends Execute: The Council of Europe and the 
International Campaign to Abolish the Death Penalty”, International Politics, Vol. 45, No. 2 
(March 2008), pp. 129–145.
44 American Bar Association Committee on Capital Punishment, “Life After the Death 
Penalty: Implications for Retentionist States”, August 14, 2017, pp. 1–34, at https://files.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/Life-After-Death-Penalty_Transcript.pdf.
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rates in Japan would rise after abolition, but abolition could have another 
unwelcome effect, by removing the spotlight that capital punishment 
shines on the workings of Japanese criminal justice. Death is a special 
criminal sanction, even if Japanese courts are reluctant to recognize this 
as a matter of law. Its severity and its irrevocability evoke heightened 
concern about the possibility of justice miscarrying. One effect of cap-
ital punishment in Japan is public and media attention on problems in 
criminal justice that might otherwise escape notice. If death is abolished 
as a criminal sanction, Japanese progressives may need to find new ways 
to concentrate attention on the serious problems that afflict the crimi-
nal justice system more broadly. I believe abolition will eventually occur 
in Japan—and I hope concern about the country’s wrongful conviction 
problem will increase in the era of life after death.
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